The case concerned the Iowa Real Estate Commissioner's revocation of Ben H. Blakeley's real estate broker license based on his alleged misconduct while serving as a court-appointed referee in a partition action involving the sale of real estate. Blakeley challenged the revocation through a certiorari action in district court, which annulled the commissioner's order, and the commissioner appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Iowa Code section 1905.45 limits license revocation after the initial six-month period to misconduct in performing duties as a real estate broker or salesman. The court further reasoned that section 1905.23 expressly exempts persons selling real estate under court order from the chapter's requirements, so Blakeley's actions as referee fell outside the commissioner's regulatory authority.
In Kelly v. Sigismund, plaintiff Kelly sued defendant Sigismund for the $619.20 purchase price of 69 hogs delivered in July 1940, alleging nonpayment after demand. Sigismund answered that he had paid in full by delivering an assignment instrument (Exhibit 1) transferring funds from his credit union account at the time of sale. The instrument was deposited but dishonored due to insufficient funds at the credit union, though Sigismund had adequate deposits; evidence conflicted on whether Kelly accepted the assignment as full settlement. The trial court overruled motions for directed verdict, the jury found for Kelly, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that acceptance as payment was a disputed fact question for the jury, with supporting evidence that Kelly did not treat it as full payment and that Sigismund later agreed to cover it.
This case involved a property owner appealing the tax assessment of his 61-acre Iowa farm, which had been valued at $35 per acre (plus $535 for buildings) for 1941 taxes, claiming the total exceeded 60% of actual value under state law. The local board of review overruled the objections, and the district court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the owner failed to prove the assessment was also discriminatory or inequitable compared to similar properties. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the statute permits relief based solely on proof of excessive valuation without needing to show inequity, and that the evidence established an actual value of $30 per acre. It remanded the case with instructions to adjust the assessed valuation to 60% of that amount while leaving the building valuation unchanged.
The case Boyles v. Cora involves a split decision by the court. Justice Mitchell dissents from the majority and states his disagreement in this excerpt. He explains that his full views appear in the original opinion issued by the court on October 14, 1941, and published at 300 N.W. 281.
The case involved Louise Armstrong suing the City of Des Moines for personal injuries sustained when she fell into a manhole on a public sidewalk after the cover tipped up due to broken lugs, alleging the city negligently maintained the sidewalk in a dangerous condition. After dismissing claims against other defendants, a jury awarded her $1,900 against the city, which appealed on grounds including failure to allege timely notice of claim under the statute and lack of evidence of negligence or constructive notice. The court affirmed the verdict, holding that the city waived the statute of limitations defense by not pleading it in the trial court and that evidence from multiple witnesses supported the jury's finding that the defect had existed for months or years, imposing a duty on the city to maintain the sidewalk safely.
Lewis Freeseman brought an equity action against the administrator of his deceased sister Tillie Henrichs's estate, seeking to impose a trust on two-thirds of the residuary personal property from their brother Dick Freeseman's estate based on an alleged oral agreement that Dick would leave the property to Tillie, who would then transfer half of it to Lewis. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, but on de novo review the Iowa Supreme Court reversed. The court held that enforcement of such an oral contract requires proof that is clear, convincing, and satisfactory rather than a bare preponderance, and found the testimony from the plaintiff, his wife, and a tenant insufficient due to inconsistencies with the will's drafting process, a later codicil, threats to contest the will, and a release executed in related estate settlements.