Tyler C. Lockett

In State v. Adams, defendant Tieller M. Adams appealed his felony murder conviction following a no-contest plea, arguing the district court should have allowed withdrawal of the plea before sentencing because there was no good cause, the state's factual basis was insufficient, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance due to an undisclosed conflict of interest from prior representation of the victim. The opinion recounts the plea hearing, where the state summarized evidence including witness accounts of Adams threatening and shooting the victim over a drug debt, shell casings, autopsy results, and DNA linking the victim to Adams' shoes. The court held that a sufficient factual basis existed for felony murder, that Adams failed to show the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance or that he would have gone to trial absent it, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal. The conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bryan, the defendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior after being found naked with an erection on his 13-year-old daughter's bed while she slept. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3508(a)(2) does not require the victim to be aware of the offender's exposed sex organ. The court reasoned that the statute prohibits exposing a sex organ in the presence of a non-spouse without consent with intent to arouse sexual desires, where "exposing" refers to the act itself without needing perception by the victim, and the offender's awareness of the victim suffices for the presence and intent elements.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Charles Myers, who was terminated from his county road department job and alleged retaliatory discharge after filing a workers' compensation claim, had properly given notice of his tort claim against Jackson County before suing. Myers' attorney sent the required claim letter and proposed petition to the county counselor, who forwarded it to the Board of County Commissioners; the Board reviewed and denied the claim without a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board, ruling that service on the counselor did not satisfy K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 12-105b(d), which requires filing with the clerk or governing body. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Kansas Supreme Court held that actual notice and review by the Board did not constitute substantial compliance because the statute specifies the exact recipients and substantial compliance cannot create new methods of service. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's dismissal.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

In State v. Green, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter as an aider and abettor after a fight outside a bar in which O.T. Ruffin died from blunt force trauma inflicted by multiple people, including Derrick Henderson. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient because Green was chasing the victim's brother rather than directly participating in the attack on the victim and that death was not a foreseeable result of a bar fight. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction, concluding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State supported the jury's determination that the death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the aggravated battery that Green aided and abetted and that Green's immediate flight and subsequent disappearance indicated consciousness of guilt.

criminal law

In State v. Ross, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder after a shooting at a Wichita club that killed one victim and injured another; he challenged the admission of evidence that he fled to Washington and of his gang affiliation with a defense witness, asserted cumulative trial errors, and claimed his criminal history should have been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in full. It held that evidence of flight was properly before the jury, that gang-affiliation evidence was admissible to show the witness's bias despite its potential prejudice, that no individual errors existed to support a cumulative-error claim, and that established precedent permitted sentencing based on criminal history without jury proof.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Trotter, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, capital murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery arising from a planned home invasion robbery that resulted in the shooting deaths of two victims. Trotter raised four issues on appeal: the trial court's failure to give an eyewitness identification instruction, the admission of evidence that one victim was pregnant, the State's use of peremptory strikes to remove nine of ten African-American jurors in violation of Batson, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, that the Batson claim was not properly preserved or supported by the record, and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to convict. The court emphasized deference to the trial court's credibility and sufficiency determinations without reweighing evidence.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Peterman, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for attempted rape arising from a sting operation in which the defendant arranged via phone and in-person meetings to have sex with a child whom an informant falsely claimed she could provide. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction for insufficient evidence, finding no overt act because the intended victim was fictional and the defendant never came into physical proximity with a child. The Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, holding that Kansas law expressly eliminates both factual and legal impossibility as defenses to attempt crimes and that the defendant's drive to the arranged meeting, combined with his detailed planning and display of implements, constituted an overt act beyond mere preparation.

criminal law

In State v. Post, the defendant, convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and related charges after sexually abusing a minor, challenged a no-contact order imposed as a condition of his prison sentence prohibiting contact with the victim's family and minors under 18. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the district court lacked statutory authority under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4603d(a) to impose such conditions on a term of imprisonment, as the statute only permits conditions when sentencing to probation or community corrections. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute, supported by prior precedent, does not allow combining imprisonment with probation-like conditions, making the no-contact order an illegal sentence, which was vacated while the rest of the sentence remained intact.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Evans, defendant Larry Evans was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after a trial in which the court excluded certain circumstantial evidence that a third party, Andrew Reed, had shot the victim Michael Prince. Evans appealed, contending that the trial court erred by barring witnesses from testifying that Reed possessed the gun immediately after the shot and that the Kansas third-party evidence rule was unconstitutional. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the excluded evidence was admissible because there is no distinction in probative value between direct and circumstantial evidence, the proffered testimony was sufficiently linked to Reed and corroborated by other evidence including Reed's admissions, and its exclusion infringed on Evans' right to present a defense and was not harmless error. The court therefore remanded for a new trial without addressing the constitutional claim.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Davis, the defendant appealed his convictions for premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a firearm, and aggravated robbery arising from a fatal shooting at the victim's home and the subsequent abduction of a witness. The court considered claims that the trial court erred by not giving a unanimity instruction, that evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction, that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, that the defendant's criminal history score was miscalculated, and that the jury was not properly instructed on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The opinion examined the jury instructions as a whole and concluded they correctly allowed the jury to consider lesser offenses when reasonable doubt existed on the greater charge. The court affirmed the convictions in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Varney Business Services, Inc., the successor corporation to an accounting firm, suing former officer and shareholder Harley W. Pottroff to recover fees under a modified employment agreement requiring departing shareholders to pay a declining percentage of fees earned from the firm's former clients over the five years after termination. The district court granted summary judgment to Varney, determining it had standing as the real party in interest following a merger and awarding a money judgment plus prejudgment interest. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the corporation could enforce the agreement, the claim was valid and liquidated, and the award of interest was within the trial court's discretion under K.S.A. 16-201.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

In Smith v. Russell, a workers' compensation insurer (EMC) appealed the district court's denial of its motion to intervene in a personal injury suit brought by its insured (Smith) against the tortfeasor (Russell) five months after the court approved a $100,000 settlement. Smith had received benefits from EMC for work-related injuries and notified EMC of the lawsuit, but EMC did not intervene or file a lien; the settlement allocated $75,000 to loss of consortium and $25,000 to non-duplicative wage losses to avoid subrogation under K.S.A. 44-504. The district court found no misrepresentation or misconduct warranting relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) and noted EMC's deliberate choice not to participate. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the motion was untimely and no statutory basis existed to vacate the judgment.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In State v. McIntosh, the defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy based on allegations that he sexually abused his girlfriend's daughter over several years. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for independent psychological and physical examinations of the victim and by admitting expert testimony about behaviors consistent with sexual abuse. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendant failed to show a compelling reason for a psychological exam under the Gregg standard, that courts lack authority to order physical exams of victims in criminal cases, and that the expert testimony was admissible because it addressed common patterns without directly opining on the victim's credibility or diagnosing abuse. The court's reasoning centered on the trial judge's discretion, the absence of evidence like the victim's mental instability or prior false claims, and the limited nature of the expert's observations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a divorced couple disputing whether the ex-wife was entitled under the divorce decree to half of a lump-sum military payment received by the ex-husband after he was removed from temporary disability retirement status. The district court awarded the ex-wife a share of the payment plus interest, treating it as divisible retirement pay, but the Court of Appeals reversed, classifying it as indivisible disability severance pay. On review, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed both lower courts and remanded, holding that the district court had applied the incorrect provision of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (10 U.S.C. § 1408) and that unresolved factual questions remained about the payment’s character, including its tax treatment. The court declined to address related issues of prejudgment interest and relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6).

family lawpropertyfederal power

In Pipe v. Hamilton, the plaintiff sued a doctor for medical malpractice, alleging that negligent failure to perform additional tests after surgery for bowel obstruction caused the loss of a 5-10% chance of survival for the plaintiff's wife, who died after life support was withdrawn based on the doctor's prognosis. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that such a small percentage chance was not substantial enough under Kansas law to establish a prima facie loss-of-chance claim. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that a 10% lost chance of survival is substantial as a matter of law and sufficient to survive summary judgment, drawing on precedent from Roberson v. Counselman and other cases that recognize the doctrine without requiring a majority chance.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved a dispute over the limits of a one-year homeowners insurance policy with a $40,000 dwelling coverage amount after two successive fires occurred at the insured property, with the insurer having already paid nearly the full limit for the first fire. The policyholders sued after the insurer tendered only the remaining balance for the second fire, claiming the limit applied once for the entire policy period, while the policyholders argued it reset per loss. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the policyholders, finding the policy unambiguous and providing a fresh $40,000 limit for the second fire. The Court of Appeals reversed on public policy grounds, applying a common-law rule that prior payments reduce available coverage. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the policy language ambiguous as to whether the limit was per loss or aggregate, construing it against the insurer under established rules of contract interpretation, and noting that courts should not create public policy in a heavily regulated insurance field.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Mann, Ahmon Mann appealed his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and life sentence after a jury trial, raising claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and voluntary manslaughter, that he was denied his right to be present at critical stages, that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, that his counsel was ineffective, and that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence supported the first-degree murder charge without requiring a lesser-included-offense instruction, that no reversible errors occurred regarding jury instructions, presence, or misconduct, and that trial counsel's performance did not prejudice the defense. On the speedy-trial issues, the court ruled that the 90-day statutory deadline did not apply because Mann was not held solely on the murder charge, and the seven-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial under the constitutional balancing test from Barker v. Wingo.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Carr, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to a district court's imposition of a prison sentence rather than presumptive probation for a defendant convicted of criminal possession of a firearm under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. The defendant, with a criminal history score of E, had entered a plea and faced a severity level 8 offense that presumptively called for probation, but the court departed dispositionally based on findings that he was not amenable to rehabilitation due to the timing of the offense shortly after release from juvenile custody, prior failed probation, and drug-related criminal history. The court held that Apprendi v. New Jersey does not apply to such upward dispositional departures, distinguishing them from durational departures invalidated in prior precedent, and concluded that the departure reasons were substantial and compelling. The decision affirmed the Court of Appeals on these points while noting that an unrelated notice issue had already led to remand for resentencing.

criminal law

In Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., a chiropractor sued an automobile insurer for breach of contract after an insured assigned her right to receive personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for medical treatment following a car accident, but the insurer declined payment under a policy clause prohibiting assignment of interest without its written consent. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, determining that the non-assignment provision was clear, enforceable, and consistent with Kansas public policy favoring freedom of contract. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed on de novo review of the stipulated facts, concluding that the clause validly barred the assignment even though choses in action are generally assignable, as the legislature had not overridden such provisions in the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act and other states' laws often address the issue specifically. The court rejected arguments that the policy language was ambiguous or that public policy required allowing post-loss assignments to healthcare providers.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerned Dr. Thomas Winston's appeal from an administrative determination by the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) that he had physically abused his son and emotionally abused his son and daughter, resulting in his name being placed on the state's child abuse and neglect central registry. Winston challenged the SRS proceedings on multiple grounds, including alleged procedural violations, denial of due process, improper admission of hearsay evidence from his ex-wife, lack of substantial evidence, and claims that res judicata barred the action. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the SRS final order, holding that the agency followed required procedures, that hearsay was admissible in administrative hearings under the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act, that Winston had remedies available to secure cross-examination but did not pursue them, and that the findings were supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary. The court rejected the due process and res judicata arguments as well.

family lawprocedure