Paul W. Richards

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance company landlord could terminate a farm lease with its tenants under a clause allowing cancellation upon sale of the property, after the landlord accepted an offer to sell but before closing. The tenants occupied the land under a written lease that permitted termination with notice by January 15 if the property was sold, and the landlord sent notice after signing an acceptance of a purchase offer in December 1939. The court held that the landlord failed to prove a qualifying sale, as the contract was executory, subject to unresolved title objections, and did not create an enforceable obligation ensuring alienation with certainty. As a result, the termination was invalid, the landlord could not quiet title against the tenants' possessory claim, and the trial court's decree was affirmed.

property

The case involved a dispute over whether a $11,500 note and mortgage executed in 1938 by Harm Van Hauen and his wife to the decedent's widow Tatta Van Hauen was an asset of Henry G. Van Hauen's estate. In 1930, the decedent had released an earlier mortgage on the same land to enable Harm to obtain a Federal Land Bank loan on the condition that the debt be extinguished without any replacement note or mortgage to the decedent. After the decedent's death, the administratrix petitioned the probate court to declare the new mortgage an estate asset as a renewal of the prior obligation and to compel its assignment to her. The probate court granted the relief, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence that the new instruments renewed the extinguished debt or that any obligation existed to the estate, and noting that any such asset would have been assigned to the widow by family agreement.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case Sweet v. Bergen concerned whether plaintiffs Caleb and Pearl Sweet had abandoned their homestead rights in a life estate on 40 acres after financial hardship from illness led them to execute a 1931 quitclaim deed and agreement with Musser in exchange for funds, move temporarily to a nearby town, and later redeem the property in 1939, at which point a judgment creditor sought to levy execution on the life estate. The court determined that the homestead exemption remained intact and was not subject to the levy. It reasoned that the 1931 transaction was intended as security for repayment with a right of redemption rather than an absolute transfer of title, that the family's departure was a temporary expedient without intent to abandon the property as their home, and that their continuous efforts to return supported preservation of the homestead character under the facts presented.

propertyfamily law

The case involved a dispute over an $8,500 promissory note given to contractor J. E. Lovejoy for unpaid work on a church building constructed by the Euclid Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church. Lovejoy sued the church corporation and its individual trustees after acquiring the note, seeking personal judgments against the trustees who had signed it; the trustees cross-petitioned in equity for reformation of the note to limit it to a corporate obligation only, claiming they signed solely in their representative capacities based on assurances they incurred no personal liability. The trial court granted reformation and ordered judgment accordingly, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence failed to clearly and convincingly establish mutual mistake or inequitable conduct by Lovejoy sufficient to overcome the presumption of personal liability shown on the face of the note and the parties' prior conduct. The court emphasized that reformation requires strong proof that the writing does not reflect the true agreement and remanded for entry of judgment on the note as written.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a pedestrian struck and injured by a car while crossing a city avenue not at a crosswalk or intersection. The plaintiff sued the driver for negligence, but the defendant moved for a directed verdict claiming the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law under a statute requiring pedestrians to yield the right of way to vehicles. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the issues to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff that was later reduced; the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the evidence permitted the jury to find the plaintiff had yielded the right of way by stopping in a position where the car could pass without contact if it stayed on course, and that the plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law given the clear visibility and unoccupied street. The court also upheld an instruction on the driver's duty to keep a proper lookout based on evidence that the driver should have seen the plaintiff earlier.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute between Sinclair Refining Co., as lessee of two service station properties owned by defendant Daniel E. Cole, and the defendants over interference with the leases. Sinclair sought a permanent injunction barring the defendants from the premises and granting it possession, while the defendants denied the claims, sought reformation and cancellation of the leases, and argued that Sinclair was attempting to recover possession improperly through equitable proceedings. The trial court granted the injunction and ordered the defendants to surrender possession. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that an injunction is not available as an independent remedy to regain possession of real property when the defendants are already in peaceful possession and claiming ownership, as this exceeds the equitable function of the writ under the Iowa Code. The court remanded the case for dismissal of the petition.

propertyprocedure