
United States v. Evans
District Court, S.D. New York · 1976-12-03 · cited 14×
The case involved defendants John Evans and Marcus Hand, who were charged with participating in an armed bank robbery in New York and sought dismissal of the indictment after a mistrial and retrial proceedings. They argued that the government violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers by failing to bring them to trial within 120 days of their April 1976 appearance in federal court under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and by returning them to Pennsylvania custody without trial. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the writ ad testificandum did not qualify as a detainer triggering the Agreement's protections under Article IV, unlike a writ ad prosequendum, and that the defendants' status as pretrial detainees and the sequence of proceedings did not violate applicable speedy trial rules or the Agreement's requirements.
criminal lawprocedure
Tabacalera Cubana, SA v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1974-07-12 · cited 12×
This case concerns a dispute over who is entitled to payment for cigars shipped from Cuba to an American importer both before and after the Castro government's 1960 expropriation of the Cuban manufacturer Tabacalera, a subsidiary of American Brands. The Cuban government and its agencies, on one side, and American Brands as successor to the original owners, on the other, each claimed the purchase price from defendant Faber, Coe & Gregg, which had made some payments to the Cuban interventors after expropriation. The court addressed only the defendant's motion to dismiss the portion of American Brands' claim seeking recovery for pre-expropriation shipments on which payment had been mistakenly made to the Cuban government, on the ground that the claim was barred by New York's six-year statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, holding that the additional claim was an amendment that related back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to the date of the original state-court pleading because it arose from the same transactions and occurrences and caused no substantial prejudice to the defendant.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
United States v. Rizzo
District Court, S.D. New York · 1973-10-04 · cited 4×
In United States v. Rizzo, defendants were charged with conspiracy to use extortionate means to collect a loan under 18 U.S.C. § 894 and with using an interstate facility to further that unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1952; the indictment detailed the alleged scheme but omitted the name of the prospective victim because it was unknown to the grand jury and government. The defendants moved for a bill of particulars seeking the victim's identity and, implicitly, to dismiss the indictment for insufficiency. The court denied the motion, holding that the indictment adequately stated the elements of the offenses, informed the defendants of the charges, and protected against double jeopardy. The core reasoning was that, because the charges involved conspiracy rather than the completed substantive crime of extortion, the victim's identity was not an essential element of the offense and need not be alleged.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Sisca
District Court, S.D. New York · 1973-06-25 · cited 33×
This case involved multiple defendants charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics and related offenses under federal law, including use of telephones to facilitate violations and, for one defendant, operating a continuing criminal enterprise. The prosecution introduced intercepted telephone conversations obtained via state wiretap orders as key evidence leading to convictions after a six-week trial. Following the verdicts, defendants moved to suppress the wiretap evidence on grounds that law enforcement failed to minimize interception of non-relevant calls as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) and parallel New York law. The court denied the motions in full, ruling that defendants had waived the claims by failing to raise them before trial and that, even on the merits, the minimization efforts satisfied statutory requirements given the broad nature of the conspiracy and reasonable monitoring practices employed.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. General Electric Company
District Court, S.D. New York · 1973-05-08 · cited 21×
This case is a civil antitrust suit by the United States against General Electric under Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, challenging GE's long-standing consignment agency system for distributing large lamps, under which GE retains title to the lamps and requires agents to sell at prices fixed by GE. The Government moved for summary judgment, arguing that prior Supreme Court and district court decisions upholding the same system in 1926 and 1949 are no longer controlling because GE no longer holds a dominant patent position in large lamps and because later cases such as Simpson v. Union Oil Co. have altered the law on vertical price fixing through genuine agency arrangements. GE countered that the earlier rulings remain stare decisis, that res judicata or collateral estoppel bars relitigation, and that the rule of reason rather than a per se rule should apply. After the parties stipulated that GE lacks a controlling patent position, the court examined whether the 1926 holding on agency price fixing survives subsequent precedent and whether the prior judgments preclude the present action.
business & regulatory
United States v. Heng Awkak Roman
District Court, S.D. New York · 1973-03-19 · cited 36×
The case involved defendants Heng Roman and Lee Koo, charged with conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws and with possession of 2.5 kilograms of heroin with intent to distribute. Following a bench trial, the court found both guilty on the conspiracy count and, on the substantive count, convicted them of an attempt to commit the offense after reserving decision. The facts showed the defendants met an informer in Singapore, displayed what was confirmed to be high-purity heroin in a suitcase, arranged to sell it in New York, and negotiated with undercover agents, but the heroin had been removed by authorities and replaced with soap powder. The court reasoned that the defendants possessed the required mens rea, would have had constructive possession if circumstances had been as they believed, and their conduct went beyond mere preparation to constitute an attempt under the statute.
