John W. Anderson

This case was an appeal from a district court judgment in a paternity action under chapter 544-A1 of the 1935 Iowa Code, brought by the mother to establish that the defendant was the father of her child born out of wedlock and to obtain support orders. The trial court declared paternity, ordered the defendant to pay confinement costs and monthly support until the child turned sixteen, and directed that he be jailed for up to a year if he did not post a bond or make payments. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the imprisonment and contempt portions of the judgment, holding that the action is civil rather than criminal, that the statutory provisions authorizing jail commitment or contempt without a hearing or finding of willful noncompliance violate the Iowa Constitution, and that those punishment sections are therefore void.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

This case concerned challenges by an existing private utility provider and others to a city's plans to build and operate a municipal electric plant funded through revenue bonds. The opponents argued that the special election lacked sufficient votes, involved fraud or misleading ballots, featured noncompetitive bidding due to discrepancies in plans and specifications, and that the construction contracts were invalid for failing to specify a maximum rate for electricity charged to the municipality. The trial court upheld the election but enjoined the contracts on the bidding and rate issues. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the injunction, holding that the election was valid under the applicable statutes requiring only a simple majority, that the contracts complied with the law when payment was made in cash from bond proceeds rather than future earnings, and that the maximum-rate requirement did not apply to such construction contracts.

electionsbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute over entitlement to a $6,000 payment under a 1930 right-of-way easement for a natural gas pipeline across land in Marion County, Iowa. The easement required the pipeline company to either purchase a 20-rod strip or remove the line if strip coal mining began on the north eighty acres. After strip mining started in 1937, the company elected to buy the strip, but coal lessee Albert Penn sued for the payment while original owners, the bank, and related parties intervened claiming the funds. The court held that Penn had no title to convey because the coal lease was subject to the easement and he had agreed not to excavate the strip until the company elected; the intervenors were entitled to the payment upon delivering clear title and ensuring back-filling of excavations, which Penn was ordered to perform or pay $1,500 for. The decision rested on the chain of title, the easement language reserving mineral rights but conditioning the purchase option, and Penn's knowledge of the restrictions.

property

This case was a libel action brought by two attorneys against a newspaper publisher, its editor, and a distributor, alleging that a front-page article falsely accused them of unethical stalling tactics while handling an appeal in a client's criminal case. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the article was not libelous per se under the statutory definition because it did not charge the plaintiffs with any unlawful or unprofessional conduct even by innuendo, made no direct reference to them, and no special damages were alleged.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

This case was a replevin action brought by the Orris plaintiffs against the executor of Clara Aken's estate to obtain possession of a deed to real estate in Lehigh, Iowa, that Aken had executed in 1935 naming the plaintiffs as grantees. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the deed had not been delivered and therefore did not pass title. The core reasoning was that delivery requires both the grantor's intent to convey and an act relinquishing control, which were absent because the deed remained in Aken's safety deposit box, was never given to or seen by the grantees, and was never recorded. The court overruled prior inconsistent decisions and reaffirmed that the burden to prove effective delivery rests on the grantees.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned Emerson State Bank’s effort to collect on a promissory note signed by A.G. Cole, secured in part by a written agreement with his father Eleazar Cole that limited collection to A.G.’s share of the father’s estate, along with an alleged oral agreement that Eleazar would not change his will devising specific real property to his son. After Eleazar died, having altered his will and transferred assets, the bank amended its petition to assert equitable claims based on the oral promise and moved to transfer the action to equity; the trial court granted the transfer and entered judgment for the bank. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, finding the oral agreement fully supported by the record, given in consideration for the bank’s agreement to carry the debt until Eleazar’s death, and enforceable against the estate.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned the proper venue for a lawsuit challenging a decision by the State Appeal Board, which had reviewed and reduced a proposed tax levy and budget for the Independent School District of Council Bluffs in Pottawattamie County under Iowa's Local Budget Law. Taxpayers had protested the school board's budget to the county auditor, leading to a hearing and a final decision by the State Appeal Board (composed of state officers) that was filed with the Pottawattamie County auditor. The State Appeal Board sought to move the case from Pottawattamie County District Court to Polk County, arguing that the board's actions occurred at the state capitol. The court held that venue was proper in Pottawattamie County because the underlying dispute arose there between local parties, the board's decision became effective only upon filing with the local auditor, and the original action involved local taxpayers and the school district rather than a matter centered in Polk County.

proceduretaxes

The case involved a minor plaintiff suing defendant Sherrill for personal injuries from a sledding accident in which the plaintiff and another boy attached their sleds to the rear of Sherrill's car on a snowy, icy street in Waterloo, Iowa; after Sherrill accelerated to 20-25 mph, the sled veered into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle. The trial court directed a verdict for one defendant and entered a $4,750 judgment against Sherrill after a jury found him negligent on the sole submitted ground of driving too fast while knowing the children were holding on. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a driver aware of children's hazardous position and the road conditions owes them a duty of ordinary care and breaches it by excessive speed, and that a local ordinance banning coasting on sleds did not apply to this situation or affect liability given the plaintiff's age under fourteen.

torts & liability

This case involved a challenge by Josephine Kommelter to a criminal information filed against her for falsifying corporate records. Kommelter had testified as a witness before a grand jury investigating embezzlement by another person and argued that her involuntary appearance entitled her to immunity from the charges. After the district court overruled her motion to dismiss the information, she petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the ruling. The Iowa Supreme Court held that certiorari was not available because the claim concerned only an alleged error of law rather than lack of jurisdiction or illegal action by the lower court, and the proper remedy was an appeal. The court annulled the writ after noting that the outcome would have been the same even if reviewed on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case State v. Mikels concerned a dispute over whether a particular jury instruction should have been given at trial. The majority opinion reversed the trial court's ruling that refused to provide the requested instruction. In dissent, Justice Anderson stated that he would approve instruction No. 7 and affirm the trial court's decision to refuse the instruction. Justice Bjntzinger joined the dissent.

criminal law

The case concerned a mortgage foreclosure on Iowa farmland where the borrower, McNamara, sought continuances and extensions of the redemption period under successive state moratorium statutes passed in the 1930s. After an initial continuance order was modified to require payment of certain rents and profits into court, the foreclosure proceeded to sale; the borrower then applied under a later moratorium act for an extension of redemption, but the trial court denied the application for lack of jurisdiction. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the application remained pending when the newest moratorium law took effect, that the statute preserved jurisdiction over such pending matters, and that the trial court should therefore consider the extension request on the merits without reference to prior rulings on the same issues.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a mortgage foreclosure action filed by Prudential Insurance in Lyon County, Iowa district court against defendant Frank Howard Beck on a 1926 promissory note for $10,000 secured by 189 acres of farmland, with approximately $10,361 due at filing. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a continuance until March 1, 1939, under Iowa's Moratorium Act (chapter 80 of the 47th General Assembly), over the plaintiff's resistance claiming bad faith because the defendant had not mortgaged his $3,000 in personal property to pay delinquencies. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the Act makes continuance the rule absent a showing of bad faith or no reasonable probability of refinancing, that insolvency and inadequate security are insufficient grounds for denial, and that the record showed good faith given Depression-era hardships, droughts, and the need to retain personal property for ongoing farm operations to enable potential refinancing.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a mortgage foreclosure on 200 acres of Iowa farmland where the mortgagors sought extensions of the redemption period under successive state moratorium acts following the 1934 foreclosure sale. The trial court granted a further extension to March 1, 1939, and the mortgagee appealed, contending the application lacked good faith, the debtors were insolvent, and the security was inadequate. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence showed the land's value exceeded the debt, good-faith refinance efforts had been made, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the extension under the statute's provisions that insolvency and inadequate security alone do not justify denial.

property

The case involved two foreclosure actions by the Federal Land Bank of Omaha against the Sutherlin defendants on Iowa farm mortgages, resulting in sheriff's sales, deficiency judgments, and multiple prior extensions of the redemption period under state moratorium laws. The defendants applied for a further extension to March 1, 1939, but the trial court granted only a limited extension to January 1, 1938, conditioned on a lease, after finding the property value far below the debt, no good-faith refinancing efforts, and no reasonable prospect of redemption. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order, concluding that the evidence showed the defendants' insolvency, the debt's steady increase, and their lack of resources or willingness to redeem, justifying denial of additional time.

property

This case concerns repeated attempts by a mortgagor, Roy L. Brown, to extend the statutory period of redemption after a 1933 foreclosure sale of his Warren County, Iowa, real estate to the plaintiff bank. Brown filed three successive applications for extensions under Iowa's Moratorium Acts of the 45th, 46th, and 47th General Assemblies; the first two were denied, a sheriff's deed was issued in 1934, and the third application under the 1937 act was dismissed by the district court. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that its prior affirmance of the denial of the first extension was res judicata, that the redemption period had expired without a granted extension, and that the latest moratorium statute applied only to cases in which an extension to March 1, 1937, had already been ordered. The court also rejected arguments that the restraining order or lack of record entry prevented issuance of the deed.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a claim by the plaintiff against his mutual automobile insurance company for $196.99 in collision damages to a replacement vehicle covered under a transferred policy. The insurer raised defenses including lack of ownership, failure to provide timely notice or proof of loss, and nondisclosure of a conditional sales contract lien on the new car. After the company investigated the accident but denied liability and attempted to cancel the policy retroactively, the plaintiff sued, and a jury returned a verdict in his favor. The court affirmed, holding that the record presented factual questions about the insurer's knowledge of the lien and any waiver of policy conditions, which were properly submitted to the jury through the trial court's instructions, and that the verdict was supported by the evidence.

business & regulatory

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action by First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank against the Spencers, resulting in a 1935 foreclosure judgment and sale that left a deficiency; the Spencers had previously obtained an extension of their statutory redemption period under the 1935 Iowa Moratorium Act, and they sought a further extension under the 1937 Acts. The trial court granted the additional extension to March 1, 1939, and the bank appealed, arguing lack of jurisdiction and insufficient showing of good faith. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a prior extension had already been granted, the 1937 statutes placed the case in a different category from earlier precedents where no prior extension existed, so the court had jurisdiction to hear the application; it further held that the statute requires the extension unless good cause to the contrary is shown, and the record of the farm's value, improvements, and the owners' circumstances did not establish such cause.

propertyprocedure

In Tharp v. Rees, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages after their automobiles collided on a primary highway in Iowa, alleging five specific acts of negligence by the defendant including crossing the center line without warning, failing to keep a lookout, and driving at excessive speed. The trial court submitted only the center-line claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant on both the claim and the defendant's counterclaim, leading to dismissal of the plaintiff's petition. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained no evidence supporting submission of the other negligence grounds and that the instructions on contributory negligence were proper. The court also found no prejudicial misconduct in the jury's deliberations, including discussions of insurance or the jury's initial report of deadlock, as those matters did not affect the outcome. The verdict was supported by the evidence showing one driver must have crossed the center line.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of larceny whose conviction was reversed on appeal due to erroneous jury instructions; after remand, the defendant sought dismissal under Iowa Code section 14024, claiming the state failed to provide a speedy trial at the next regular term following the reversal and procedendo. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, and the defendant petitioned for certiorari. The Iowa Supreme Court annulled the writ, holding that the statute did not require dismissal because the defendant caused multiple delays through filings such as a petition for rehearing and a motion for change of venue, the case had been assigned for trial at three successive terms, and the provision was not intended to allow a defendant to evade trial through technical maneuvers.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a suit on an alleged lost promissory note filed in Iowa district court, where the defendant answered with a general denial and challenges to the note's execution and signature. After the case was assigned for trial and the defendant and counsel failed to appear, the court found a default for nonappearance, excused the jury, heard the plaintiff's evidence, and entered judgment; the defendant's late-arriving counsel refused the court's offer to retry the case without a jury. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that failure to appear at the assigned trial time waived the right to a jury under Iowa Code provisions, that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed, and that the motion to set aside the judgment filed six weeks later was untimely under the five-day statutory deadline.

procedure