Theodore G. Garfield

This case involved a dispute over the amount of damages owed to landowners after the Iowa State Highway Commission used eminent domain to condemn approximately five acres of their 33.9-acre property, along with access rights, for the construction of Interstate 80 and a substitute access road near Iowa City. The landowners appealed the commission's initial assessment, and after a jury trial awarded them $27,500, the commission appealed, claiming errors in the jury instructions. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on how to consider evidence of comparable sales as substantive evidence of property value and that the instruction on loss of access rights was insufficiently specific. The majority reasoned that under recent precedent, comparable sales evidence is admissible without limitation and requires an appropriate instruction, while the access instruction did not adequately guide the jury on assessing impairment of reasonable access.

propertyprocedure

The case involved two insurance companies that paid damages to victims of a car accident caused by an intoxicated driver and then sued the defendant liquor licensee for contribution, indemnity, and damages under Iowa's dram shop statutes (sections 129.2 and 123.95) as well as common-law negligence. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed that dismissal. The court held that the statutes create a cause of action for persons injured in their property—including insurers who made payments due to the intoxication—and that the petition sufficiently alleged the defendant's sale of liquor to the driver was a proximate cause of the collision. The opinion explained that Iowa's dram shop acts are to be liberally construed and that questions of proximate cause are generally for the jury when the facts are taken as true on a motion to dismiss.

torts & liability

The case involved 33 Des Moines police detectives who appealed to the city's Civil Service Commission, claiming that a 1966 city council ordinance increasing their pay at a lower rate than sergeants constituted an illegal demotion violating civil service and veterans' preference laws. The commission dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction by a 2-1 vote, a decision upheld by the district court on certiorari review. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission had no authority to review the ordinance because the city council was acting in its legislative capacity to set salaries for an entire classification rather than as an appointing authority under chapter 365 of the Code. The court reasoned that allowing the commission to override such legislative actions would improperly disrupt municipal government structure, and any challenge to the council's action belonged in court instead.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Willie Mayhew's appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder after he fatally stabbed Ellis McClellan during a drunken argument over buying wine. The primary issues on appeal concerned the trial court's admission of a post-arrest statement by the defendant to police, challenges to other evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions, with the defendant arguing violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Miranda standards. The court held that the statement was voluntary and not elicited through improper interrogation, that any objections regarding incomplete Miranda warnings were not properly preserved at trial, and that other assigned errors lacked merit, thereby affirming the conviction. Dissenting opinions focused on the denial of access to certain police or witness reports for impeachment purposes.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Church, the defendant was charged and convicted by a jury of robbery without aggravation after an incident in which he and companions allegedly assaulted and took money from a hitchhiker on Interstate 29. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of statements made to a highway patrolman before Miranda warnings were given, as well as the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on his defense of intoxication negating specific intent. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the pre-Miranda conversation was admissible because the investigation had not yet focused on the defendant and he was not in custody. The court also found the evidence insufficient to support an intoxication defense, as no testimony established that the defendant was incapable of forming the required intent due to beer consumption or glue sniffing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Iris Smith challenging the Iowa Liquor Control Commission's confirmation of the automatic revocation of her class B beer permit after her employee Elsie Watts was convicted of selling beer to a minor on the premises, in violation of Code section 124.20(3). The district court annulled the cancellation of Smith's liquor license but sustained the beer permit revocation, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed that ruling on appeal. The court held that under Code section 124.30(3), the permit is automatically revoked upon the employee's conviction without any requirement for prior notice or hearing to the permit holder. The majority reasoned that the statute's plain language provides for revocation by operation of law, the commission had adequate records including the conviction to act, and due process was satisfied under existing precedent like Walker v. City of Clinton.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by an employee who suffered thermal burns in 1958 while working for Bituminous Material & Supply Co., which later developed into skin malignancies diagnosed in 1966. The claimant filed his application for arbitration in September 1966, more than two years after the original injury, leading the industrial commissioner to dismiss the claim under Iowa Code section 85.26 as untimely. The district court affirmed the dismissal, and the Iowa Supreme Court upheld that ruling on appeal. The court reasoned that the two-year limitation period begins to run from the date of the injury causing the disability, not from the later discovery or diagnosis of its full nature or malignancy, and that compliance with this condition is essential to the right to benefits. It also held that defendants did not need to plead the time bar as a special defense because the statute conditions the right itself rather than serving as a procedural limitation.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was an appeal by Curtis Lee Redding from his jury conviction for robbery with aggravation under Iowa Code section 711.2, based on robbing a gas station attendant at gunpoint. Redding challenged three trial court rulings: denial of his pretrial request for a list of investigating police officers and the nature of their work, admission of a mug-shot photograph used for the victim's identification, and admission of a victim's conversation with an eyewitness describing the robber as res gestae. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the discovery denial under precedents like State v. Eads that limit production of police work product, and holding the photographic and res gestae evidence admissible without improper references to prior arrests. The core reasoning emphasized that pretrial discovery is restricted absent specific existing documents or constitutional requirements, while allowing corroborative identification evidence if it avoids implying a defendant's criminal record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved carpenters who built a home for the defendants under an oral agreement and sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for about $3,343 in additional costs beyond the defendants’ loan amount. The trial court found that the parties had agreed the total construction cost would not exceed $24,000, that the plaintiffs had repeatedly assured the defendants the project was on budget, and that the plaintiffs had not met this limit, leading to denial of relief. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed after a de novo review, giving weight to the trial court’s factual findings, holding that an express agreement on price precluded recovery on an implied contract theory for reasonable value, and finding the plaintiffs’ evidence on value insufficient. The court noted that any claim of mistake in the estimate could not be raised for the first time on appeal and that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving their claimed contract.

