Louis W. Schultz

The case involved a medical malpractice suit by Sally and Wilbur Hantsbarger against podiatrist Paul Coffin, alleging negligence in surgery performed in 1988. The plaintiffs designated expert witnesses before the statutory deadline under Iowa Code section 668.11 but initially omitted details on qualifications and the purpose for each expert. The trial court barred the experts' testimony for noncompliance and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute requires only substantial compliance and that good cause existed to permit the testimony given the minimal delay, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and plaintiffs' overall compliance with discovery.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves the dissolution of the marriage between Rhonda Lynn Gulsvig and Ronald Gerald Gulsvig, who had one child together prior to separating. The district court granted joint custody with primary physical care to Rhonda, set child support at $47 per week, established a visitation schedule, and declined to change the child's surname from Acosta (as listed on the birth certificate) to Gulsvig. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution and child support amount under the guidelines but modified the visitation schedule to provide the father with additional weekends, holidays, and summer time, finding the expanded schedule better served the child's interests. The court also upheld the surname determination, consistent with the trial court's ruling.

family law

This case involved a claim by Richard Miller that the Sioux Gateway Fire Department violated Iowa's employment discrimination law by discharging him from his airport firefighter position due to his diabetes. The district court ruled in Miller's favor, finding he was regarded as disabled and ordering reinstatement along with damages. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the nature of the firefighter occupation exempts the Department from liability under Iowa Code section 601A.6. The court reasoned that the inherently dangerous duties require immediate high-level physical fitness and performance from all firefighters, making reasonable accommodation impossible without compromising safety standards.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether the doctrine of claim preclusion barred a tort action for intentional interference with a bequest when the plaintiffs had already succeeded in a prior will contest that invalidated a will on grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the tort claims were not precluded and could proceed separately from the probate proceedings. The court reasoned that the two actions involve distinct remedies, with the tort suit allowing recovery of damages such as emotional distress and litigation costs not available in probate, and that the underlying facts do not make them the same claim for preclusion purposes. The court also addressed but did not resolve certain procedural issues like real-party-in-interest status and statute of limitations.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Stanfield v. Polk County, property taxpayers sued Polk County to enjoin it from making payments under a lease-purchase agreement for the Prairie Meadows horse racing track, which had been financed through industrial revenue bonds issued under Iowa Code chapter 419; the plaintiffs argued that the county's actions violated state law and the Iowa Constitution's prohibition on lending public credit. The district court certified a class of all ad valorem property taxpayers in Polk County, rejected the county's statute of limitations and laches defenses, but granted summary judgment to the county on the merits, finding no illegality. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that summary judgment should have been granted on the statute of limitations defense because the claims were time-barred. The court reviewed the undisputed facts surrounding the bond issuance, lease agreement amendments, and payments, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed on the timeliness issue.

taxespropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Laurie Mallone Lee, a tenured teacher at the Iowa School for the Deaf, whose employment contract was terminated by Superintendent C. Joseph Giangreco amid declining enrollment without initial stated reasons or adequate pretermination process. Lee sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claiming violations of her procedural and substantive due process rights as a state employee with a protected property interest in continued employment, along with gender discrimination. A jury found for Lee on the due process claims, and the district court denied the defendant's post-verdict motions. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, concluding there was substantial evidence that the termination lacked required procedures, objective criteria, and good cause, and that the damages award was supported by evidence of lost wages and impaired future earning capacity.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved the termination of elementary teacher Kathleen Davies' employment contract by the Lawton-Bronson Community School District board under Iowa Code section 279.27 after she was arrested for shoplifting at a department store, an incident that became public knowledge in the small community and was alleged to impair her effectiveness as a role model for students. Davies contended that her actions stemmed from a mental illness or medication-induced mania and appealed the board's decision; an adjudicator directed further board consideration with additional medical evidence, and the district court affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reinstating the board's termination on grounds that substantial evidence supported a finding of just cause, including the board's assessment of Davies' credibility, conflicting medical testimony, the permanent impairment of her role-model status, and the factors outlined in prior precedent such as contract duties and employer needs.

labor & employment

This case involves parents seeking county funding and services for their profoundly retarded adult daughter after her public education ended. The plaintiffs sued Webster County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of substantive and procedural due process rights under Iowa Code § 222.60, which requires counties to pay for certain approved mental retardation services. The district court ruled that the county must pay for but not provide such services, and since the requested services were not approved by the Department of Human Services, the substantive claim failed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no approved services were denied and the county had no duty to provide the demanded programming, there was no deprivation of a protected interest requiring procedural protections.

civil rightsprocedurehealthcare

The case involved Montgomery Ward Development Corp. challenging Cedar Rapids Board of Review decisions on property tax assessments for its holdings in tax years 1989 and 1990, claiming the assessments were excessive under Iowa Code section 441.37(1)(b) and also discriminatory in violation of state and federal constitutional equal protection and uniformity clauses. Ward had protested only the excessive-value ground to the board using the required form but later sought to add 1990 claims and new discrimination allegations in district court after a ratio study was released. The district court granted the board partial summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Iowa Code section 441.38, after which Ward voluntarily dismissed its remaining 1989 excessive-value claim; the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that unprotested grounds could not be raised judicially and that voluntary dismissals under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215 are unreviewable.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute between a construction company, Frontier Properties Corp., and homeowners, the Swanbergs, over payment for building a home with numerous additions beyond the original contract estimate. Frontier initially pursued a mechanic's lien foreclosure but dropped that count and proceeded to trial solely on express and implied contract theories, winning a judgment for about $69,000 after the district court found substantial evidence that the additions were not covered by the original $61,400 estimate and that the homeowners had failed to pay. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Iowa Code chapter 572 on mechanic's liens does not preempt common-law contract actions for work and materials. The court reasoned that the statute provides no exclusive remedy, that the district court's factual findings on the scope of work and amounts due were supported by substantial evidence including subcontractor testimony, and that the homeowners' counterclaim for exemplary damages lacked merit because they had not made full payment. The decision clarified that contractors may pursue implied contract or quantum meruit recovery for extra work requested by owners.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Paula Skeel, who was charged with violating Iowa's compulsory education reporting statute (Iowa Code § 299.4) by failing to file a report with her local school district after placing her three school-age children under private instruction. Following a bench trial, an associate district judge convicted her of the simple misdemeanor, but the district court reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court, applying the substantial evidence standard of review under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(3), examined the record and found sufficient evidence from the school district attendance officer's unrebutted testimony regarding compliance efforts, along with no support for Skeel's selective prosecution claim. The court therefore reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with directions to reinstate the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State filing a petition to declare Verle Moret a habitual offender of motor vehicle laws based on multiple convictions, including out-of-state DWI offenses, seeking to bar him from driving in Iowa. A district associate judge dismissed the petition after finding that Moret had established a laches defense due to the State's delay in bringing the action. The Iowa Supreme Court treated the State's appeal as a certiorari action challenging jurisdiction and held that district associate judges lack subject matter jurisdiction over habitual offender proceedings because they are civil actions not involving indictable misdemeanors or money judgments, as required by Iowa Code section 602.6306. The court sustained the writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, while providing guidance on the potential applicability of laches.

procedurecriminal law

The case involved Thomas Breitbach's appeal of his conviction for escape under Iowa Code section 719.4(1) after he fled from officers who had arrived with an arrest warrant for cocaine delivery and informed him he was in custody. Breitbach argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek acquittal or a mistrial and claimed errors in the jury instructions regarding the element of custody. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show Breitbach was in custody at the time of his flight, that any motion for acquittal would have failed, and that the instructions properly reflected the statute and precedent without needing additional requirements like physical restraint or risk of injury.

