In Re McCurdy's Guardianship
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-11-25
This case involved exceptions filed by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs and the successor guardian against the final report of Walter C. Clarke, who served as guardian of the estate of an infirm World War veteran from 1922 to 1939. The lower court sustained objections to certain expenditures for property repairs, taxes, and Barrett Law assessments totaling $606.26, and required Clarke to pay the successor guardian $4,022.75 in cash to replace four mortgages on real estate that had declined in value. On appeal, the court reversed those rulings and directed approval of both the current and final reports. The core reasoning was that the guardian had managed the estate prudently by making investments that did not exceed 50 percent of appraised value before the 1929 depression, accounting for all rental income, and following court orders on liquidation, with any losses attributable to general economic depreciation rather than mismanagement or lack of ordinary care.
family lawproperty
Cullins v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-11-25
In Cullins v. State, the appellant was prosecuted and convicted by jury of third-degree burglary after his motion to quash and plea in abatement were denied. He appealed, assigning errors that the verdict lacked sufficient evidence, was contrary to law, and involved jury misconduct, but his brief did not comply with court rules requiring proper numbering of assigned errors and separately stated propositions supported by authorities. Although no reviewable questions were presented, the court examined the full record and found the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict, resulting in affirmance of the judgment.
criminal lawprocedure
Smith v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-11-08 · cited 7×
In Smith v. State, the appellant landowners sought a writ of assessment of damages under eminent domain statutes for a 100-foot strip they had dedicated in 1912 for what became North Meridian Street north of Indianapolis, arguing that the dedication lapsed because the highway was not opened and used within six years under a 1905 statute. The trial court denied the writ after a stipulated facts trial, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the recorded dedication instrument conveyed title to the public for highway purposes. The court reasoned that the dedication was either complete or an unrevoked offer that the state accepted through formal action by the State Highway Commission and substantial public improvements and use, rendering the six-year opening statute inapplicable to this type of voluntary dedication. The triangular portion of the appellants' land at issue remained subject to the dedication and was already in public use, so no compensation was required.
propertyprocedure
Williams v. Williams, Admr.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-10-28 · cited 26×
The case involved appellants suing the administrator of a decedent's estate for damages due to the decedent's alleged negligence. The trial court dismissed the action because it was brought by complaint and summons rather than by filing a claim in the clerk's office as required by statute for claims against estates. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the statute's broad language requiring presentation of "any claim" against the decedent includes tort claims, and the 1937 survival statute also mandates prosecuting such actions as claims against the estate.
proceduretorts & liability
Norris, by Next Friend v. Mingle
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-10-21 · cited 3×
In this case, a five-year-old child injured by an automobile in 1935 brought suit through a next friend in 1938 to recover damages. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint was timely. Under the applicable statutes, a person under the disability of infancy may commence an action at any time during minority and for two years after reaching the age of twenty-one; the next-friend mechanism permits the minor to exercise that right without waiting until majority. The court rejected the argument that the limitations period runs fully against the child during minority, leaving only a post-majority window to sue.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Standard Accident Insurance v. Ayres
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-06-28 · cited 2×
This case involved an appeal by Standard Accident Insurance Company from a judgment holding it liable as surety on an ejectment bond executed by its attorney-in-fact on behalf of defendants in a prior real estate possession action. The bond promised to preserve the property and pay any damages awarded, and after judgment was entered against the defendants for possession and $1,000 in damages, the plaintiff sued on the bond. The insurer defended on the ground that its power of attorney to the agent limited the types of bonds he could execute and did not authorize this statutory undertaking in an ejectment suit. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the power of attorney was ambiguous as to the agent's authority, that any ambiguity must be construed against the insurer, and that the bond fell within the agent's authorized scope.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Bellin v. Bloom
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-06-28 · cited 10×
The case involved a dispute between a father and his daughter over ownership of real estate that the parents had deeded to the daughter in 1932 to protect their equity from creditors and a failing mortgage holder, with an oral agreement that she would reconvey it once conditions improved. The trial court found that the deed was never delivered, there was no intent to transfer ownership, no consideration was given, and the daughter had obtained possession through later trickery after a family estrangement; it ruled in the father's favor on his cross-claim for reconveyance. The dissenting opinion concludes that the trial court correctly decided the matter because delivery is essential to pass title and the special findings established that none occurred, so legal title never vested in the daughter despite recordation. Core reasoning rests on the requirement that a deed must be delivered with intent to convey ownership, which the facts negated, and that equity prevents the daughter from retaining property under these circumstances.
