The case concerned whether national banks located in Nebraska could charge Iowa residents interest rates permitted under Nebraska law but exceeding limits in Iowa's Consumer Credit Code for Bank Americard transactions. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant banks, holding that Iowa's interest rate ceilings apply to such loans. The court reasoned that under 12 U.S.C. § 85 of the National Bank Act, while national banks may generally charge rates allowed by their home state's laws, this does not permit them to exceed Iowa's limits when extending credit to Iowa residents, as the applicable rate is ultimately determined by federal law interpreted in light of the state where the borrower resides. The Attorney General had sought injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce the Iowa code's finance charge restrictions and notice requirements against the banks' practices.
The case involved David Randel Jump, who was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the stabbing death of Kevin Dean Senyard. Jump appealed his conviction, asserting that statements he made during interrogation were involuntary due to psychological coercion in violation of his constitutional rights and should have been suppressed, and that the trial court erred by refusing to give his proposed jury instructions regarding the polygraph examination he had taken. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the statements were properly admitted after a suppression hearing and that the requested instructions on the polygraph were correctly refused because unstipulated polygraph evidence is inadmissible and defendant had introduced the topic himself. The court noted that other arguments raised on appeal had not been preserved in the trial court.
This case concerned the dissolution of the marriage of W.P. and Necia A. Hitchcock, specifically Necia's appeal from the financial terms of a settlement decree (including alimony of $1500 monthly, a $50,000 lump-sum payment, and division of the home and other assets) and the denial of her post-decree motion to vacate the judgment. After the parties reached a settlement mid-trial following the judge's urging, Necia claimed her consent resulted from undue duress due to the trial court's remarks and conduct. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the record of the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the valuation disputes over the husband's business interests, and the circumstances of the settlement discussions. The court held that the trial judge's statements did not constitute coercion or prejudgment sufficient to invalidate the agreement.
This case involved a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against Gerald R. Ralph for failing to file Iowa state income tax returns for 1973, 1974, and 1975, resulting in criminal convictions under section 422.25(5) of the Iowa Code, and for falsely certifying on required forms that the returns had been filed. The Grievance Commission recommended suspension after a hearing, and the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo. The court found that Ralph's actions violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5), and (6), as well as sections 610.24(3) and (4) of the Iowa Code. It therefore suspended his license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for 12 months from the date of temporary suspension, requiring proof of no practice during that period upon any future reinstatement application.
The case involved Moorman Manufacturing Company, an Illinois-based corporation that sold livestock feed in Iowa through warehouses and sales staff but manufactured no products there, challenging Iowa's corporate income tax apportionment. Iowa's statute used a single-sales-factor formula to determine the portion of a multistate corporation's net income taxable in the state, based on in-state gross sales relative to total sales. The district court held this formula facially unconstitutional under due process and commerce clause protections. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, ruling the formula constitutional both facially and as applied because Moorman failed to show it produced a grossly distorted or unfair attribution of income to Iowa activities.
In State v. Ivory, defendant Janice Ivory was charged and convicted by a jury of delivering heroin in violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(1), based primarily on testimony from an undercover police agent who claimed to have purchased the drug from Ivory and her husband. Ivory appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine her about her prior drug use, exceeding the limits of Iowa Code section 781.13, which confines cross-examination to matters raised on direct examination, and that she was wrongly denied a post-trial accommodation hearing. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the challenged questions were irrelevant to Ivory's ability to observe or recall events and fell outside the narrow scope of her direct testimony, which had only addressed the specific transaction and denied involvement. The court noted that evidence of general drug use did not tend to show impairment at the relevant time and thus should have been excluded. The accommodation hearing issue was addressed by directing that any retrial follow procedures from State v. Monroe.