The case involved a horse breeder who shipped 26 imported horses from New York to Iowa via American Express and later sued for losses during transit. The plaintiff had signed shipping contracts presented to him at night in a rail car without reading them; those contracts limited the carrier's liability to $100 per horse. The court held that the contracts were valid and binding because there was no evidence of fraud or imposition by the carrier, and a shipper is presumed to know the terms of a contract of affreightment he signs absent such misconduct. The judgment was affirmed on the validity of the liability limitation but reversed on the issues of interest and allocation of costs, which were remanded for recalculation.
This case involves a personal injury lawsuit brought by Gordon against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. for injuries from a railway accident that occurred in Indian Territory, with the matter returning on its third appeal after Gordon's death during the proceedings. The court addressed whether the action abated upon his death, ruling that the law of the forum (Iowa) controls the survival of the cause of action, allowing substitution of the administratrix under Iowa statutes even if the law of Indian Territory would not permit survival. Additional issues regarding the defendant's alleged negligence in track construction and the admissibility of a res gestae statement were resolved based on prior appeals as the law of the case, with the court finding sufficient evidence to submit the matter to the jury. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
The case involved a divorced father (plaintiff) seeking damages after being denied entry to his former father-in-law's (defendant's) home to attend his child's funeral. The divorce decree awarded custody to the mother, barred the father from the grandfather's premises, and conditioned visitation rights elsewhere on payment of costs and child support, which the father had not made. The court held that the decree remained binding and unmodified by the child's illness or death, giving the father no right to visit at the grandfather's home. Even assuming changed circumstances, the court reasoned that a property owner has absolute control over access to his premises, and a lawful exclusion does not become actionable due to malicious motive. The trial court's directed verdict for the defendant was affirmed.
The case involved executors of the William H. Kelty estate who sought to rescind a three-year lease of 320 acres of farmland to defendant McPeake after he allegedly made false statements about his assets, debts, solvency, and lack of encumbrances to induce the lease; the lease included a landlord's lien on the tenant's crops and personal property. The plaintiffs claimed these misrepresentations, combined with the defendant's subsequent chattel mortgage to a bank that primed their lien and his insolvency, justified cancellation of the lease and return of the rent notes. The trial court granted rescission, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant had falsely represented material existing facts regarding his financial condition and property, which the plaintiffs reasonably relied upon as one inducement for the lease. The court noted that such fraud in the inducement permits equitable rescission even without proof that the defendant knew the statements were false, and that the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of the misrepresentations.
The case concerned a dispute over title to real property that had been sold at a tax sale in 1887, with the tax deed issued in 1892 and recorded in 1896, while the defendants had been in continuous adverse possession since the late 1870s. The court addressed whether the five-year statute of limitations under Code section 1448 barred recovery by the tax deed holders and whether section 1445's requirements for challenging a tax title applied to the defendants in possession. It held that the statute of limitations applied and extinguished the tax title, as the defendants satisfied the prerequisites by establishing both record title from the government and clear adverse possession for the full statutory period, and that they were not required to reimburse taxes paid by the tax purchaser. The decree in favor of the defendants was affirmed.
This case involved a dispute over ownership of a lot in Des Moines, where plaintiff Petersborough Savings Bank held a foreclosed mortgage from 1888 and obtained a sheriff's deed in 1897, while defendant Des Moines Savings Bank acquired a tax deed in 1897 based on an unredeemed 1892 tax sale certificate it purchased, along with a pledged junior mortgage. The plaintiff sued to set aside the tax deed and quiet title, offering to pay any amounts due, but the trial court ruled that the plaintiff had no title and the defendant owned the property via the tax deed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the applicable Code section, a party challenging a tax title must first prove it held title at the time of the tax sale or acquired it afterward from the state or U.S., which the plaintiff failed to establish, and that a tax title constitutes an independent new grant rather than a derivative claim. The court also noted that the action was not properly framed as a redemption proceeding under related statutes and that the plaintiff had not met statutory prerequisites to contest the tax deed.
