Frederick F. Faville

The case concerned whether the Battens' $1,000 payment on principal of a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real estate, made to the original payee Smith after he had transferred the note and mortgage to Holden, should be credited against the note. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the payment was not binding on Holden. The court held that the Battens bore the burden of proving Smith was Holden's authorized agent to collect principal (as opposed to interest), which they failed to meet because the note was not produced at payment, there was no evidence of actual agency or ostensible authority, and records of other dealings were insufficient to establish the required authority.

property

The case involved a dispute over a promissory note and mortgage on appellants' homestead that they delivered to broker Smith to sell for cash, with proceeds to pay off an existing building and loan mortgage. Smith instead transferred the note and mortgage to appellee Baker to satisfy Smith's own prior debt, without paying off the prior mortgage. Appellants claimed the transfer involved fraud and breach of authority by Smith, but the court determined that Baker was a holder in due course under Iowa Code sections 9516 and 9518 because he had no actual knowledge of any title defect and his actions did not amount to bad faith. The court reasoned that the instruments were made payable to Smith and placed in his possession, giving him apparent authority to negotiate them, and Baker's reliance on Smith's statements that the prior mortgage had been cleared did not constitute bad faith. The district court judgment was affirmed.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to a petition filed to call an election on establishing a municipal court in Sioux City under Code section 10643, which required signatures from at least 15 percent of the qualified electors as shown by the poll list from the last municipal or state election. The dispute centered on whether 'poll list' referred to the permanent registration list of all qualified voters or only the certificates of registration documenting those who actually voted. The court interpreted the term to mean the records of actual participants in the election, based on provisions in Chapters 475 and 39-B1 of the Code that equate poll lists or poll books with the certificates returned after voting in permanent-registration cities. It concluded that the petition met the statutory threshold under this definition and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the challenge.

electionsprocedure

The case involved a manslaughter charge against Elva L. Long for the death of Martha Stull, who was struck by his automobile while stepping off a stopped streetcar on University Avenue in Des Moines. Long was driving at an estimated 40-50 miles per hour, passed the streetcar, and caused severe injuries that led to Stull's death hours later. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the short-form indictment was valid, the evidence was sufficient to present a jury question on the facts, and there were no prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence, jury instructions, opening statements, or other trial rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a bank receiver suing a former director and depositor to recover proceeds from two certificates of deposit that the director had transferred before the North English Savings Bank closed in 1928. In one transaction, the director assigned a $2,000 certificate to the bank's president in exchange for a personal note secured by collateral; in the other, he exchanged a $3,500 certificate for a new certificate from another bank. The receiver relied on prior precedent holding bank officers accountable for withdrawals from insolvent institutions, and the court assumed the bank was insolvent at the time but found no fraud or bad faith. The court held that the transactions were ordinary business dealings in due course, with the transferees providing full value without collusion, and therefore declined to extend trustee liability to the director. The trial court's dismissal of the receiver's petition was affirmed.

business & regulatory

The case involved a contract dispute between a paving company and a property owner over the construction of a driveway, where the written agreement set a price per square foot with specific payment terms and required the company to repair any defects at its own expense within five years. After the driveway was built, the owner made payments but not strictly on the dates specified, later giving a note for the balance; when defects appeared, the owner sought damages for repair costs via counterclaim. The court held that the proper measure of damages was the reasonable cost of repairs rather than any difference in property value, as the contract expressly provided for such repairs. It also ruled that the exact timing of payments was not a condition precedent to the repair obligation, since time was not made of the essence in the contract and the parties had accepted the delayed payments and note by their conduct. The judgment in favor of the owner on the counterclaim was affirmed.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a collision between a passenger car and a gravel truck on a highway construction site in Iowa, where the plaintiff sought damages from the paving contractor and a subcontractor. The central issue on appeal was whether the truck driver was an employee of the subcontractor (White), making the defendants vicariously liable, or an independent contractor. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the driver was an independent contractor based on the terms of his contract with White, which established a contract for service rather than of service: the driver supplied his own equipment and fuel, set his own compensation and hours, could hire additional drivers, and was paid per batch hauled without direct control over his methods. The court found no employer-employee relationship that would impose liability on the defendants.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case concerned a bank's effort to foreclose a real estate mortgage on a homestead to collect on a $1,500 promissory note signed only by the husband, which was separately secured by a chattel mortgage on his business inventory. The mortgage document contained a clause covering other debts, but the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decree reforming the mortgage to strike that clause and denying foreclosure on the $1,500 note. The court found clear evidence that the parties had specifically negotiated and agreed the homestead would secure only the separate $1,000 note signed by both spouses, with no intention to encumber the property for the additional debt. Reformation was granted because the broad clause did not reflect the parties' actual understanding at execution and no third-party rights were involved.