propertyfamily law
Metz v. State Hasenour v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-06-10
This case involves appeals from convictions of three defendants for the misdemeanor of failing to support their father, based on a grand jury indictment under Indiana statutes. The defendants filed a plea in abatement asserting they had been subpoenaed and compelled to testify before the grand jury without counsel or awareness of their rights, resulting in an indictment derived from their testimony; the trial court overruled the plea without a hearing. The court determined that the immunity provision in § 9-1605 protects those required to testify about misdemeanors from subsequent prosecution or punishment based on that evidence, following precedent such as Atkinson v. State. As a result, the judgments were reversed due to the error in denying the plea in abatement.
criminal lawprocedure
City National Bank & Trust Co. v. American National Bank
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-06-10 · cited 2×
This case involved a dispute over a trustee's management of a hotel property held in trust for shareholders, where the trustee sought court approval of its fees, attorneys' fees, and a proposed lease contract with related brokerage commissions. Attorneys employed by certain shareholders challenged these claims, uncovering self-dealing and securing reductions that benefited all shareholders, then sought compensation from the common trust fund. The trial court granted an allowance of $3,000 in fees to these attorneys from the fund. In this dissenting opinion, the court reasoned that an exception to the general rule against fee recovery from non-clients applies when attorneys' services preserve or benefit the entire fund in equity proceedings, and that the trial court's discretionary allowance was supported by the evidence of substantial savings achieved.
procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty
Hankins v. State Ex Rel. Miller
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-05-29 · cited 5×
This case involved property owners abutting certain streets in Thorntown, Indiana, who filed a mandamus action against the town's Board of Trustees after the board vacated portions of the streets without preparing a roll listing owners affected by benefits or damages. The relators alleged that the lack of such a roll deprived them of the chance to file remonstrances or claims for compensation, and they sought an order compelling the board to reinstate proceedings and create the roll. The court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the relators, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim because it did not allege that the relators' property was injuriously affected and because the original published notice of the vacation proceedings provided sufficient notice to all interested parties. The core reasoning was that street vacation decisions are exercises of legislative discretion by the board, that any affected owners not listed on a roll are deemed notified by the initial resolution notice and have a right to appeal within a statutory period, and that the relators had an adequate remedy at law by participating in the board hearings rather than filing suit afterward.
propertyprocedure
Hoosier Casualty Company v. Miers
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-05-29 · cited 21×
This case involved a dispute over coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Hoosier Casualty Company to Peterson. Miers, who worked as Peterson's bartender during specified evening hours, was injured in a car accident during an off-duty daytime hunting trip as Peterson's guest; after obtaining a judgment against Peterson, Miers sued the insurer when execution was returned unsatisfied. The trial court entered judgment for Miers, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the policy's exclusion for injuries to employees did not apply because Miers was not under Peterson's control or engaged in employment duties at the time of the injury, but was instead a guest, and the insurer was not estopped from raising the defense despite having defended the underlying suit. The decision turned on the interpretation of the employee exclusion clause in light of the stipulated facts showing the injury was unrelated to the employment relationship.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
State Ex Rel. Cedar Creek School Township v. Curtin
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-04-30 · cited 6×
The case involved relators from two school townships seeking a writ of mandamus to compel a three-member committee—appointed under the 1935 Prevailing Wage Act—to meet and determine the prevailing wage scale for labor on a school addition project in Lowell, Indiana, based on local rates. The complaint alleged that two committee members (representing labor and the state) arbitrarily filed a wage schedule from another locality without investigation, while the third member's schedule accurately reflected local rates. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint, leading to judgment against the relators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although mandamus cannot substitute judicial judgment for administrative discretion, the facts alleged showed arbitrary and capricious action rendering the filed scale voidable, and the complaint's facts plus general prayer for relief stated a claim for annulment of the scale. The court reasoned that the committee had acted as required by statute but in a manner not binding on the relators due to the abuse of discretion.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Hust v. City of Evansville
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-04-08 · cited 1×
The plaintiff sued the City of Evansville claiming wrongful discharge and damages after he was terminated from his role operating a fire alarm in the fire department, a position he held from 1933 to 1935. The trial court made special findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover and should take nothing by his complaint. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff was not a member of the fire force but instead a mere employee subject to discharge at will under the applicable statutes. Because he was physically unable to serve as a fire force member and fell outside the statutory protections requiring a hearing on charges, he had no basis to claim ongoing compensation or procedural rights after his employment ended. The decision rested on the special findings showing he was appointed only as an employee, not under the fire force classification.
labor & employmentprocedure
In Re Mast
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-03-25 · cited 4×
This case concerned a proceeding under Indiana's 1927 statute (chapter 69) to determine whether an individual was a proper subject for commitment to a state hospital for the insane. A verified petition by the guardian, accompanied by physicians' examinations and reports, led to a hearing in chambers before the circuit judge, who denied the appellant's motions for a continuance (due to her hospitalization) and for a change of judge (alleging bias), then ordered commitment. The court ruled that the statute creates a special summary procedure distinct from ordinary civil actions under the civil code, so rules governing continuances, venue changes, new trials, or appeals do not apply, and constitutional protections are safeguarded through subsequent habeas corpus review. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
procedurecivil rights
Sanders v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-03-25 · cited 14×
The case involved an appeal from a jury conviction for sodomy under an Indiana statute defining the offense as the abominable and detestable crime against nature with mankind or beast. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the propriety of a jury instruction regarding the effect of the charging affidavit, the refusal of a tendered instruction on reputation evidence, and the trial court's decision to limit the number of defense character witnesses. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the evidence was sufficient, that the given instruction fairly stated the law without misleading the jury, that other instructions covered the requested topic, and that limiting witnesses was not an abuse of discretion where the state presented none.
criminal lawprocedure
American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Savings Bank
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-03-11 · cited 23×
This case involved a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of Rose Garritano's estate against American Carloading Corp. after one of its trucks struck and killed her while she was walking along a highway in Gary, Indiana. The plaintiff alleged multiple acts of negligence by the truck driver, including excessive speed, failure to keep a lookout, and failure to warn or slow down. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $8,000, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the defendant challenged rulings on motions to strike and separate the complaint, denial of judgment on the interrogatories, and various evidentiary and instructional issues raised in its motion for a new trial. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the complaint was sufficient, multiple negligence grounds could be pleaded together, the interrogatories did not contradict the verdict, the evidence supported the verdict, and the challenged instructions were not erroneous.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Citizens Bank v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-02-28 · cited 18×
The case concerned a dispute over ownership of two linotype machines used in a printing plant. The appellee, Mergenthaler Linotype Co., sold the machines under conditional sales contracts that treated them as chattels and sought to recover them via replevin after the buyers defaulted. The appellant bank claimed ownership through a sheriff’s deed following foreclosure on a mortgage covering the real estate and certain personal property. The trial court found the machines remained personal property rather than fixtures, as they were removable without damage to the realty, the contracts explicitly stated they were not affixed, and the bank had notice of their chattel character; it therefore awarded possession and damages to the appellee. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the facts supported the conclusion the machines never lost their status as personal property.
propertyprocedure
City of Evansville v. Maddox
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-02-19 · cited 25×
The case involved a policewoman appointed to the Evansville police force and assigned to the health department who was dismissed by the chief of police without charges or a hearing before the board. After a new administration reclassified police employees and assigned her duties to another person, she sued the city for breach of her employment contract seeking unpaid salary. The trial court found in her favor, awarding damages for lost wages minus her other earnings, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the discharge was unlawful and the findings supported recovery on a contract theory.
labor & employment
Byrum v. Wise, Receiver
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-02-05 · cited 8×
The case concerned the priority of liens on proceeds from the sale of assets of an insolvent corporation, Imperial Electrical Company, after a receiver was appointed and sold the property for $5,699.21, an amount insufficient to satisfy all claims. The court addressed competing claims between holders of 1922 first-mortgage notes and 1925 second-mortgage notes, some of which were exchanged for the earlier series. It held that Burkett and Conklin, holders of unsurrendered 1922 notes, held the first lien; the Trust Company, standing in the shoes of the original mortgagee as to its retained 1922 notes, held a second lien; and holders of the 1925 notes held junior liens in order of maturity. The decision rested on special findings showing the original mortgage remained unreleased, that exchanged notes did not alter the equal priority among all 1922 note holders, and that equity preserved the first-mortgage security for the benefit of those who exchanged without surrendering their rights.
propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Byrum v. Wise, Receiver
Indiana Supreme Court · 1940-02-05 · cited 8×
The case concerned the priority of liens on proceeds from the sale of assets of an insolvent corporation, Imperial Electrical Company, after a receiver was appointed and sold the property for $5,699.21, an amount insufficient to satisfy all claims. The court addressed competing claims between holders of 1922 first-mortgage notes and 1925 second-mortgage notes, some of which were exchanged for the earlier series. It held that Burkett and Conklin, holders of unsurrendered 1922 notes, held the first lien; the Trust Company, standing in the shoes of the original mortgagee as to its retained 1922 notes, held a second lien; and holders of the 1925 notes held junior liens in order of maturity. The decision rested on special findings showing the original mortgage remained unreleased, that exchanged notes did not alter the equal priority among all 1922 note holders, and that equity preserved the first-mortgage security for the benefit of those who exchanged without surrendering their rights.
propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure