Alex M. Fromme

William C. Woods, a Black employee at Midwest Conveyor Company, filed a complaint with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights alleging racial discrimination in workplace treatment, discipline, training, and his eventual termination. The Commission found in Woods's favor after a hearing, awarding back wages and damages for pain and suffering; the district court affirmed this decision after a de novo review of the transcript. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the charge was timely filed under the continuing violation doctrine but that the district court had misapplied the burden of proof by requiring the employer to rebut a prima facie case with clear and convincing evidence rather than placing the ultimate burden on the complainant. The court further addressed the relevance of prior incidents and the requirements under K.S.A. 44-1005 and 44-1009 for proving unlawful employment practices based on race.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case was a wrongful death action brought by the children of Gary Stevens against their stepmother, alleging that she caused his death by gunshot either negligently or through an intentional tort. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the interspousal tort immunity doctrine barred the children's negligence claim but permitted their claim based on intentional tort, reversing in part the trial court's denial of the stepmother's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that under K.S.A. 60-1901, recovery is allowed only if the decedent could have sued the wrongdoer if he had lived, and while immunity generally applies to spousal torts including negligence, an exception is warranted for intentional injuries because such acts already destroy marital harmony. The opinion also notes the stepmother's conviction for involuntary manslaughter but focuses on the legal application of immunity to the pleaded theories.

family lawtorts & liability

The case involved a complaint to declare Charles K. Wood a habitual traffic offender under Kansas's Habitual Traffic Violators Act based on three prior convictions within five years, two of which were for driving while suspended and one for leaving the scene of an accident under city ordinances. The trial court ruled in favor of Wood, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city ordinance convictions did not count as qualifying offenses under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-285. The court reasoned that the statute expressly referenced city ordinances only for DUI violations and otherwise limited qualifying offenses to violations of state laws or laws of other states, so the inclusion of municipal violations in only one category implied their exclusion elsewhere; later statutory amendments adding such violations applied only prospectively.

criminal law

In State v. Korbel, the defendant appealed his jury convictions for rape and aggravated kidnapping after forcing a woman at gunpoint to drive to remote locations, where he attempted sexual intercourse without her consent. The court affirmed the convictions and concurrent sentences, including application of the mandatory firearms sentencing provision. It held that an instruction on attempted rape was properly refused because the victim's and defendant's testimony established the required penetration for completed rape; that hearsay evidence of the defendant's prior statements about a gun was admissible as a party admission; that venue for the rape was proper in the county where the crime was charged; and that any error in failing to order a presentence report was harmless because the Kansas Reception and Diagnostic Center reports served equivalent purposes for sentencing and rehabilitation planning.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an original mandamus action brought by the Kansas Attorney General against a unified school district board to compel it to own and operate buses or contract for bus service to transport students rather than using mileage reimbursement contracts with parents. The board had discontinued bus service in one former district area and substituted reimbursement payments after a parent survey and cost analysis, prompting the state to argue that statutes imposed an affirmative duty to provide actual bus transportation. The court examined the relevant statutes, including K.S.A. 72-8301(c) defining "provide or furnish transportation" to include both operating buses and reimbursing private vehicle use, as well as K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 72-8302 making such provision mandatory for qualifying students. It concluded that the board could satisfy its obligations through bus routes, mileage reimbursement, or a combination of the two, consistent with prior case law and the 1968 statutory recodification. The petition was therefore denied.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between First National Bank & Trust Co. and Ford Motor Credit Co. over priority security interests in three vehicles from the inventory of a car dealership that ceased operations. The credit company had financed the dealer's vehicle purchases under a floor plan agreement and perfected its purchase money security interest by filing a financing statement, while the bank claimed interests based on loans to dealer officers for alleged purchases of specific vehicles. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment favoring the bank as to two vehicles, holding that the credit company's interest had priority under UCC priority rules because the transactions were not bona fide sales in the ordinary course of business and the vehicles remained on the lot without payment to the credit company. As to the third vehicle, the court remanded for a new trial due to inadequate discovery and lack of findings on the circumstances of the transaction.

business & regulatoryproperty