
Travis v. District Court
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1923-04-03 · cited 1×
The case involved a justice of the peace from Linn County who petitioned the Iowa Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review and annul an order by the Dallas County District Court issuing its own writ of certiorari in a civil contract dispute. The district court had directed the justice to transfer or review proceedings in a case where a defendant sought to move the matter to his home county. The Supreme Court quashed the writ and dismissed the petition, holding that certiorari from the high court was unavailable because any error by the district court could be adequately addressed on appeal or by writ of error. The court further noted that the justice of the peace lacked standing to initiate the proceeding, as the proper aggrieved party was the plaintiff in the underlying action. The opinion emphasized that one certiorari proceeding cannot be used to set aside another pending in a lower court.
procedure
Curtis v. Reilly
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1920-05-11 · cited 6×
In Curtis v. Reilly, former partners who had dissolved their real estate business and paid all debts sought a court-ordered partition and sale of their remaining undivided equitable interests in four tracts of land acquired during the partnership, naming only each other as parties. The trial court overruled a demurrer for lack of necessary parties and granted the partition decree, finding the plaintiffs and defendants jointly owned specified fractional interests while stating that the rights of non-party co-owners would not be affected. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an action for partition of land cannot proceed unless all persons holding undivided interests are joined as parties, as this requirement is jurisdictional. The court further reasoned that the case could not be sustained as an equitable winding-up of partnership affairs because the partnership had already been fully settled by agreement, leaving only a dispute over division of the land interests.
propertyprocedure
Anfenson v. Banks
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1917-06-26 · cited 41×
The case involved depositors suing Henry Banks to recover losses from the insolvent Bank of Kelley after its operator E.J. Penfield absconded in 1911, claiming Banks was either an actual partner with Penfield or liable under ostensible partnership by estoppel due to allowing himself to be held out as a partner. The trial court submitted both theories to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiffs totaling over $22,000. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding there was no evidence of an actual partnership and that the evidence failed to establish the clear representations, reliance, and other elements required for estoppel. The court reasoned that the actual partnership issue should have been withdrawn from the jury and that, under strict standards for estoppel, no jury question was presented on the ostensible partnership claim.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Mondamin Bank v. Burke
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1914-05-12 · cited 5×
The case involved a dispute between a partnership operating the Mondamin Bank and one of its partners, Burke, who had served as its manager. Burke had borrowed $5,000 from the bank via promissory notes but claimed an offset for unpaid compensation for his management services, which the bank denied existed by agreement or implication; after selling his interest, the bank sued to recover accrued interest on the notes. The trial court submitted the matter to a jury on the theory of an implied contract for reasonable compensation, resulting in a verdict for Burke. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of an implied agreement for compensation and that the trial court's instructions properly protected the plaintiff's rights while correctly stating the presumption against partner compensation absent contrary evidence.
business & regulatory
Nicoll v. Sweet
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1913-12-13 · cited 21×
The case involved a wrongful death action by the administratrix of McNulty against building owner Sweet after McNulty was struck by a falling cornice in the street and later died of pneumonia. The plaintiff alleged the injury resulted from Sweet's negligence and directly caused the fatal pneumonia. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed an $8,000 judgment for the plaintiff, holding that res ipsa loquitur and medical testimony created a jury question on negligence and causation, that evidence of the deceased's surviving wife and children was admissible to show his incentive to industry (with limiting instructions), and that other evidentiary rulings and the damages award were not prejudicial or excessive.
torts & liability
Schumacher v. the Sumner Tele. Co.
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1913-09-24 · cited 13×
In Schumacher v. the Sumner Telephone Co., the plaintiff sought to recover on a promissory note from individuals allegedly involved in an unincorporated telephone company, arguing they were liable as partners due to failure to incorporate. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing the claims against the defendants. The reasoning centered on the plaintiff's failure to meet the burden of proving the defendants' membership or authorization for the debt, the lack of any incorporation attempt or corporate holding out that would invoke statutory liability, and evidence indicating the enterprise was primarily the work of one person without the defendants' involvement.
business & regulatory
Denny v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1911-03-15 · cited 10×
The case involved a 15-year-old girl who obtained a fraudulent railway pass by misrepresenting herself as the sister of an employee and was injured in a train collision caused by a misplaced switch while returning home. Her father sued the railway company for damages, but the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the girl was a conscious trespasser who knew the pass was obtained by fraud, so the railway owed her only the duty not to willfully or wantonly injure her, and the evidence showed only ordinary negligence, not recklessness or intent.
torts & liability
Haase v. Morton & Morton
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1908-04-10 · cited 6×
The case Haase v. Morton & Morton involved a patient's claim against two physicians for injuries sustained when a hospital attendant negligently allowed her to slide from a transport cart into an elevator shaft after surgery. The majority opinion held the doctors liable for the attendant's negligence. In this dissenting opinion, the judge argues that the physicians had no control over the hospital or its staff and thus should not be charged with liability for the hospital attendant's actions in transporting the patient, as those duties belonged solely to the hospital. The dissent further reasons that the post-operative transport was not part of the partnership's medical services, so one doctor's involvement would not impose liability on his absent partner. The opinion emphasizes that expanding physician liability in this manner exceeds established legal principles and would impose undue burdens on the medical profession.
healthcaretorts & liability
Winkler v. Maxwell
Supreme Court of Iowa · 1905-02-08 · cited 7×
The case involved a widow suing physicians and undertakers for damages after they performed a post-mortem examination on her deceased husband's body, allegedly without authority and removing organs, causing her physical and mental anguish. The defendants claimed the examination was done with the widow's consent to determine the cause of death and in a proper scientific manner, also citing a city ordinance requiring certification of death causes. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants after a jury verdict, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff's own testimony showed she consented to the examination, that this consent extended to standard professional practices including temporary removal of parts for analysis (which were returned), and that any disputes over conditions were resolved against her by the jury. The court found the defendants acted in good faith within the scope of consent and noted that an erroneous allowance of an ordinance amendment in the answer was harmless due to jury instructions.
torts & liability