Truman S. Stevens

This case involved a plaintiff who was injured when her car hit a hole in a street within the incorporated Town of Magnolia, Iowa, and she sued the town for negligence in failing to repair the defect. The trial court denied the town's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the jury instructions failed to clearly require the plaintiff to prove that the town had actual or constructive notice of the defect as an essential element of recovery. Although the petition alleged notice and one instruction addressed the time the defect existed, the instructions listing the elements for recovery omitted any reference to notice, and the court did not adequately convey that such proof was a prerequisite, potentially misleading the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned an applicant's request for a class B permit to sell beer in the town of Oakland, Iowa, which the town council denied after determining the applicant failed to establish the good moral character and repute required by state law. The district court granted mandamus relief ordering issuance of the permit, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court reasoned that the statute places the burden on the applicant to prove fitness and imposes a duty on the council to investigate, that the council acted in good faith based on its findings despite conflicting trial evidence, and that mandamus does not lie to compel issuance when the council's exercise of discretion turns on factual determinations absent a clear abuse.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by a landlord against International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, for damages arising from the alleged wrongful and fraudulent removal of a stock of shoes from leased premises in Waterloo, Iowa. The company challenged the Iowa court's personal jurisdiction after service was made on its traveling salesman in the state. The court held that jurisdiction was proper under Iowa law, as the company's activities went beyond mere solicitation of orders. Its core reasoning was that maintaining a permanent sample room in Des Moines, aiding others to establish retail shoe stores, and other ongoing operations in the state warranted the inference that the corporation was present and doing business there through its agents.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a mortgage executed by Ellen McDonald Cady on real property purchased with proceeds from the sale of inherited land that belonged partly to her brother Clift MacKirdy, who was under guardianship; the court had ordered title taken jointly in her name and as guardian, but it was recorded solely in her individual name. The mortgagee sought to enforce a lien on the entire property for groceries and cash advanced, while the ward’s new guardian intervened to protect the ward’s interest. The court held that the mortgagee had neither actual nor constructive notice of the ward’s interest from the probate records, the abstract of title, or the ward’s possession of the premises, because the recording statutes did not make the probate record constructive notice and the facts did not show the ward asserting ownership. It therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment allowing enforcement of the mortgage against the whole property.

property

The case arose from a bankruptcy trustee's petition seeking to set aside a 1930 conveyance of mortgaged farmland from Orah Dunkin to Iowa Title & Loan Company as a fraudulent preference under federal bankruptcy law, to recover rents and profits, and to subject the property to claims of note holders who had obtained judgments against the original mortgagors Clark Brothers. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action or equity. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deed did not create a preference because Iowa's recording statute protects only subsequent purchasers for value and the deed was not concealed, that general allegations of fraud and insolvency lacked supporting facts, and that no facts showed the grantor contemplated bankruptcy at the time of conveyance.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by the widow of a traveling salesman who contracted with an Iowa wholesale grocery corporation in Council Bluffs, Iowa, but performed most of his duties in Nebraska, where he died from injuries sustained in a fall. The court addressed whether the claimant could recover under Iowa's workers' compensation statutes or was limited to Nebraska law. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the award of benefits under Iowa law, holding that the compensation statutes are conclusively presumed to form part of every employment contract unless rejected in writing, and that the contract here was formed in Iowa without any geographic limitation in the statute. The decision relied on prior precedent interpreting the elective statute to apply extraterritorially when the employment relationship originated in Iowa, emphasizing that the legislature had not restricted the law's scope to in-state injuries.

labor & employment

The case involved a parent who transported his children to a distant public school after the nearby rural school closed and sued the school district for reasonable compensation under state law. The district court awarded the parent payment, and the school district appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the parent's only remedy was an administrative appeal to the county superintendent. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the statute created a mandatory duty for the district to provide or pay for transportation when a school closed due to insufficient pupils, making an administrative appeal unnecessary for such nondiscretionary obligations, and that the record supported application of the statute.

