Frederick N. Six

Matthew Cullen pled guilty to attempted rape as part of a plea agreement in which he and the state jointly recommended an upward durational departure sentence of 118 months imprisonment, based on the victim's particular vulnerability due to age, along with 60 months of extended postrelease supervision. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed whether the upward departure sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey and State v. Gould even though Cullen had recommended it, and whether the extended postrelease supervision was unconstitutional. The court held that the departure sentence was unconstitutional and void because K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-4716 is facially invalid under Apprendi and Gould, as it permits a judge to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on findings made by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and this defect could not be cured by the defendant's plea or agreement. The court affirmed the extended postrelease supervision term, concluding it did not offend Apprendi or Gould.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Walker, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a sexually violent crime under Kansas law, and received a presumptive prison term plus an extended 60-month postrelease supervision period based on the nature of the offense. The Court of Appeals vacated the extended supervision term, finding it unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and State v. Gould, but the Kansas Supreme Court granted review and reversed that decision. The court held that the extended supervision did not violate Apprendi or Gould because Walker's guilty plea established the statutory classification of the crime as sexually violent, providing the necessary basis without any additional judicial fact-finding. This followed the analysis from the related case of State v. Anthony, where conviction of the same offense justified the extension, and the court distinguished precedents involving upward durational departures under different statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Pruitt, Dennis Ray Pruitt pled no contest to first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery after the deaths of a pregnant woman and her unborn child during a robbery. He received an upward durational departure sentence of 178 months for the aggravated robbery, consecutive to a life term for murder, based on findings of excessive brutality and victim vulnerability. Pruitt appealed, arguing the sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey and State v. Gould despite his plea. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the upward departure sentence was imposed under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 21-4716, a scheme declared unconstitutional on its face because it allowed penalty increases based on facts not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court vacated the aggravated robbery sentence and remanded for resentencing within the statutory range, noting that the ruling applies to cases not yet final when Apprendi was decided.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved McCain Foods USA, Inc. seeking to recover on a default judgment against Allen Quality Foods, Inc. for unpaid amounts under a contract to process potato wedges for a USDA deal, by pursuing claims under the Kansas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act against Glen Shore, an officer and director of Allen Foods and a related company, Central Processors, Inc. The trial court found that certain transfers of funds from the companies to Shore were made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, based on multiple badges of fraud such as transfers after the debtor was sued, concealment of assets, and transfers of substantially all assets, and awarded McCain $124,495 plus $20,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that substantial competent evidence supported the findings of fraud under K.S.A. 33-204 and rejecting Shore's challenges to the application of the statute and his unpreserved good-faith defense under K.S.A. 33-208(a). The court noted that issues must be raised in the pretrial order to be considered and that the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard. The ruling focused solely on the actual-intent claim after a bench trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Kenneth P. Seck, who had been indefinitely suspended from practicing law in Kansas, and was convicted of false impersonation under K.S.A. 21-3824 after sending a demand letter on attorney letterhead to a newspaper publisher regarding alleged harm to his sister. Seck appealed his misdemeanor conviction, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it left unclear what conduct was prohibited for a suspended attorney. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the statute clearly criminalizes representing oneself as licensed to practice law when one is not and that no constitutionally protected activity is curtailed. The court also rejected Seck's additional claims for lack of supporting argument or authority.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Richard Kendall's appeal of his convictions for felony driving under the influence (DUI), driving with a suspended license, and refusing a preliminary breath test, as well as his sentence. The court addressed whether the trial court erred in responding to a jury question about the definition of "driving," in admitting an officer's opinion testimony on Kendall's intoxication, and whether using prior DUI convictions to classify the offense as a felony violated Apprendi v. New Jersey. The court determined that any error in the jury instruction response was harmless, the officer's testimony was properly admitted, and the prior convictions could be used without a jury finding under the Apprendi exception for prior convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed Kendall's convictions and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure