Nancy Moritz

In this Kansas case, the State appealed on a reserved question after the district court granted Allen Jaben's petition to expunge his 1977 convictions for rape, attempted rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated battery, which stemmed from crimes committed in 1974 and 1975. The State argued that the expungement statute in effect when Jaben filed his 2008 petition, K.S.A. 21-4619(c), should apply and bar expungement of those offenses, while the district court had instead applied the earlier statute in effect at the time of the offenses, K.S.A. 21-4617 (Weeks), which permitted expungement. The Kansas Supreme Court held that because the legislature did not clearly express an intent for K.S.A. 21-4619 to apply retrospectively, the statute operates only prospectively, so the district court correctly looked to the law in effect when the underlying crimes were committed. The court further clarified that the State's appeal was properly limited to a question reserved under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3) and that the issue presented a matter of statewide importance regarding uniform application of criminal statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the adoption of T.S.W., an Indian child, and a challenge by the Cherokee Nation under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to the district court's decision allowing placement with a non-Indian family based on the biological mother's preference. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the district court's ruling that deviated from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences under 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The court held that a biological parent's placement preference cannot override those statutory factors absent a request for anonymity regarding the child's placement. The core reasoning relied on the text of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c), Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines, and related commentary, which tie the parental preference exception to confidentiality concerns rather than general preferences, while emphasizing that the child's best interests remain paramount alongside ICWA factors.

family lawfederal power

The case involved Bryan Sprung's convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and criminal threat, stemming from multiple incidents of sexual abuse against a 10-year-old girl at his church office. On appeal, Sprung challenged one indecent liberties conviction as multiplicitous, alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments regarding witness credibility, claimed error in the denial of his motion to compel a psychological examination of the victim, and argued that his aggravated sentence was imposed without jury findings on aggravating factors. The court held that the two aggravated indecent liberties convictions arose from the same act and that the statute provided only one unit of prosecution, so it reversed one conviction and vacated the related sentence. It affirmed the remaining convictions, finding that any improper comments by the prosecutor did not affect the trial outcome, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the psychological exam motion due to insufficient evidence of the victim's mental instability or lack of veracity on material issues, and that it lacked jurisdiction to review the presumptive sentence challenge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the final distribution of an $18,000 appraisers' award in a Kansas eminent domain proceeding for land owned by Oscar Armendariz, where the Britts had claimed an interest via a pending quiet title action and their attorney Vernon Jarboe sought a portion of the award as fees under quantum meruit after the Britts lost that action. The district court awarded Jarboe $2,750 in fees from the award despite the Britts no longer being interested parties. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court lacked statutory authority under K.S.A. 26-517 to make such a distribution because that statute permits allocation only upon a motion by a party in interest when there is a dispute among parties in interest as to division of the award, and neither Jarboe nor the Britts qualified as such parties at the time of the order.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Torres, the defendant pleaded guilty in 2007 to felony murder and related firearm and assault charges under a plea agreement in which the State agreed to recommend specific sentences. After his initial sentence was vacated on appeal and the case was remanded, Torres moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the State had breached the agreement at the first sentencing by reading a letter from the victim's mother requesting the maximum penalty. The district court denied the motion, and at the resentencing hearing the State again recommended the agreed-upon sentence while the victim's mother testified in person; the court imposed the bargained-for sentence. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that Torres's claim was moot because the original sentence had been vacated, he received the recommended sentence at the new hearing, and he did not allege any breach at that hearing. The court therefore affirmed without reaching the merits of whether good cause existed to withdraw the plea.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Miller, the defendant was convicted of intentional second-degree murder following a trial in which the jury received instructions on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The instructions were contradictory, with one directing simultaneous consideration of the offenses and another directing sequential consideration of voluntary manslaughter only if the jury could not agree on second-degree murder. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that there was a real possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the error because the contradictory instructions, verdict form, and closing arguments likely led the jury to consider the offenses sequentially rather than simultaneously.

criminal law