Harvey Uhlenhopp

In Moser v. Stallings, a patient sued her plastic surgeon and his professional corporation for battery and negligence based on lack of informed consent after elective cosmetic surgery on her face, eyelids, forehead, and lip, claiming the results worsened her appearance with scars and other issues; she also alleged the surgeon deviated from consent by skipping a chin implant. The trial court directed a verdict against the battery claim and submitted only the negligence claim to the jury, which found for the defendant. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no battery because the surgeon performed authorized procedures without substantially deviating from the consent form, which permitted necessary variations, and that any flaws in the informed consent instructions were not prejudicial when read as a whole with the other instructions.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case arose from the 1980 bankruptcy of Prairie Grain Company, where plaintiffs who had sold grain to or stored grain with the company sued Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co. (later under FDIC receivership), claiming the bank conspired with Prairie Grain's manager to defraud customers by extending loans and other support that created a false appearance of financial stability, inducing continued dealings with the insolvent firm. The district court, after a bench trial on remand, entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings of the bank's statutory violations and deviations from sound banking practices, such as facilitating overdrafts and improper handling of warehouse receipts, which showed the bank's knowing participation in sustaining the grain company for its own benefit. Review was deferential, limited to whether the facts, viewed favorably to the judgment, established an agreement to accomplish the fraud.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against attorney George West arising from his involvement in acquiring, managing, and selling real estate that included an office building. The Iowa Supreme Court found that West committed ethical violations by forging his relatives' signatures on a deed transferring interest in the property and having his secretary falsely acknowledge the conveyance in violation of state notary statutes. The court agreed with the Grievance Commission's findings on these misconduct issues but rejected claims of conflict of interest or improper actions to clear title from his associate's creditors due to insufficient evidence. It suspended West's law license for one year, concluding that the proven dishonest and illegal acts warranted discipline even without proof of personal gain or harm to others.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned Kalonji Saadiq's conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon under Iowa Code section 724.26, which was based on his prior guilty plea to third-degree theft, an aggravated misdemeanor carrying a maximum two-year sentence. Saadiq challenged the conviction through postconviction relief and on appeal, arguing the theft was not a felony, and also raised an issue regarding the prosecutor's peremptory strike of a Black prospective juror at trial. The court held that the specific definition of felony in section 724.25, covering any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, controlled over general felony classifications and applied here because the theft sentence exceeded one year. On the jury selection claim, the court applied Batson v. Kentucky and remanded for a hearing to determine whether the strike was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, directing further proceedings based on the outcome.

criminal lawcivil rightsguns

The case concerned the timing requirements under the Iowa civil rights act for filing a district court action after the Civil Rights Commission issues a right-to-sue release. Plaintiff Saemisch filed an employment discrimination complaint, received a release letter mailed by the commission on December 7, 1984, and sued on March 11, 1985—ninety-four days after mailing but within ninety days of receipt. The court interpreted the statute and commission rules, which define "issuance" as mailing by certified mail, to mean that the ninety-day period begins on the date of certified mailing. Because the record did not establish whether certified mail was used, the defendant bore the burden of proof on the limitations defense and had not met it. The court reversed the dismissal of the discrimination claim and remanded for further proceedings, while noting the contract claim was improperly dismissed.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

This case arose from a December 1981 traffic collision on a snow-covered Iowa highway in which plaintiff Leo Jones was injured when defendant Robert Blair's vehicle slid into the Jones car during a left turn; Jones and his wife sued Blair for negligence under several traffic statutes and common-law duties, joined his employer under respondeat superior, and faced a counterclaim from the Blairs for vehicle damage. After a jury found neither driver negligent, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial between the Joneses and Blairs because the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on legal excuse that allowed the jury to excuse statutory violations without proper factual predicate. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the employer, holding that Blair was not acting within the scope of employment while driving home the day after the job ended, as mileage reimbursement alone did not give the employer control over his travel. The cross-appeal was affirmed without discussion.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment