Arndt v. Lapel
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 26×
This case involves a dispute between the widow of Fred Arndt and his daughter over ownership of a quarter section of land. The widow claimed title through a warranty deed executed by the deceased in 1929, while the daughter alleged the deed was obtained through undue influence, that the grantor lacked mental capacity, and that there was no valid delivery or that it was revoked along with a will. The trial court ruled in favor of the widow by quieting title in her name. On appeal, the court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence of valid delivery, the grantor's sound mind at the time, and that the deed was not testamentary in nature or revoked.
propertyfamily law
State v. Henricksen
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 4×
In State v. Henricksen, the defendant was charged with arson for allegedly setting fire to a barn in Decatur County, Iowa, in January 1931. He pleaded not guilty, but a jury convicted him based partly on his signed confession. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved the corpus delicti as required by statute when a confession is not made in open court. The evidence showed the barn was securely closed with animals inside shortly before the fire, but the fire started from within with doors open and animals removed, indicating someone had intentionally set the blaze and freed the livestock.
criminal lawprocedure
Maasdam v. Kirkpatrick
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 6×
This case concerns a lawsuit by landowners in Iowa's Drainage District No. 17 against the Jasper County Board of Supervisors and auditor, seeking to block changes to the district's drainage plan that would reroute the North Skunk River around a privately owned mill dam and destroy its water power. The intervener, dam owner J.W. Wagaman, had previously settled a damages claim based on an agreement to maintain flow over the dam, but the board later attempted to implement the bypass as a "repair" under its existing authority. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed an injunction against the board, ruling that the project was not a repair but a new construction requiring statutory procedures for original establishment—such as petitions, notices, bonds, and reassessments—because it altered the fundamental plan and the estimated costs exceeded 10 percent of the original ditch expense. The court held that without these steps, the board lacked jurisdiction, rendering its actions void.
propertyprocedureenvironment
Wosoba v. Kenyon
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 50×
This case concerns a negligence claim arising from a nighttime automobile collision on a primary highway, in which one vehicle had stalled and was being manually propelled. The majority affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The dissenting opinion contends that the jury instructions regarding damages were misleading and incomplete, and that the court failed to properly instruct on every issue in the case. It further argues that evidence of surrounding circumstances, including traffic speeds, light glare, and the stalled vehicle's position, should have been admitted and considered by the jury in applying the statutory "assured clear distance ahead" rule to determine negligence.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Salinger v. General Exchange Insurance
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 1×
The case involved a dispute over a theft insurance policy on a LaSalle sedan purchased under a conditional sales contract, where the plaintiff claimed ownership interest after the car was stolen, recovered, repaired at the insurer's expense pursuant to a signed release, and later repossessed and sold at a loss by the financing company. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,600 against the insurance company. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions on damages were erroneous because they permitted consideration of factors such as the car's value to the plaintiff as a means of conveyance and other vague elements, rather than limiting recovery strictly to the policy's measure of actual cash value at the time of loss without compensation for loss of use.
business & regulatoryproperty
Thompson v. Butler
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 8×
In Thompson v. Butler, the plaintiff filed a slander action in Polk County district court seeking $100,000 in damages based on statements in a letter sent by defendant Earle E. Butler. The defendant filed a special appearance challenging jurisdiction, arguing that service of the original notice was invalid because it was left with Vera Leonard, a maid employed at his residence who was not a member of his family. The court examined evidence including Leonard's affidavit and testimony showing she was a paid employee without a fixed contract, could be terminated at will, maintained her own residence elsewhere when not working, and did not consider herself part of the Butler family. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the statute authorizing substituted service on a family member over age 14 does not include a hired domestic employee whose relationship is solely contractual rather than based on reciprocal family duties without expectation of pay.
proceduretorts & liability
Wren v. Berry
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 1×
The case involved a dispute over a special assessment for paving levied in 1922 on a tract of land in Iowa City, which was payable in installments through 1932. After the plaintiff sold a portion of the property in 1925, several installments went unpaid, leading to a tax sale of the entire tract in 1929; the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the county treasurer to cancel the sale, claiming irregularities such as advertising the property under the buyer's name and failing to divide the taxes. The court held that the tax sale was not void, as statutory provisions protected the sale from irregularities in advertising and the sale included at least one valid installment not subject to certain procedural requirements. It further ruled that the plaintiff had no right to the requested relief in this mandamus action against the treasurer alone, as redemption rights existed through other channels and the certificate holder was not a party. The trial court's decree denying relief was affirmed.
taxespropertyprocedure
Baird v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 1×
The case involved a lawsuit by a landowner against a railroad company in receivership, alleging that sparks from one of its trains started a fire that burned approximately forty acres of the plaintiff's meadow land seeded with clover and timothy. The plaintiff sought damages based on evidence estimating the lost value of seed that could have been harvested from the burned area. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the trial court erred by admitting testimony on hypothetical seed yields per acre and their market value. The court reasoned that such evidence improperly invited the jury to speculate on specific crop losses rather than applying the correct measure of damages—the difference in the land's fair market value immediately before and after the fire—and that the failure to thresh seed was unrelated to the fire damage in any event.
torts & liabilityproperty
Citizens National Bank v. Rowe
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 2×
The case involved a dispute over liability on a $5,000 promissory note and mortgage signed by S.E. Rowe and his wife to facilitate the repurchase of farmland that had been foreclosed from L.A. Conway, who owed substantial debts to the Citizens National Bank secured by second mortgages and chattel liens. After the first mortgage holder foreclosed and sold the land, the bank arranged for title to pass to Rowe so a new loan could be obtained, with the bank advancing funds for part of the purchase; Conway later received the deed. The bank sued the Rowes to collect on the note and foreclose the mortgage. The Rowes claimed they signed only as accommodation parties for the bank and that their agreement was conditional or fraudulent, but the court found they were accommodation makers for Conway's benefit, rendering them liable to the bank, and rejected the other defenses based on the parol evidence rule prohibiting evidence of oral agreements contradicting the note's terms.
business & regulatoryproperty
Beck v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24 · cited 4×
The case involved a plaintiff's claims for damages after a warehouse was destroyed by fire, with three counts alleging the blaze was set by a passing train, an employee of the railroad, or spread due to the railroad's failure to clear combustibles from its right of way. The trial court, sitting in equity, dismissed all counts in favor of the defendant railroad. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof because no direct evidence showed the origin of the fire and the circumstantial evidence was equally consistent with other possible causes, such as the building's own condition or unrelated sources. Counts Two and Three were abandoned on appeal as the employee's actions were outside the scope of employment and insufficient to impose liability. The court clarified that a fire near a railroad right of way does not create a prima facie case of negligence without competent evidence linking it to the railroad's operations.
torts & liabilityproperty
Branch v. Des Moines Railway Co.
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-06-24
In Branch v. Des Moines Railway Co., the plaintiff sued the defendant streetcar company for damages after a 1930 collision at the intersection of Forty-sixth Street and Forest Avenue in Des Moines, where the plaintiff's truck, driven by his son with the plaintiff as passenger, struck the defendant's bus. The bus had veered left around parked cars on the east side of the street, and both parties disputed speeds, positions, and right-of-way under Iowa Code Section 5035. The trial court submitted questions of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury rather than directing a verdict. A majority of the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law and that sufficient evidence existed to submit both issues to the jury.
torts & liability
Hollingsworth v. Hall
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-04-05 · cited 4×
This case involved a 1929 vehicle collision at the intersection of Main Street (a designated boulevard) and Saunders Street in Mount Pleasant, Iowa, where the plaintiff drove west on Saunders Street and the defendant drove south on Main Street in a car owned by the codefendant. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants after all evidence was presented. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the directed verdict. The court first held that the city boulevard ordinance requiring vehicles to stop before entering the boulevard was properly admitted into evidence under Iowa Code section 5721 as a published book of ordinances. The court then concluded that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to yield the right of way to the defendant's vehicle on the boulevard, with no evidence that the plaintiff had stopped or that circumstances excused the failure to yield.
torts & liabilityprocedure
State v. Davis
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-04-05 · cited 2×
The case involved George Davis, who was convicted of larceny of a motor vehicle after being arrested while starting the engine of a car stolen hours earlier in Des Moines. The trial court instructed the jury that unexplained possession of recently stolen property created a presumption of guilt that the defendant needed to overcome with an honest explanation. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal, ruling that the instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The court held that the state always bears the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and recent possession supports only an inference of guilt rather than a presumption requiring the defendant to explain his possession.
criminal lawprocedure
Andrew v. State Bank of Swea City
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-04-05 · cited 7×
The case involved a receiver of an insolvent Iowa state bank who obtained court approval to sell remaining assets at auction, including a claim for unpaid stock assessments against defendant Paul W. Larson, which was purchased for a lump sum along with other items and arbitrarily apportioned. The purchaser then sought to enforce the full $500 statutory assessment against Larson. The trial court overruled Larson's motion to dismiss and allowed the action to proceed, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed. The court held that a stockholder's super-added statutory liability under Code Section 9251 is a trust fund for creditors, not a bank asset that can be sold at auction, and therefore cannot be enforced by a private assignee beyond any amount actually paid that benefits creditors.
business & regulatory
Keating v. Augustine
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 6×
The case involved a dispute over the validity of a deed executed in 1929 by Mary J. Spates conveying 80 acres of her Iowa farmland to her nephew, J.D. Augustine, with the deed delivered to an attorney to record after her death. Following appointment of a guardian for Spates, the guardian sued to set aside the deed, alleging insufficient delivery and lack of mental capacity on the grantor's part. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that delivery to a third party for the grantee's benefit was effective and that the grantor had full knowledge of her property and relationships with no proof of incapacity, fraud, or undue influence.
propertyfamily law
West v. Heyman
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 2×
In West v. Heyman, the plaintiff sought to annul a default judgment entered against him by the municipal court of Clinton, Iowa, on a promissory note, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction because he resided in another county and service was made on his wife there. The court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that the municipal court had jurisdiction over the subject matter since the note was expressly payable in Clinton County under Iowa Code provisions allowing suits where the contract is to be performed. Service of process was also proper as municipal court rules align with district court procedures permitting service outside the county when the action is brought in the proper venue. The defendant could not collaterally attack the judgment on grounds that could have been raised as a defense in the original action.
procedure
Peoples Investment Co. v. City of Des Moines
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 2×
This case concerns a city's attempt to assess property owners for the cost of street improvements without first establishing an official paper grade for the street. The dissenting opinion argues that the city's actions were invalid because state law requires the establishment of a paper grade prior to making assessable improvements, and the city instead constructed the gravel street and then retroactively tried to align a grade with it. The court reasoned that without a pre-established grade, property owners could not be properly notified or charged for the work, which would otherwise be funded from the general city fund, and that allowing such practices could lead to multiple assessments or denial of damage claims. Property owners are thus entitled to enjoin the collection of the assessment.
propertyprocedure
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Slate
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 2×
The case concerned a railway company's challenge to a county emergency tax levy in Iowa for 1928 taxes payable in 1929, after the original authorizing act was invalidated for a defective title and later subject to a legalizing act that took effect in April 1929. The company tendered payment for the undisputed portion of its taxes before the legalizing act became effective, but the county treasurer refused the partial payment and later sought penalties totaling over $1,600 when the company attempted to pay the emergency levy amount. The court held that no penalties were owed on the tendered taxes, as the emergency levy was separable from the rest, the initial tender complied with statutes permitting payment of one-half the taxes, and the treasurer could not demand full payment including the disputed tax. The decision turned on the timing of the legalizing act relative to the tender and the statutory rules allowing separate receipts for concededly valid taxes.
taxesprocedure
McKeehan v. City of Des Moines
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 5×
The case involved an eleven-year-old girl who suffered burns to her knees after stepping into hot ashes on an unimproved, swampy section of Illinois Street in Des Moines while walking home; the street had been filled with willows, refuse, and cinders by local residents under city council resolutions granting permission to make it passable, with no sidewalks or formal improvements. The plaintiff sued the city for negligence in the street's condition and maintenance, and a jury returned a verdict in her favor. The court reversed the verdict on appeal, concluding that the trial court's jury instruction improperly imposed a duty on the city to maintain the entire width of the street rather than only the portion prepared and used for public travel, as established in prior Iowa precedents distinguishing dedicated travel areas from the full street width.
torts & liability
Mitchell v. Brennan
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1932-03-08 · cited 2×
In Mitchell v. Brennan, a landlord sued tenants in municipal court for unpaid rent under a lease that included a lien on personal property, obtained a default judgment for $135 with provisions for special execution on the liened property after an agreement between counsel, and then faced a motion to vacate part of the judgment due to alleged fraud in procuring the lien foreclosure. The municipal court set aside the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion was timely under Code section 10681 and that trial courts have broad discretion to vacate judgments for irregularities in procurement, which was not abused here based on the court's knowledge of the telephone agreement and related facts.
procedureproperty