procedure

The case involved a constitutional challenge to an Iowa legislative act (chapter 89 of the Forty-fifth General Assembly) that amended various Code sections to reduce the salaries of numerous state, county, township, and municipal officers, including judges, due to an asserted public emergency. The dissent argued that the act did not violate the state constitution's single-subject requirement under article III, section 29, because its title clearly and unambiguously expressed the single subject of statutory salaries and compensation for designated public officers, avoiding any risk of logrolling or surprise. It further contended that the act satisfied the uniform operation mandate of article I, section 6, and the Fourteenth Amendment, as it applied generally to specified classes of officers without granting unequal privileges. The opinion concluded that provisions affecting judicial salaries were separable from the rest of the act and did not invalidate it as a whole, so the challenge should fail and the act should be upheld.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether a teacher had a valid written employment contract with a school district after the subdirector authorized her hiring for an eight-week term at $80 per month, but the parties disagreed on whether the salary term was mutually agreed upon when the teacher filled in the contract blanks. The teacher was later barred from teaching due to a board resolution against employing married women following her marriage, and she also claimed an oral extension of the contract term. The court held that conflicting evidence on mutual assent to the salary created a factual issue for the jury rather than grounds for a directed verdict, but that the statute requiring written teacher contracts with fixed terms precluded any oral extension of the agreement. The judgment was reversed on the defendant's appeal and affirmed on the plaintiff's cross-appeal.

labor & employment

The case involved a rear-end collision on a clear street in Des Moines where a grocery truck struck the car in which plaintiff Ruth Harvey was a passenger, causing her serious injuries; Harvey sued the truck's owner and driver, alleging negligence without specifying particular acts and relying instead on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court overruled the defendants' motions to strike the general negligence allegation and for more specific statements, permitted the res ipsa loquitur theory, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances—defendant's exclusive control of the truck, the unobstructed street, and the unexpected impact from behind—warranted an inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence. The court found the evidence sufficient to submit the issue to the jury and rejected challenges to the jury instructions and certain testimony.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by a bank superintendent against Laura M. Green to enforce a promissory note she co-signed with her husband, secured by a mortgage on which she also released dower. Green defended on the ground that she received no consideration and signed the documents solely to release her dower interest, not to assume personal liability on the note. The trial court found the evidence supported her defense that she intended only to release dower, and the appellate court affirmed, applying settled Iowa precedents that such a factual finding, when supported by evidence, defeats enforcement of the note against the wife.

family lawproperty

The case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Dearinger, who was injured when his eastbound Model T Ford collided at night with an unlit truck parked on the south side of a crushed-rock highway in Poweshiek County. Dearinger alleged the truck owner's failure to display rear lights violated the duty of care, but the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on grounds of contributory negligence and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. Under the 1931 Code section 5029, a driver must operate at a speed allowing a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, and the court held that Dearinger's admitted speed and failure to observe the truck until 10 feet away breached this rule. The court further reasoned that a distant light observed south of the highway did not qualify as a diverting circumstance excusing the failure to watch the road, as it posed no apparent danger and was unrelated to the parked truck.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Appanoose County Farm Bureau qualified for a county appropriation under Iowa Code section 2930 after filing a certificate claiming 239 bona fide members. The Board of Supervisors refused the appropriation, arguing that the actual number of bona fide members fell below the required 200, and the bureau sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment. The trial court found the membership exceeded 200 and granted the writ for $2,190, treating the certificate as prima facie evidence that the board could rebut with contrary proof. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute imposes a mandatory duty to appropriate upon proper certification but permits the board to challenge the accuracy of the membership count, while the officers' duty to certify only bona fide members is enforced by misdemeanor penalties for false statements.

business & regulatory

This case arose from a replevin action filed by a mortgagee in district court to recover possession of mortgaged livestock, grain, and machinery from the mortgagors, who raised defenses including fraud and lack of consideration in the mortgage. The defendant moved to transfer the matter to equity under Code section 12362 to contest the mortgage's validity via foreclosure proceedings, and the trial court granted the transfer while also issuing an injunction against sale of the chattels. On certiorari, the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and ruled the transfer improper, holding that replevin actions are triable at law under ordinary proceedings, that the cited defenses were fully available in that forum, and that an adequate remedy at law precluded resort to equity. The court further noted that section 12362 permits transfer only when necessary and that actions in replevin may not be joined with other causes triable in equity.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a dispute over title to real property where the appellee obtained a tax deed after purchasing the property at a tax sale for unpaid taxes and assessments. The appellant, holding a special paving assessment certificate, challenged the validity of the tax deed, arguing that notice of redemption was improperly served only on the possessor rather than the current owner, D.A. Morin, following the original owner's death. The court affirmed the validity of the tax deed, reasoning that statutory requirements for notice were met by serving the person in whose name the property was taxed, and no further notice to subsequent owners was required. Additionally, the appellant lacked standing to contest the deed under section 7290 because he did not hold title to the property or demonstrate payment of all taxes due.

propertytaxesprocedure

This case arose from a nighttime collision in Newton, Iowa, where the plaintiff parked his truck illegally in violation of a city ordinance and without required rear lights or reflectors as mandated by state statutes, and the defendant struck the parked vehicle while driving. The plaintiff sued for damages to his truck, and the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on contributory negligence grounds before submitting the case to the jury. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because his unlawful parking directly contributed to the collision, making it impossible to separate the illegal act from the resulting harm. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's violation of the ordinance and lighting requirements constituted negligence per se that necessarily played a role in the accident, regardless of any negligence by the defendant, and thus the motion for directed verdict should have been granted.

torts & liability

This case involved a claim for malicious prosecution brought by appellee Whitaker against appellant Richmond. Richmond had sold Whitaker a used car with an undisclosed Ohio lien, which led to the vehicle being repossessed from a subsequent buyer; Richmond then initiated criminal charges against Whitaker for false pretenses that were later dismissed. The court affirmed the judgment in Whitaker's favor, holding that the favorable termination of the criminal proceedings created a prima facie case of lack of probable cause, that evidence supported a jury finding of malice (including an attempt to use the charges to collect a debt), and that conflicts in the testimony on probable cause and malice presented factual questions properly decided by the jury rather than as a matter of law.

criminal lawtorts & liability

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action on real property that also sought to establish and foreclose a lien on the 1933 crops, rents, and income from the premises under a clause in the mortgage pledging those items to secure the debt, with a provision for a receiver upon default. An intervenor, who had taken an assignment of a lease on the property executed by the mortgagor before the foreclosure action, claimed a superior right to the rents and crops. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the intervenor, holding that the mortgage clause amounted only to a pledge of the rents and profits rather than a valid chattel mortgage because it was separate from the granting clause and thus did not create an immediate lien. Under settled Iowa law, such a pledge attaches only upon default, commencement of foreclosure, and appointment of a receiver, which occurred after the good-faith lease and assignment. Therefore, the intervenor's prior interest prevailed over the mortgagee's claim to the chattel property.

property

This case concerned an executor's attempt to satisfy a $5,000 cash bequest to a minor grandson by transferring a Missouri note and trust deed to the minor's father instead, pursuant to a probate court order obtained after posted notice and acceptance by the minor's mother. No guardian or guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor, who reached majority years later, disaffirmed the transaction, tendered back the property and its income, and sued the executor for the legacy amount plus interest. The court held for the minor, entering judgment for the cash bequest with 6% interest (less credited income) and requiring reconveyance of the property. The core reasoning was that a natural guardian has no authority to receive payment of a minor's legacy, the probate court lacked power to authorize the substitution without a guardian's appearance, and the resulting order was void and subject to collateral attack, as minors cannot be deprived of estate property without proper legal representation.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute in probate court over the final report of E. O. Wilson as administrator of his brother's estate. Mapleton Trust & Savings Bank, as assignee of Wilson's interest in the estate's personal property under a written assignment, objected to the report and sought distribution of one-seventh of the net proceeds (including surplus from sale of estate real estate) to itself. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling in favor of Wilson, holding that the assignment covered the surplus because the proceeds constituted personalty in the administrator's hands. The court reasoned that the doctrine of equitable conversion, which preserves the character of real estate for purposes of inheritance among heirs, does not apply to an assignment between an heir and a third-party creditor, and that Wilson could validly assign his interest in the actual funds on deposit.

propertyprocedurefamily law