criminal law

This case involved a farmer suing his local bank for breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations after the bank stopped advancing funds on an operating loan, allegedly causing the loss of the farm. The jury had awarded a verdict to the farmer, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support either claim. The court reasoned that the bank was entitled under the loan terms to cease advances upon believing its security was impaired, and the evidence showed no bad faith or improper motive by the bank in doing so. The interference claim failed because the bank's actions were not improper as a matter of law.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involves a modification of child support payments following the dissolution of the marriage between Carol and Charles Lee. The noncustodial parent, Charles, appealed the district court's order increasing his monthly child support obligation for one remaining minor child from $125 to $632, arguing there was no substantial change in circumstances and that his veterans’ disability payments should not be included in his net income. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the modification, holding that a substantial change in circumstances existed due to the increase in Charles's income since the prior modification, and that veterans’ disability benefits are properly considered as income under the child support guidelines even though they are exempt from federal taxes. The court applied the guidelines to calculate the support amount at 22.5% of net income and found no extraordinary circumstances warranting deviation from the presumptive amount.

family law

This case involved a dispute between Davenport Bank and State Central Bank over how to divide proceeds from liquidating collateral on defaulted farm loans made under a series of participation agreements. After the loans soured, the banks exchanged letters in May 1985 that a jury found formed an accord and satisfaction, but the jury also found State Central had proved a defense of mistake based on an erroneous prediction of collateral value. The trial court granted Davenport Bank judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that the language of State Central's May 7 letter allocated to State Central the risk that liquidation proceeds would fall short of estimates, thereby barring the mistake defense as a matter of law.

business & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Bernard Schnoor, an experienced farmer hired to haul grain, was injured when his leg became entangled in an unguarded grain auger owned by defendant Deitchler and manufactured by Versatile Farm Equipment Operations; his wife joined as a co-plaintiff seeking damages. The Schnoors sued Deitchler on a premises-liability theory and Ford New Holland, Inc. on a product-liability theory as the alleged corporate successor to Versatile. After a jury apportioned fault and awarded damages, the trial court entered judgment against both defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed both judgments, holding that Ford was not liable because only its Canadian subsidiary had acquired Versatile's assets and assumed related liabilities, and that Deitchler owed no duty to the business invitee because the open and obvious danger of the operating auger was known to Schnoor. The court reasoned that a possessor of land is not liable for injuries from known or obvious conditions absent special circumstances requiring anticipation of harm.

torts & liability

This case involved a son seeking to contest his late mother's will, which left her entire estate to his sister and explicitly excluded him, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence. The will was admitted to probate following publication of notice in a local newspaper as required by Iowa Code sections 633.304 and 633.309 (1985), but the son did not file his contest action until over two years later, claiming the four-month limitations period was tolled due to his mental illness. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that publication provided sufficient due process notice to known heirs, that subsequent statutory changes and procedural rules did not alter the bar, and that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge related orders after dismissal.

propertyfamily lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether evidence from a blood alcohol test, obtained under Iowa's implied consent statute without an arrest, should be suppressed in a prosecution for operating while intoxicated. The trial court suppressed the results because the investigating officer lacked personal knowledge that the defendant had been injured in the car accident. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, holding that Iowa Code section 321J.6(1)(b) requires only that the driver was involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or death and does not impose any requirement that the officer have knowledge of the injury. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language is unambiguous on this point and that undisputed evidence confirmed the defendant had in fact sustained injuries, satisfying the statutory condition for invoking implied consent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a fire insurance policy appraisal process between Central Life Insurance Company and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company after a 1987 fire loss to Central's buildings in Des Moines. Central invoked the policy's appraisal clause, leading to an award of $522,233, which Aetna challenged in a declaratory judgment action seeking to vacate it; Central separately sued for bad faith refusal to pay. The district court upheld the award on summary judgment and a jury awarded damages on the bad faith claim. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed both, holding that the appraisal award must be vacated because the process was tainted by the umpire's ex parte communications and joint inspection with Central's appraiser, failure to consult Aetna's appraiser, and Central's contingency-fee arrangement with its appraiser, which raised issues of partiality and invalidated the award under the policy terms. The court further held that Aetna had a right to fairly debate the award's validity, so there was no bad faith as a matter of law.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure