
Grand Lodge Hall Ass'n. v. Moore
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-12-11 · cited 11×
This case involved fraternal and charitable organizations incorporated under Indiana's 1921 general act (ch. 246) that owned real estate rented for secular uses, with net income applied to authorized educational, religious, or charitable purposes; after a 1937 amendment limited tax exemptions to property exclusively occupied and used for those purposes, the organizations sought a declaratory judgment that the original act created a perpetual contractual exemption immune from impairment. The court affirmed judgment for the taxing officials, holding that the properties would lose their exemption after March 1, 1944, unless meeting the new use requirement. The core reasoning was that the 1921 statute was a general incorporation law whose text and context showed no clear legislative intent to form an irrevocable contract with the state, unlike special acts, and therefore the legislature could validly amend the exemption terms without violating state or federal contract clauses.
taxespropertybusiness & regulatory
Hilfiker v. Fennig
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-12-05 · cited 1×
This case involved a dispute over the probate of two conflicting wills executed by Henry Sheffer, where legatees under the later will contested the earlier will on revocation grounds, and the decedent's heirs intervened to challenge the validity of the first will on additional grounds such as undue influence and lack of capacity. The trial court excluded the heirs after they intervened, struck their cross-complaint, and proceeded to trial only on the revocation issue between the will beneficiaries. The court held that the heirs were proper parties to the will contest action and that excluding them was error, as the relevant statute permits additional parties beyond executors and beneficiaries and doing so allows all issues regarding both wills to be resolved efficiently in a single proceeding. The court further ruled that the clerk's and special judge's actions in probating the first will were a nullity due to the pending contest. The judgment was reversed with instructions to reinstate the heirs, frame issues for a comprehensive trial, and conduct further proceedings accordingly.
procedureproperty
Levick v. Hughlett Levick v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-11-26 · cited 11×
The case arose from an indirect civil contempt proceeding initiated by the original appellee to enforce payment on a judgment, which was later dismissed after full payment; the trial court then independently found the appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt for failing to personally appear on an earlier date and sentenced him to 48 hours in jail. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal as to the original appellee and substituted the State of Indiana as the appellee. The core reasoning was that the matter had converted into a criminal contempt action in which the State alone has an interest in defending the judgment, while the original appellee bears no responsibility or stake, and substitution ensures the appeal is not ex parte.
criminal lawprocedure
Levick v. Hughlett Levick v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-11-26 · cited 11×
The case arose from an indirect civil contempt proceeding initiated by the original appellee to enforce payment on a judgment, which was later dismissed after full payment; the trial court then independently found the appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt for failing to personally appear on an earlier date and sentenced him to 48 hours in jail. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal as to the original appellee and substituted the State of Indiana as the appellee. The core reasoning was that the matter had converted into a criminal contempt action in which the State alone has an interest in defending the judgment, while the original appellee bears no responsibility or stake, and substitution ensures the appeal is not ex parte.
criminal lawprocedure
Equitable Life Insurance Society v. Kellemen
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-11-08 · cited 6×
The case involved a beneficiary's claim under a group life insurance policy issued to an employer, covering an employee who was furloughed for military service and died in 1942. The policy required due proof of death before payment, but the beneficiary filed suit without providing such proof, and the insurer had removed the employee from coverage and received no further premiums. The trial court ruled that the insurer's denial of liability in its answer waived the proof requirement and entered judgment for the beneficiary after a jury verdict. The appellate court reversed, holding that a denial in the answer does not waive the contractual condition of submitting proof of death prior to commencing the action, as the policy language made receipt of proof necessary to mature the cause of action and authorities from other states supported that inconsistent or multiple defenses may be pleaded without creating a waiver. The court concluded that the insurer was entitled to a directed verdict due to the absence of any pre-suit proof or waiver.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Brown v. Brown
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-11-08 · cited 1×
In Brown v. Brown, the appellee filed a complaint for separation from bed and board under a 1903 statute and requested support for herself, their minor children, and attorney fees. The trial court issued interlocutory orders requiring the appellant to pay $10 per week for child support and $75 toward the appellee's attorney fees. The appellant challenged the court's jurisdiction to make such orders, arguing that the statute did not authorize interlocutory payments, that the act's title was insufficient, and that the special judge lacked authority to rule on fees previously addressed by another judge. The court rejected these claims, noting prior precedent allowing such orders, the continuing jurisdiction over support matters, and the absence of record support for procedural irregularities. The order was affirmed.
family lawprocedure
State Ex Rel. Reed v. Howard, Warden
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-10-31 · cited 6×
This case involved an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by an inmate who had been convicted of felonies in 1937 and 1942 and initially sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory. After serving part of his second sentence, he was transferred to the State Prison by order of the State Department of Public Welfare under a statute allowing such transfers at the agency's discretion for the inmate's welfare. The petitioner argued that the transfer was unconstitutional because it interfered with the court's sentencing authority and imposed greater stigma. The court affirmed the denial of the writ, holding that the legislature controls the place of imprisonment and may delegate decisions about transfers to administrative agencies as a non-judicial function. The opinion reasoned that the sentencing judge was aware of this delegated authority, that the transfer statute did not violate due process or state constitutional provisions, and that the agency's action was presumed reasonable absent contrary evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Giberson v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-10-31 · cited 2×
The case involved an appeal from a jury conviction for first degree burglary, where the appellant challenged the trial court's rulings on cross-examination and evidence admission, an instruction on accomplice testimony, and the suspension of the accomplice witness's sentence. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the judge's evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and did not improperly suggest the defendant's guilt to the jury. The accomplice instruction had been previously upheld as valid, and there was no record evidence of any sentence suspension that could be reviewed on appeal.
criminal law
Harris v. North Shore Discount Co.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-10-17
The case involved Walter Harris seeking an injunction against Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation to prevent it from deducting his wages to satisfy a judgment obtained by North Shore Discount Company against him as a guarantor. The complaint alleged that the judgment creditor had levied execution and that the steel company would deduct and pay over the wages unless restrained, but it did not establish that the steel company employed Harris or owed him wages. The court sustained the demurrer, ruling that the complaint failed to state a basis for equitable relief because Harris had an adequate remedy at law absent any showing that the defendant was insolvent. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
procedurelabor & employment
Evans v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-09-23 · cited 39×
The case involved appellant Evans, who was prosecuted on counts of grand larceny, second-degree burglary, and entering with felonious intent after an electric grinder, paint spray gun, and drill were stolen from a Terre Haute shop through a window on November 24-25, 1944. Tried without a jury, he was convicted only of grand larceny based on evidence of the break-in, footprints, the items' shipment by express to him in Decatur, Illinois, his sale attempt, and his post-arrest statement admitting possession while offering an implausible story of purchase. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the corpus delicti was independently established by physical evidence and that his exclusive, unexplained possession of the recently stolen property permitted an inference of guilt, even without crediting his statement. The acquittals on the other counts were not inconsistent, as felonious intent at entry was not required for the larceny finding.
criminal law
Blue v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-06-21 · cited 51×
The case involved a defendant charged with assault and battery for his actions during a labor picket line incident in 1944. The dissenting opinion argues that the conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered because the prosecuting attorney repeatedly injected extraneous and highly prejudicial matters into the trial, including accusations that the defendant and his witnesses were aiding the Axis powers and undermining the war effort. The core reasoning is that courts have an inherent duty to ensure a fair trial by preventing inflammatory arguments that shift the focus from the charged offense to unrelated issues like treason or patriotism, particularly in a wartime setting where community resentment was high, and that the trial court failed to control such conduct.
criminal lawlabor & employmentprocedure
County Board of Review of Assessments v. Kranz
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-06-07 · cited 6×
In this case, taxpayers in Hobart Township, Lake County, Indiana, petitioned for and obtained a re-assessment of all real estate in the township by the State Board of Tax Commissioners under state statutes. The township assessor completed the re-assessment, but other taxpayers secured a permanent injunction preventing the county board of review from examining those valuations, arguing that the process was arbitrary, lacked uniformity with statewide assessments from 1932, and violated due process. The defendants (the auditor and board of review) appealed the injunction. The court held that the injunction was improper and reversed the decree, instructing that the demurrer to the complaint be sustained. It reasoned that administrative review processes provided by statute must be exhausted before judicial intervention, that local re-assessments are authorized and constitutional without requiring a simultaneous statewide valuation, and that the statutes afforded adequate notice and hearing.
taxespropertyprocedure
Felix v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-06-05 · cited 1×
In Felix v. State, a jury convicted the 35-year-old appellant of assault and battery after finding that he unlawfully touched a 16-year-old boy in a movie theater while making indecent suggestions. The appellant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred by refusing several of his tendered jury instructions on topics such as the effect of an arrest or charge and the burden of proof. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim's testimony provided substantial evidence of an unlawful touching, the jury could properly consider the appellant's prior conviction, and the refused instructions were either adequately covered by other given instructions or correctly rejected because they misstated the standards for evaluating a testifying defendant's conduct.
