Maurice F. Donegan

In this premises liability case, plaintiff Mary F. Lotz sued United Food Markets, Inc. for injuries sustained when she fell down a stairway in the defendant's store. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and later overruled her motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that no appealable judgment had been properly entered on the record and that the notice of appeal was untimely under the applicable statutes governing the time for appeal after denial of a new trial motion. The court further determined that certain evidentiary rulings were not preserved for review because no offer of proof was made and that other alleged errors were abandoned due to inadequate briefing and argument. Accordingly, the trial court's rulings were affirmed.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved an appeal from a district court order granting a further extension of the redemption period in a mortgage foreclosure action under a state moratorium statute enacted by the Forty-seventh General Assembly. The mortgagee, Prudential Insurance Co., sought to block the extension for the insolvent borrower, citing evidence that the farm's value was around $14,000 to $14,500 while the debt exceeded $26,000 and was projected to reach nearly $30,000 by the end of the extension, with no other assets available to the borrower. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the extension order, reasoning that the extreme disparity between debt and property value, combined with the borrower's financial situation and lack of any prospect for refinancing, meant the statutory purpose of allowing redemption could not be fulfilled, consistent with prior precedents like Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Sanford Manufacturing Company suing Western Mutual Fire Insurance Company directly to recover the value of ink destroyed by fire while stored in a Des Moines warehouse operated by Fred A. Hermann. The policies included a clause permitting direct action against the insurer when service could not be obtained on the assured within Iowa, and one count of the petition relied on that provision while alleging Hermann's negligence; a second count alleged the warehouse operator's legal liability for the goods. The insurer filed a special appearance and motion to dismiss, asserting that Hermann was an Iowa resident on whom service could have been made and that the direct-action clause did not apply. The Iowa Supreme Court held that a special appearance under the statute must challenge jurisdiction over the entire action rather than only one count, and therefore affirmed the trial court's overruling of the motion.

procedure

The case involved a negligence lawsuit arising from a 1936 car collision in which plaintiff W. H. Churchill, a passenger in L. A. NaLean's vehicle, was injured when the car was struck by one driven by defendant Briggs while the two men were searching for mules to inspect. At trial the jury returned a verdict for Churchill, and Briggs appealed, arguing that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on contributory negligence imputed through a joint enterprise and by allowing certain rebuttal testimony. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence did not establish a joint enterprise because the men lacked any agreement for shared control, profits, or operation of the vehicle and that the rebuttal evidence was properly admitted since the defendant had first introduced the conversation at issue. The court reasoned that mere shared travel for a common purpose without mutual right of control does not impute the driver's negligence to the passenger.

torts & liability

In Converse v. Converse, the plaintiff wife sued her husband for divorce on grounds of habitual drunkenness and cruel and inhuman treatment after 21 years of marriage and with six children; the trial court granted the divorce, awarded her custody and child support, a life estate in the family farm home plus personal property, and ordered the defendant to pay taxes, attorney fees, and other sums. The defendant appealed, contending that the evidence failed to prove either ground for divorce and that the property division was excessive. The appellate court examined the testimony, finding the wife's and children's accounts of the defendant's intoxication and abusive language sufficient to establish both statutory grounds while the defendant's witnesses provided only limited or negative testimony, and it upheld the divorce, custody, and most financial awards as reasonable for the family's support. However, it modified the decree to leave the remainder interest in the 43-acre tract with the defendant rather than conveying it directly to the children. As modified, the trial court's decree was affirmed.

family lawproperty

In this case, plaintiff McClure sued defendants Herman and Forest Richard after being injured when a third party's car struck the truck in which he was riding. The truck had been stopped on the shoulder of an icy highway following an initial collision with the Richards' car; after the Richards moved their vehicle off the road, McClure and the truck's driver were clearing merchandise from the pavement when the second car hit the truck and swung it into McClure. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the Richards' negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries because the subsequent collision by the third driver constituted an efficient intervening cause that broke the chain of causation. Under the applicable proximate-cause standard, the court reasoned that injuries must follow in a natural and continuous sequence without an intervening cause, and the evidence showed that several minutes had passed and all effects of the first collision had ended before the second collision occurred.