property

The case concerns a claimant's effort to recover funds transferred to the Moravia Bank via check from an Omaha account, specifically to obtain certified checks supporting a bid to the state highway commission. The dissent argues that the deposit was not a general one but instead a specific deposit for a limited purpose, understood by all parties, after which the funds were to be returned. It concludes that the bank held the money as trustee and that the claim qualifies as preferred under chapter 30 of the Acts of the 43d General Assembly. The majority opinion reached the opposite result. The dissent would therefore classify the claim as preferred rather than general.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a defendant charged under Iowa Code Section 12967 with unlawful carnal knowledge of a female naturally of such imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance. The trial court submitted the included offense of assault with intent to commit rape but not assault and battery or simple assault. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that under the evidence presented, the lesser offenses of assault and battery and simple assault should have been submitted to the jury as included offenses, following precedent from State v. Hoaglin. The court noted a division among justices regarding whether the evidence sufficiently showed the prosecutrix's imbecility but did not resolve that issue due to the reversal on other grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a mortgage foreclosure action in which the plaintiff sought appointment of a receiver to manage the property and collect rents, and the defendants resisted that request while demanding an immediate hearing. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to continue the receiver hearing until after the foreclosure decree and sheriff's sale. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the timing of such a hearing is a procedural matter committed to the trial court's sound discretion. The court explained that it would not interfere absent a clear abuse of that discretion, which was not shown on the record, and that the ultimate merits of appointing a receiver were not before it on appeal.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with bootlegging after allegedly selling a can of alcohol to buyers on a farm near Creston, Iowa. The state introduced evidence of eleven additional cans of alcohol found during a search of the same building the next day. The defendant argued that this evidence should not have been admitted because he did not reside on the property and it did not connect him to the items. The court held that the evidence was properly admitted as circumstantial proof linking the defendant to the location and the sale, and it found no error in the jury instructions regarding the exhibits or the definition of the crime. The conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a judgment creditor (who had acted as surety on an appeal bond and received an assigned promissory note and mortgage as collateral) and the judgment debtor, concerning the creditor's delay in foreclosing on the Missouri real estate securing the $4,500 note. The lower court found the creditor negligent for not foreclosing by September 1926 and credited the debtor with the note's full face value plus interest as of that date. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debtor failed to prove damages from any delay because no competent evidence established the note and mortgage's value at the relevant time, given the senior liens, land depreciation, and makers' insolvency; only the net proceeds actually received from the 1929 foreclosure could be credited. The matter was remanded for recomputation consistent with that ruling.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a widow who insured her automobile against theft with the defendant insurer but faced denial of her claim after the vehicle was stolen, on the ground that a prior transfer of the registration certificate to her adult daughter meant she was not the policy's required unconditional and sole owner. The plaintiff contended the registration transfer was merely colorable, done to shield the car from a creditor claim against her late husband's estate, and that she retained actual ownership; she supported this with evidence that she could not read or write and that the documents were obtained through misrepresentations. The trial court treated ownership as a factual dispute, allowed evidence contradicting the registration and related writings, instructed the jury that the registration was only prima facie evidence of title, and denied the insurer's motion for directed verdict; the jury found for the plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that under Iowa law the registration statute does not conclusively establish title as between the parties and a third-party insurer, that the true ownership agreement could be shown by other evidence, and that the issue was properly submitted to the jury.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Bott Bros. Manufacturing suing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad for damage to a box car that the manufacturer had delivered to the railroad for shipment to a consignee in Arkansas. The railroad transported the loaded car to St. Louis and handed it off to a connecting carrier, which delivered it and later returned the empty car, during which the damage occurred on the connecting carrier's line before redelivery to the railroad. The court dismissed the suit, finding no evidence of any agreement making the railroad responsible for the return trip of the car, and that under the bill of lading the railroad's duty was limited to delivery to the connecting carrier without damage, which it fulfilled.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved a 1930 car collision at an intersection in Boone, Iowa, where plaintiff Waldman, a guest passenger in his daughter's sedan, was injured when the vehicle was struck by a roadster driven by 16-year-old Frank Sanders; Waldman sued Frank, his father Ben Sanders, and the Sanders Motor Company for negligence, resulting in a jury verdict of $5,250 for the plaintiff. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The core reasoning centered on errors in the trial court's jury instructions, including Instruction No. 9 which improperly suggested that exceeding the statutory speed limit constituted negligence as a matter of law without allowing for excuse, failed to limit considerations to evidence or pleaded allegations, and similar flaws in Instruction No. 13 that did not restrict recovery items to the petition's claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved depositors who sought preferred status for uncollected checks totaling over $2,500 deposited into the Security Trust & Savings Bank on May 17, 1930, shortly before the bank closed and a receiver was appointed. The majority held that the deposit created a debtor-creditor relationship, denying the preference. The dissenting opinion argued that the passbook's printed terms established an agency relationship for collection, under which the bank's insolvency revoked the agency and entitled the claimants to recover the checks or their value as a preferred claim against the receiver's assets. The dissent cited the contract language, analogous statutes from other states, and precedents supporting the agency rule when items are received for deposit or collection subject to final payment.

business & regulatory

The case involved a 1930 automobile collision in Mason City, Iowa, where the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's car while turning west onto Eleventh Street from Carolina Avenue; the plaintiff alleged the defendant was driving negligently, including at excessive speed around a streetcar. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff after a jury verdict, rejecting claims of contributory negligence and challenges to voir dire questions about insurance company ties. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions erroneously incorporated detailed statutory rules on vehicle speed, control, and intersections that were not fairly supported by the petition's broad negligence allegations, rendering the instructions confusing to the jury. The court found no reversible error in allowing limited insurance-related voir dire or in submitting contributory negligence to the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a tax lien for unpaid motor carrier taxes assessed against Bert Alexander could attach to a Ford truck that Universal Credit Co. had repossessed under a conditional sales contract before the tax warrant was executed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against selling the truck, ruling that the lien under Code Section 5105-a50 did not apply because Alexander had no remaining property interest in the vehicle at the time of the levy. The court reasoned that the statute created a first lien on all property of the motor carrier, but under the conditional sales contract Alexander held only a contractual right to title that was extinguished upon repossession, leaving the truck outside the scope of his property subject to the lien.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the estate of Kendrick, who died after being under guardianship; his former guardian Caldwell was appointed special administrator and had previously deposited over $11,000 of estate funds in a private bank in which he held a one-third ownership interest. After Kendrick's death, Caldwell receipted for the funds as special administrator, inventoried them as estate assets, but failed to comply with a court order to deposit them in another bank; the original bank later failed, resulting in loss of the funds. The trial court entered judgment against Caldwell and the surety on his special administrator's bond, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding them liable. The court reasoned that the funds were treated as received by Caldwell in his capacity as special administrator, that his ownership interest in the bank created a conflict equivalent to self-dealing with no protection from the insolvency, and that his negligence in not withdrawing or transferring the funds as required made the surety responsible.

propertyprocedure