property

This case involves an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order setting aside a default judgment in a subrogation action where plaintiff Insurance Co. of North America sought to recover from defendant Sperry & Hutchison Co. for fire damage caused by defendant's alleged negligence. Plaintiff obtained the default after proper service on defendant's process agent, with no timely appearance or answer filed. Defendant moved under Rule 236 to set aside the judgment, citing mistake and inadvertence in the internal routing of the notice among insurers, supported by affidavits, but the evidence showed no specific excusable error by the relevant parties. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's finding of good cause lacked evidentiary support under the applicable standard from prior cases like Handy v. Handy and Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., and remanded with instructions to reinstate the default judgment.

procedure

This case concerns an equity action by the heirs of a deceased property owner to set aside a tax deed issued after a 1963 tax sale, where the purchaser sought to quiet title; the central issue was whether notice of the expiration of the redemption period was required to be served on Lorenzo Duke under Iowa Code section 447.9 because of his possession of the Des Moines residence. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding Duke had been in possession by storing lumber, junk, and other items on the premises, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed that decree as modified, allowing the heirs to redeem. The court reasoned that the visible pile of lumber and other materials on the property in 1966 constituted actual possession sufficient to put the tax purchaser on inquiry notice, requiring service on Duke who had not been notified, even though no one was living in the dwelling at the time. The decision rests on de novo review giving weight to the trial court's factual findings regarding the nature and duration of Duke's use of the property.

propertytaxes

The case involved a defendant convicted in Dubuque municipal court of a traffic violation under a city ordinance for running a red light and colliding with another vehicle; he was fined $35 and costs after pleading not guilty. He sought to appeal to district court under Iowa Code section 762.43 but filed written notice 29 days after judgment (beyond the 20-day limit) and had already paid the fine on the day it was imposed. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the untimely and improperly filed notice, as well as waiver from voluntary payment satisfying the judgment. On further appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial compliance with statutory timing and notice requirements is jurisdictional, payment of the fine constituted acquiescence waiving the appeal right absent coercion, and claims of ineffective counsel did not excuse the defects or extend the deadline. The court noted that while appeals from justice or municipal courts generally cannot be dismissed, proper and timely invocation of appellate jurisdiction is still required.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned defendant Allan, who was acquitted by jury of assault with intent to murder on grounds of insanity and then ordered committed by the district court to the State Mental Health Institute under Iowa Code section 785.19 after a hearing found his discharge would endanger public peace and safety. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the commitment order, rejecting challenges that the defendant was not "in custody" while on bail, that the dangerousness finding lacked evidentiary support, that the commitment terms exceeded statutory authority, and that the statute and order violated due process and jury trial rights under the Iowa Constitution. The court held that bail constitutes constructive custody sufficient for the statute, that the proceeding is a civil commitment exercising the state's police power rather than a criminal punishment, and that post-commitment habeas corpus review satisfies constitutional requirements. It further ruled the order appealable as a final civil judgment and that the 1967 statutory amendments did not retroactively affect the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a prisoner who had pleaded guilty to robbery and later sought a writ of habeas corpus in district court, claiming his attorney was incompetent for advising the plea without explaining trial options. The district court denied the writ on May 14, 1968, and the prisoner filed a notice of appeal on June 14, 1968. The Iowa Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 335 requires appeals to be taken within 30 days of the judgment, making June 13 the deadline and rendering the filing one day late. Because the timeliness requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, the court lacked authority to consider the appeal or the underlying claims about counsel's performance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a car dealership suing a neighboring store owner (Scott’s) and a painter (VeDepo) for damage to 39 vehicles caused by overspray from painting the store building, with the plaintiff relying on negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The trial court found Scott’s vicariously liable as VeDepo’s employer and awarded $1,050 in damages. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence established VeDepo as an independent contractor rather than an employee because Scott’s merely contracted for a completed painting job, furnished the paint, and exercised no supervision or control over the work methods. The court emphasized that Scott’s paid a fixed price upon completion and that no evidence showed direction by Scott’s agents during the job. Issues regarding the painter’s own liability were not properly raised on appeal and could not support affirmance.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Medina, the defendant was charged under Iowa Code section 742.1 with knowingly and willfully resisting a deputy sheriff's attempt to execute an order issued by the Appanoose County Hospital Commission to take him into custody. After a jury trial, Medina was convicted and fined $200, and he appealed on grounds including defects in the information and insufficient proof that the order was legal or properly served. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that objections to the information's omission of the word "legal" were waived because they were not raised by demurrer before trial as required by Code sections 777.2 and 777.3, and that substantial evidence supported the jury's findings that the order appeared regular, the officer complied with statutory execution requirements, and Medina forcibly resisted. The court also noted that failure to renew a motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence constituted waiver, and it found no reversible error in the trial court's rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a hotel guest who slipped and fell on a wet marble floor in the lobby after snow was tracked in from outside during a blizzard, sustaining a broken ankle. The guest sued the hotel for negligence in failing to remove the water or warn of the hazard and won a jury verdict, which the hotel appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence. The court reasoned that hotels owe only ordinary or reasonable care under the circumstances and are not required to immediately remove every deposit of tracked snow or water, as this would demand an unreasonable degree of extraordinary care; weather-related tracked moisture on floors does not by itself create an actionable condition absent other factors like structural defects.

torts & liability

The case involved defendant Gillespie, who was convicted after a jury trial of assault with intent to rob under Iowa Code section 694.7 following an incident at a Des Moines service station where the victim testified that the defendant pointed a gun at him and ordered him to hand over cash from the register before fleeing upon a customer's arrival. On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on alibi, its overruling of a motion in limine to bar certain prejudicial terms, and its refusal of two requested jury instructions. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on assault and intent, that no reversible error occurred regarding the alibi instruction or the motion in limine, and that the requested instructions were properly denied because they improperly argued the case rather than stating the law.

criminal law

This case involved a defendant charged with breaking and entering who appealed a district court order denying his release from custody on personal recognizance and instead setting a $1,000 bond. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order after a summary review of the record. The court held that the proceedings supported the magistrate's discretionary determination that release without bond would not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance, based on factors including his insecure family status due to divorce proceedings, unstable employment history, lack of financial resources or property, evidence of mental health issues, and prior minor offenses. The statute governing pretrial release conditions was applied, which requires consideration of the offense's nature, the defendant's ties to the community, and other relevant circumstances, with appeals to be affirmed if supported by the district court record.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Berenger, the defendant was charged and convicted under Iowa Code section 708.8 of breaking and entering a garage with intent to commit a public offense. He appealed, arguing that the county attorney's information was insufficient because it did not specify the particular public offense intended, that he was surprised by the state's evidence of multiple intended offenses, and that jury instruction 10 was erroneous. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the information was valid under sections 773.4 and 773.5 because it used the statutory name of the offense and referenced the relevant code section, and that a bill of particulars was not required. The court further reasoned that alleging multiple intents in a single count did not render the information duplicitous, as breaking and entering with intent to commit one or more public offenses constitutes only a single crime.

criminal lawprocedure