torts & liability

The case involved a 1935 collision on a bridge where plaintiff Helen Hawkins was injured when the car she rode in struck a truck owned by defendant Farmers Elevator Company and driven by defendant Orville Burton; Hawkins sued for damages alleging the truck driver was negligent by driving on the wrong side of the road. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, but the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on grounds including that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, resulted from passion and prejudice, and involved juror misconduct such as statements about facts not in evidence and improper observations at the accident scene. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the order for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it was in the best position to evaluate the evidence of negligence and the jurors' conduct during deliberations, and the record showed sufficient evidence to support submitting the negligence claims to the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the validity of a declaration and deed of trust executed by Mary M. Krickenberger shortly after her brother John H. Krickenberger's death in 1930. Under the instrument, she conveyed her inherited real and personal property to neighbor Dan H. Goodman as trustee, directing him to use the assets for her support during her lifetime, pay her funeral expenses and small bequests after her death, and transfer the remainder to Goodman individually. After her death in 1933, her administrator F. F. Bauer and heir Sara C. Minor challenged the trust, alleging lack of mental capacity. The trial court upheld the trust, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence established Krickenberger's soundness of mind and free exercise of will when she signed the document.

propertyfamily law

The case involved Shimp Brothers, who released a mechanic's lien on farmland in exchange for a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage on horses and a corn sheller, along with a bank memorandum directing that payments on the note be credited to their special account. After the collateral was allegedly sold without crediting during a receivership sale of other McNellis property, Shimp Brothers sued the receiver, his surety, and related banks for damages, conversion, and enforcement of a trust. The trial court dismissed all counts, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that Shimp Brothers failed to meet their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the specific collateral was sold by the receiver or that any payments were received for it.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over ownership of land west of a public highway in Section 30, Township 70, Range 43 in Fremont County, Iowa, along the Missouri River. Plaintiff Sheldon sought to quiet title to the disputed tracts, claiming them as accretions to land he acquired by deed in 1927. Defendants Chambers and Moore asserted record title to the same parcels based on original U.S. government patents, arguing the land had remained in place. The district court ruled for the defendants, finding the disputed land consisted of original lands in place that had not been eroded away by the river, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the evidence failed to show the land had been washed away and, even if accretion had occurred, it would have attached to lands to the west rather than to the plaintiff's parcel.

property

This case arose from a 1936 automobile collision on a narrow wooden bridge in Page County, Iowa, between a Ford coupe driven by the 18-year-old plaintiff and a Chevrolet sedan driven by the 17-year-old son of the defendant. The plaintiff sued for personal injuries, including permanent disability to his left arm and pain and suffering, alleging negligence by the defendant's driver in failing to yield or maintain proper position on the bridge. The jury returned a $3,000 verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the evidence supported submission of damages for permanent disability and that the jury instructions properly limited recovery to the amounts claimed without allowing improper speculation.

torts & liability

This case involved two claims filed by Florence Graves against the estate of May Hill for personal services allegedly performed for the decedent by Graves and her husband (whose claim was assigned to her), which the executor (her husband) had approved. Objectors, who were beneficiaries under the will, challenged the claims on grounds that they were barred by statutes requiring timely notice of hearing (sections 11972 and 11968 of the Iowa Code) and that the executor's approval was invalid due to his personal interest. The trial court overruled the objections after a hearing focused on timeliness and equitable relief issues, allowing the claims to proceed to a merits hearing if not barred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning from the record and stipulation that the claims were presented within statutory periods, the executor indicated no notice was needed, and peculiar circumstances justified equitable relief from any bar, without adjudicating the claims' validity.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether federal income taxes could be assessed against a casualty insurance corporation that had been declared insolvent and dissolved by a state court in 1921, on income generated from its assets while they were held and managed by a court-appointed receiver. The receiver had collected interest, rents, and investment returns on deposited securities and foreclosed mortgages but had not paid federal income taxes for the years 1924 through 1932; the United States filed a claim in the receivership proceedings seeking payment of those taxes. The trial court allowed a reduced claim of approximately $60,000 and ordered payment, rejecting the receiver's objections that the dissolved corporation could not be taxed, that reports filed were sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, and that various expenses should be deducted. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal revenue statutes expressly require receivers operating corporate property or business to file returns and pay tax on income in the same manner as the corporation itself, that the receiver had not met the burden of proving additional deductions beyond his own salary, and that state law did not override federal tax rules. The decree directing payment of the taxes was therefore upheld.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved competing claims to priority among mortgages on the same Iowa real estate: a 1915 mortgage to Thos. W. Lackey (assigned to Luna and Olive Lackey and partially renewed by a 1931 mortgage to Olive J. Lackey), and a 1930 mortgage to Carl Zachritz that expressly acknowledged the earlier encumbrance. The trial court held that the 1915 mortgage was time-barred, that the 1931 mortgage was valid but junior to the Zachritz mortgage, and ordered foreclosure of both the 1931 and Zachritz mortgages with Zachritz having senior lien status. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court modified the decree, ruling that the 1930 mortgage's written acknowledgment revived the underlying debt under the applicable statute, that the 1931 instrument operated as a renewal preserving the original lien's priority, and that the Zachritz mortgage therefore remained subordinate. The court reasoned that the Zachritz mortgage had been taken subject to the prior lien, that partial payment and renewal did not prejudice Zachritz, and that nothing in the recording statutes or equities altered the priority.

property

The case involved a dispute over a 1935 lease and joint farming agreement for 120 acres in Iowa, where landlord Ernest Wright sought to evict tenants Albert and Dorothy Flatterich via forcible entry and detainer after an alleged April 1937 oral agreement to terminate the lease and submit disputes to arbitration. The tenants' answer raised defenses including lack of consideration for the oral agreement and homestead rights in 40 acres of the property, which they claimed could not be terminated without written acknowledgment by both spouses under Iowa statute. The trial court overruled Wright's demurrers to these defenses, and he appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the oral agreement did not satisfy statutory requirements for terminating homestead rights and thus could not end the lease as to the homestead portion, so the tenants were not wrongfully holding over.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a Wisconsin corporation suing an Iowa property owner to recover the unpaid balance on a contract to install heating equipment in a Des Moines building. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove it obtained the permit required by Iowa Code sections 8420–8427 before transacting business in the state. The court reasoned that the statutes apply to any foreign corporation for pecuniary profit, that the general denial in the answer placed the authorization allegation in issue, and that compliance with the permit requirement is a condition precedent that the plaintiff must allege and prove to maintain an action on an Iowa contract. The decision emphasized that without such proof, the trial court erred in directing a verdict.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a claim filed by the assignee of Mary E. King against the estate of Arthur E. Hazeldine for repayment of funds advanced to him, with the claimant seeking priority payment from life insurance proceeds based on an alleged oral promise by Hazeldine to secure the debt with his policies. The administrator of the estate and the guardian of Hazeldine's adjudicated illegitimate minor daughter (his sole heir) opposed the claim, arguing that the insurance proceeds were exempt from debts and belonged to the heir. The trial court denied the claimant's request for a lien or preference on the proceeds. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court had in personam jurisdiction to determine the parties' rights to all five policies, including one located in Minnesota, because equity courts primarily act in personam and the location of the policies did not restrict that jurisdiction.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case involved a dispute between two New York insurance companies over liability for fire damage to property in Iowa owned by Clyde N. Whiting. The plaintiff, Home Insurance, sought to recover from the defendant, Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance, after both had issued overlapping policies; Fidelity-Phenix had directed its agent to cancel its policy effective March 15, 1934, and Home had agreed to increase coverage, but a fire occurred and the parties disputed whether the cancellation had taken effect. The trial court found that Fidelity-Phenix's policy had not been cancelled by mutual consent on that date and entered judgment against it. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the inference that the insured did not intend or understand the policy to be cancelled until he received formal notice from the defendant, and that the trial court's finding on the undisputed facts was reasonable and binding. The decision rested on principles allowing courts to draw reasonable inferences from facts regarding cancellation of insurance policies.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerns whether the estate of John Young, a shareholder and officer in the Traer State Bank, could be held liable for debts of two related private banks (Bank of Buckingham and Farmers Bank of Voorhies) after those banks failed in 1931. The banks had been organized with capital from the Traer State Bank, and ownership interests were allocated proportionally to Traer stockholders without separate stock certificates; Young's interest passed into his estate upon his death in 1927. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the estate and its distributees were liable to contribute to the banks' indebtedness, reasoning that the ownership structure created a contractual obligation tied to the bank interests that survived Young's death and remained with the estate. It further held that neither the general five-year statute of limitations nor the one-year estate-claim deadline barred the action, as the liability arose from post-death ownership of the interests and equitable circumstances excused formal claim filing.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case was a wrongful death action arising from a 1935 highway collision in Iowa in which the plaintiff's decedent, riding a motorcycle, struck the defendant's car as it turned left across the road. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff that the trial court upheld after remittitur of part of the damages. On appeal the court affirmed, holding that testimony about the motorcycle's speed was properly excluded as too remote or indefinite, that the evidence presented a factual dispute that precluded a directed verdict on either negligence or contributory negligence, and that the remaining claims of error concerning jury instructions and other rulings lacked the required specificity or merit.

torts & liabilityprocedure