The case involved a dispute over modification of a Colorado child custody decree, with the father filing in Iowa after retaining the child there following a visitation and the mother appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction. The Iowa trial court refused to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the application, and the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal while also affirming denial of the mother's request for expense reimbursement on cross-appeal. The court reasoned that under section 598A.14 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Iowa could not modify the foreign decree because Colorado had jurisdiction as the child's home state and had not declined to assume jurisdiction to modify, as it had recently rejected a similar petition on the merits. Regarding expenses, the court held that the relevant statutory provisions for reimbursement did not apply because the dismissal was based on section 598A.14 rather than the grounds those provisions addressed.
The case involved an employee, Pease, who sought indemnity from his employer, Pexa, for attorney fees and expenses incurred in successfully defending a wrongful death lawsuit brought by a co-employee's estate alleging gross negligence in a workplace ditch cave-in. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Pease was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or recovery of fees. The court's reasoning was that the charges against Pease involved active negligence with his personal participation, barring indemnity under precedents like Peters v. Lyons, and that the employer's workers' compensation immunity under Iowa Code § 85.20 precluded claims based on primary-secondary liability even when framed as a breach of independent duty.
This case was a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the executor of Joan Marie Lang's estate against the City of Des Moines, alleging negligence in the city's care of Lang while she was held in jail on an intoxication charge after she had walked away from a detoxification center. Lang suffered seizures, a skull fracture, and ultimately died after being returned to her cell following initial treatment attempts. The trial court entered a jury verdict for the plaintiff, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded for retrial, finding errors in the jury instructions on the city's duty of care to inmates and on damages, while upholding the exclusion of city property taxpayers from the jury pool in this civil case.
In State v. Hellwege, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed a district court's refusal to impose the mandatory minimum five-year prison sentence under section 902.7 of the Iowa Code for a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter while armed with a firearm. The court granted certiorari after the State challenged the sentencing judge's determination that voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a "forcible felony." The court held that voluntary manslaughter is a forcible felony because it is a class C felony that necessarily includes an assault, as an intent to kill cannot occur without an act intended to cause injury. This conclusion followed from prior precedents defining forcible felonies to include crimes that are felonies and inherently involve assault, thereby requiring application of the firearm minimum sentence.
The case concerned an equal protection challenge to an Iowa statute that extends the time for a person to file a tort lawsuit on claims arising during their minority, giving them one year after reaching adulthood. The plaintiff, injured as a minor in 1976, reached majority in 1977 but did not file suit until 1979, which the trial court dismissed as untimely under the two-year personal injury statute of limitations combined with the extension provision. The court affirmed the dismissal, applying rational basis review and finding that the statutes create no improper classification because the extension operates only to lengthen, not shorten, the standard two-year period, serving the legitimate purpose of limiting the time for bringing suits while accommodating minors. The provisions together ensure a minor plaintiff receives at least the full two-year period, and often more, without violating constitutional guarantees.
In State v. Hitchens, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after a fatal car collision; police suspected intoxication, arrested him, and obtained a search warrant for a blood test after he refused voluntary chemical testing under Iowa's implied consent law. The district court ruled the blood test results inadmissible, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed on discretionary review. The court held that chapter 321B, section 321B.7 prohibits any test after refusal, even pursuant to a warrant, as the statute's scheme relies on license revocation rather than compelled testing, and its broad admissibility rules apply to such proceedings. The decision rested on statutory interpretation guided by the law's purpose of reducing drunk driving without authorizing physical compulsion post-refusal, distinguishing it from other jurisdictions' approaches.