criminal lawprocedure
State Ex Rel. Mavity v. Tyndall
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-05-24 · cited 46×
The case concerned whether a man acquitted of misdemeanors could force Indianapolis police officials to return or destroy his fingerprints, photographs, and other arrest records, including copies sent to state and federal agencies, and to stop displaying his photo in a public "rogues' gallery." The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a viable claim for injunctive relief limited to barring public exhibition of his photograph. The court reasoned that while police have broad administrative discretion to maintain identification records as part of routine operations authorized by statute, public display of an acquitted person's image alongside criminal records could implicate privacy interests warranting judicial protection, though mandatory destruction of fingerprints or other non-public records was not justified on the facts alleged.
criminal lawcivil rights
Peru Cemetery Co. v. Mount Hope Cemetery
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-04-08 · cited 7×
This case involved a dispute over whether Mount Hope Cemetery could use eminent domain to acquire a 13-acre tract of land from the individual appellants and their newly formed Peru Cemetery Company for cemetery expansion. The court affirmed the appointment of appraisers, allowing the condemnation to proceed. The reasoning centered on the fact that the appellants had not properly appropriated or set apart the land for cemetery purposes by platting or other overt acts prior to the filing of the condemnation action, and evidence suggested the corporate formation was intended to hinder the appellee's acquisition. The court interpreted the relevant statute to require such platting or visible dedication to bar condemnation by another cemetery.
propertyprocedure
Davis v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-03-19 · cited 2×
In Davis v. State, Elmer Davis petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review four criminal cases from 1933 in the Vigo Circuit Court, where he was convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison, and pleaded guilty to robbery charges resulting in additional 20-year sentences. The court denied the petition, noting that the records showed no reviewable questions on their face, such as a motion for new trial or bill of exceptions, and that the time for appeal had long expired. Certiorari in Indiana is used in aid of appeal rather than as a substitute, and there was no pending appeal to which the records would relate, though a prior coram nobis petition was mentioned but not pursued in this request.
criminal lawprocedure
MacDonald v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-02-06 · cited 4×
The case involved the conviction of appellant MacDonald for practicing medicine without a license under Indiana statutes. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the affidavit charging the offense in general terms was sufficient and did not violate due process requirements by omitting specific acts. The core reasoning was that the statute defines the substantive offense of practicing medicine without a license and specifies what acts constitute such practice, so the defendant had adequate notice of the charges and precedent supported the form of the affidavit. Challenges to jury instructions and evidence rulings were also rejected because they were based on an erroneous theory regarding revoked licenses and did not affect the outcome.
criminal lawhealthcarebusiness & regulatory
State Ex Rel. Fulton v. Schannen
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-01-30 · cited 15×
The case involves relator Fulton, an inmate serving a sentence for second-degree arson, who petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court to compel a trial court judge to hear his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The judge had declined to act on the petition directly from the prisoner and had directed that future such filings be handled through the newly created Public Defender's office under the 1945 Act. The court held that the judge must promptly consider and dispose of the petition as filed, without requiring representation by the Public Defender. The reasoning is that the statute establishes voluntary public legal assistance for indigent convicts and does not authorize courts to force such representation on those who choose to proceed pro se, though the defender may still participate as amicus curiae with consent; the judge had misconstrued the Act's effect on direct inmate filings.
criminal lawprocedure
State Ex Rel. Thompson v. Marsh
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-01-11 · cited 3×
The case involved a prison inmate who filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel a circuit court judge to hear his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The judge's response indicated that an attorney had been appointed, a demurrer had been filed by the prosecutor, and multiple continuances had been granted at the request of the attorneys, resulting in an 11-month delay. The court held that the delay was not adequately explained and ordered the judge to set a hearing on the demurrer within 30 days with proper notice, even if attorneys did not appear, and to proceed promptly to judgment thereafter. The reasoning emphasized a judge's duty to expedite court business and the ability to resolve matters without waiting for counsel to request action.
criminal lawprocedure
Tresenriter v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1946-01-10 · cited 1×
The case involved the conviction of the appellant for automobile banditry under Indiana law, specifically for stealing two automobile skirts valued at $35 and using a car to flee the scene, resulting in a 10-year sentence. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the trial proceedings. The appellant's challenges regarding a juror's qualification as a householder were rejected based on the juror's affidavit, and objections to the admission of evidence, including testimony about other stolen items found in the appellant's car and mirrors from a prior similar theft, were overruled as they were relevant to showing a common plan or identity of the perpetrator and the defendant's credibility. The court reasoned that such evidence had probative value for the charged crime despite potentially indicating another offense.
criminal lawprocedure