The case involved a dispute over payment for printing, binding, and related services provided by Mills & Co. to Davies, where the account included items both inside and outside an alleged special contract on pricing. The trial court had instructed the jury that the statute of limitations would bar recovery on certain items if a special contract existed, leading to a verdict for the defendant. The appellate court reversed the judgment, ruling that instructions 7 and 12 were erroneous because they focused on the existence of a contract rather than whether the items properly belonged in an open, current account. The core reasoning was that agreed prices for work with uncertain quantities do not prevent items from constituting an account, and the limitations period under the relevant Iowa statute runs from the last debit or credit item, regardless of any parol agreement on price.
The case Maxwell v. Gibbs involved a dispute over a bailment contract for a team of horses, with plaintiffs claiming defendants were liable as partners for the death of a horse. The court addressed challenges to jury instructions regarding the need to prove the exact contract alleged, the burden of proof on plaintiffs, partnership by estoppel if defendants held themselves out as partners, and defendants' liability only if they caused the horse's disease through wrongful acts. The trial court refused one instruction but gave others that covered the issues, modified another on partnership, and modified the disease instruction to include wrongful acts. On appeal, the court found no error or conflict in the instructions given the pleadings and evidence, and affirmed the judgment.
The case involved a challenge to a state statute authorizing counties and cities to subscribe for railroad stock and impose taxes to support railroad construction. The majority of the court reversed the judgment below, invalidating the law and related bond issuances. It reasoned that an unwritten constitution protects private property rights as paramount, preventing the legislature from delegating such taxing and spending authority to municipalities for internal improvements. The dissent maintained that courts may only strike down legislation conflicting with the written state constitution and that the legislature possesses all power not expressly denied.
The case involved a suit by the plaintiffs on promissory notes and an associated account against the defendant, where the trial court excluded the plaintiffs' books of account on the ground that the underlying debt appeared barred by the five-year statute of limitations, sustained objections to evidence of a partial payment and other admissions, and instructed the jury that the statute began running from the last debit item. The court held these rulings erroneous, concluding that the books were admissible as a foundation for the claim even if potentially time-barred, that evidence of payments (including those made before the bar attached) and of the application of goods delivered by the defendant was competent and should have been received, and that the statute of limitations for a continuous open account accrues from the date of the last item proved, whether debit or credit. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded.
