Alfred G. Schroeder

This case is a long-running class action by thousands of gas royalty owners from across the U.S. and abroad against Phillips Petroleum seeking interest on royalties that Phillips held in suspense while awaiting federal regulatory approval for price increases. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Kansas could not apply its own law to all claims without violating due process and full faith and credit, the Kansas Supreme Court on remand reviewed the district court's interest calculations. The court affirmed the use of the FPC/FERC corporate undertaking rates for interest up to the date of judgment but held that post-judgment interest must instead follow the statutory rates of the states where the leases are located for claims tied to Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming, while applying Kansas's rate to remaining claims. The decision rests on respecting the Supreme Court's mandate and applying the law of the relevant jurisdictions to avoid constitutional conflicts.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Armstrong, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder in the 1979 deaths of Don and Norma Earl after three trials, with the prosecution's case relying primarily on the testimony of Cecil Stembridge, who received immunity and directed police to the victims' bodies. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence (a police memorandum and FBI field notes obtained during a co-defendant's later trial) and that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder due to lack of evidence of premeditation. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence in question was not material enough to warrant a new trial and that the defense's strategy of denying any participation provided no basis for instructing on second-degree murder under the circumstances. The court also noted a need to correct the journal entry via nunc pro tunc order.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bennett, the defendant appealed concurrent minimum sentences of five to twenty years for aggravated criminal sodomy and three to ten years for aggravated burglary after pleading guilty, arguing that the trial court failed to sentence him in a way that advanced vocational rehabilitation goals and abused its discretion by not stating on the record the sentencing factors from K.S.A. 21-4606. The Kansas Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the sentences under K.S.A. 22-3602(a) without requiring allegations of partiality or corrupt motive. The court reasoned that while sentencing judges may recommend rehabilitation measures in the journal entry, the Secretary of Corrections has sole statutory authority over inmate placement and training programs, so any complaint about vocational opportunities was not justiciable on direct appeal from the sentence. On the second issue, the court found no abuse of discretion because the sentences were at the statutory minimum, the presentence investigation report and diagnostic center report addressed the relevant factors, and detailed on-the-record explanations are not required in minimum-sentence cases.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Alexander, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, rape, and aggravated burglary after a jury rejected his insanity defense, raising claims of trial error including the admission of testimony from a jailer who observed the defendant's behavior while in custody and the trial court's refusal to give a full pattern jury instruction on the consequences of an insanity verdict. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that the jailer's testimony improperly referenced the defendant's incarceration in a manner that could undermine the presumption of innocence, but concluded it was harmless error under the state's harmless-error rule because of the strength of the evidence against the defendant. The court further held that the given jury instructions sufficiently directed the jury to focus only on guilt or innocence without inviting improper consideration of disposition or sentencing, and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Wheaton, the defendant appealed her conviction for aggravated robbery after a jury trial, raising two issues: the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification and its failure to question a juror who had inquired about being excused from service. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification was properly excluded under the precedent of State v. Warren, which favors cautionary jury instructions over such expert evidence to address potential misidentification risks, including those arising from stress or cross-racial identifications. On the juror issue, the court ruled that the claim was waived because defense counsel had informed the trial court of the juror's inquiry but made no objection or request for questioning during trial, and precedent bars raising known issues of potential misconduct only after an unfavorable verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In Noble v. State, the petitioner appealed the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion seeking to withdraw guilty pleas to nine felony counts including burglary, sexual exploitation of a child, attempted sexual exploitation, indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated burglary, on grounds that the arraigning court failed to inform him of the maximum penalties or otherwise comply with K.S.A. 22-3210 at the time the pleas were accepted. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial, ruling that any noncompliance was harmless because the information provided the penalties, the petitioner confirmed reviewing it with counsel, and the record established that the pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made. The court further held that the statute's purpose is satisfied by substantial rather than strict compliance and declined to expand the grounds for post-sentence plea withdrawal beyond those stated in K.S.A. 22-3210(d).

criminal lawprocedure