criminal law
Mosher v. LaVallee
District Court, S.D. New York · 1972-12-07 · cited 15×
The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition by Robert Mosher, who was serving a 40-60 year sentence as a second felony offender after pleading guilty to armed robbery in New York state court. Mosher claimed his plea was involuntary, either because the sentencing judge promised a minimum sentence that was broken or because his attorney falsely assured him of such a promise. After holding an evidentiary hearing with testimony from the judge, attorneys, and others, the court found no promise or commitment had been made by the judge, though Mosher expected a 15-16 year sentence based on a misunderstanding. The court decided to allow the state courts to determine whether Mosher could withdraw his plea and stand trial or receive a reduced sentence matching his expectation, as this would fairly address the circumstances without granting full relief on the plea claim.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
United States v. Wilson
District Court, S.D. New York · 1972-07-20 · cited 4×
The case involved Ronald Wilson, a Jehovah's Witness, who was charged with willfully failing to submit to induction into the armed forces under the Military Selective Service Act after his local board denied his conscientious objector claim. Wilson had registered, received deferments and orders, and only sought a conscientious objector form after an induction order issued; he refused induction citing his religious beliefs. The court granted his motion for acquittal, finding him not guilty. The core reasoning was that Wilson's longstanding religious beliefs entitled him to consideration of his claim, but Selective Service personnel provided misleading advice and failed to assist him properly, depriving him of any forum to have the claim reviewed on the merits before or after induction.
criminal lawreligious liberty
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1972-06-14 · cited 29×
The case arose from the 1960 Cuban government's intervention and confiscation of five leading Havana cigar manufacturers, after which the former Cuban owners fled to the US and sued American importers for trademark infringement and unpaid amounts due on cigars shipped from the seized Cuban plants, while the Cuban interventors separately asserted rights to the same claims. The court had earlier determined that the former owners could pursue the trademark claims but the interventors were entitled to the debt claims for post-intervention shipments. On the merits of the trademark claims under the Lanham Act, the court held there was no infringement because the marks were used on genuine goods without likelihood of consumer confusion or deception, the former owners' rights did not extend to block such uses after the intervention and embargo, and any related claims for damages or injunctions failed for lack of proof or legal basis.
business & regulatoryproperty
Domingo v. States Marine Lines
District Court, S.D. New York · 1972-04-13 · cited 21×
The case arose from a 1966 ship collision in Manila Harbor, Philippines, between a U.S.-flag vessel owned by defendant States Marine Lines and a Philippine vessel, resulting in the sinking of the latter and the deaths or injuries of approximately 100 Philippine citizens and residents. Plaintiffs, all Philippine citizens, filed wrongful death and personal injury actions in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under diversity and general maritime law jurisdiction. Defendant moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. The court granted the motions, holding that the Philippines was an available alternative forum because the defendant was amenable to jurisdiction there (with conditions including waiver of the statute of limitations), and that private and public interest factors, such as access to witnesses and evidence located primarily in the Philippines, favored adjudication there rather than in New York.
proceduretorts & liability
Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. Giffen Industries, Inc.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1971-12-30 · cited 12×
The case involved Mohasco Industries suing Giffen Industries on a written guaranty in which Giffen promised to pay amounts owed by its subsidiary Marsh for carpet products sold on open account by Mohasco. After Marsh stopped payments and filed an antitrust suit in California, Mohasco obtained an attachment and sought summary judgment in New York federal court following removal on diversity grounds; Giffen raised defenses of fraud in the inducement of the guaranty and argued liability should await resolution of the antitrust claims. The court granted summary judgment to Mohasco, holding that the undisputed facts showed valid sales and delivery of goods, no duty by Mohasco to disclose any contemplated termination of the distributorship, and that Marsh's separate antitrust claims did not affect Giffen's independent obligations under the guaranty, which expressly waived such defenses.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Carswell Trucks, Inc. v. International Harvester Co.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1971-12-03 · cited 10×
This case is a private antitrust action brought by truck dealer Carswell Trucks, Inc. against manufacturer International Harvester Co. alleging that Harvester's optional rebate plan for service parts, which rewarded dealers for reselling at or below specified prices, violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court denied both Carswell's motion for partial summary judgment on liability and Harvester's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. The core reasoning was that a plaintiff in a private antitrust suit under Section 4 of the Clayton Act must prove not only an antitrust violation but also actual injury to its business or property, and the record left a genuine factual dispute unresolved as to whether Carswell suffered any damages from the plan.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Negri v. Schering Corporation
District Court, S.D. New York · 1971-10-30 · cited 15×
This diversity case under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 involved actress Pola Negri suing Schering Corporation for publishing her photograph from the film Bella Donna in a two-page advertisement for the allergy drug Polaramine Repetabs without her consent. The district court granted Negri’s motion for summary judgment on liability and denied Schering’s cross-motion, holding that the image was a recognizable likeness of the plaintiff and that its use constituted advertising or trade purposes under the statute. The court rejected Schering’s arguments that the likeness was unrecognizable and that the photo was merely incidental, noting its prominent placement and the explicit product recommendation. It further held that New York law applied because the magazines circulated widely in New York, allowing nonresidents to sue under §§ 50 and 51. The case was set for trial on damages.
civil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure
Groban v. S.S. Pegu
District Court, S.D. New York · 1971-07-23 · cited 13×
The case involved two consolidated actions regarding a shipment of Caterpillar tractor parts damaged en route from Sierra Leone to New York: an admiralty suit against the vessel and its operator alleging reliance on a misdescribed, claused bill of lading, and a diversity suit against the marine insurer seeking recovery under an open cargo policy. The court held that the plaintiffs possessed an insurable interest in the goods and could recover on the policy. Its core reasoning was that the policy expressly permitted coverage for shipments on behalf of others upon prior written instructions, the goods had been identified to the purchase and resale contracts, and New York precedent recognized an insurable interest once the buyer bore the risk of loss, regardless of the pre-shipment damage noted in the bill of lading.
business & regulatory
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INDIA SUP. MIS.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1970-11-30
This case involved consolidated claims by Hellenic Lines, a Greek shipping company, against the Director General of the India Supply Mission acting for the Union of India, seeking damages for vessel detention and lighterage expenses arising from delays in discharging fertilizer and rice shipments at congested Indian ports like Bombay under contracts of affreightment and bills of lading negotiated in the United States. The court dismissed all claims after a bench trial, holding that the freight contracts assigned discharge responsibilities and expenses to the carrier at shoreside berths, with no obligation on the consignee to supply lighters, accept delivery at anchorage, or nominate alternative ports. Core reasoning focused on the terms of the contracts controlling over inconsistent bill of lading clauses, the absence of any implied consent or liability for port congestion caused by labor issues, and insufficient evidence of breaches once vessels were berthed.
business & regulatory
United States v. Re
District Court, S.D. New York · 1970-06-02 · cited 16×
In United States v. Re, defendants charged with criminal violations of the internal revenue laws moved to suppress documents obtained from their accountant via a grand jury subpoena duces tecum and to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the documents were illegally seized in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The court denied the motion in full. It held that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the subpoena or the seizure because they had neither actual nor constructive possession of the accountant's workpapers and thus could not assert any privilege against self-incrimination. The court further found that the use of a forthwith subpoena was justified under the circumstances to prevent potential document tampering and did not constitute an abuse of process.
criminal lawproceduretaxes
Smith v. Murchison
District Court, S.D. New York · 1970-03-24 · cited 27×
This case is a stockholder derivative and class action brought by a shareholder of Alleghany Corporation against former officers and directors, alleging violations of multiple sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and state-law fiduciary duties arising from the defendants' sale of Alleghany stock to Gamble-Skogmo at a premium allegedly tied to the transfer of corporate control. The moving defendants, served in Texas, sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, transfer of the case. The court transferred the action to the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), holding that venue was improper in the Southern District of New York because the claims arose in Texas, all individual defendants were domiciled there, and transfer served the interests of justice; it noted that the action could have been brought in that district under the applicable venue statutes and that personal jurisdiction issues would not bar transfer.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Medical Ass'n
District Court, S.D. New York · 1970-03-16
This case involves a nonprofit organization, Friends of Animals, Inc., that sues national and state veterinary professional associations under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, alleging a conspiracy to restrain its spaying program for homeless cats and dogs through minimum fee schedules, threats of expulsion against participating veterinarians, and campaigns to discredit the organization. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the matter did not involve trade or commerce, that damages were not adequately shown, and that the plaintiff lacked standing. The court denied the motion in full, holding that the plaintiff was engaged in trade or commerce as a nonprofit hiring veterinary services, that the complaint sufficiently alleged monetary harm, and that the antitrust violations were directly aimed at the plaintiff, giving it standing to sue.
business & regulatory
American Dredging Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.
District Court, S.D. New York · 1970-02-24 · cited 20×
The case concerned a maritime insurance dispute in which plaintiff American Dredging Co., after repairing damage to a pipeline it was constructing, sought to recover its expenses from defendant insurers while having already received an equivalent sum from another insurer (London) under a "loan" arrangement. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the payment extinguished plaintiff's loss, that London was the real party in interest pursuing contribution from co-insurers, and that plaintiff therefore could not maintain the action in its own name. The court ruled that plaintiff could not recover the paid amount on its own behalf under Rule 17(a), allowed 30 days to join London as a plaintiff or amend the complaint to seek only an additional uncompensated claim of about $70,000, and denied without prejudice the alternative request to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The core reasoning was that the London payment functioned as satisfaction of the loss rather than a true loan, leaving only contribution rights that London itself must assert, while any separate additional claim could proceed independently.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
VTR, INCORPORATED v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
District Court, S.D. New York · 1969-07-30 · cited 32×
This case involved a dispute arising from 1965 contracts under which VTR assigned its rights to repurchase a tire retail business from Goodrich to Goodyear in exchange for payments and ongoing commissions for advisory services, while also asserting federal antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. VTR alleged breach of contract by Goodyear and violations leading to treble damages. The court treated the defendants' motion as one for summary judgment due to submitted affidavits and granted it, dismissing all three counts of the amended complaint. For the contract claim, the court found the agreement's terms permitted Goodyear's actions without creating liability for breach. For the antitrust claims, the court held that VTR lacked standing because any injury was indirect and incidental rather than a direct result of the alleged conduct.
business & regulatory