Jerry Buchmeyer

In this case, an inmate at a federal prison sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that prison guards negligently facilitated her sexual assault by another guard by violating regulations to escort her to him after midnight and failing to report the suspicious activity. The United States moved for summary judgment, arguing that employee selection and supervision were discretionary functions exempt from the FTCA, the assaulting guard was not acting within his employment, and the events were not foreseeable. The court denied the motion in full, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the assisting guards acted within the scope of their employment, breached a duty to protect the inmate, and proximately caused her injury through their violations of prison rules that created a foreseeable risk of harm.

criminal lawfederal powertorts & liability

The case concerns a lawsuit brought by the mother of an 18-year-old inmate who died by suicide shortly after being placed in administrative segregation at a Texas state prison. The plaintiff alleged that several prison officials violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from a known risk of suicide or to respond adequately once the hanging began. The court granted summary judgment to Warden Robert Treon and Executive Director Gary Johnson on all claims, finding no basis for liability, but denied summary judgment to Officers Williams and Blanford and Sergeant Taylor on the claim that they failed to properly react to the suicide attempt. The denial rested on the existence of genuine issues of material fact arising from highly inconsistent witness accounts and reports about the timing and nature of the officers' observations and actions, which prevented a determination that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Sharon Marketic obtained a home equity loan secured by a mortgage on her Texas property and later defaulted, prompting defendant U.S. Bank to seek foreclosure. She sued for declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages, alleging the loan documents violated Texas Constitution article XVI section 50(a)(6) requirements for homestead liens and that the property's agricultural-use designation under tax statutes barred foreclosure; the bank counterclaimed for fraud based on her representations about the property's use. The court addressed the bank's motion for partial summary judgment on all claims except those under TILA and RESPA. Applying Rule 56 standards and analyzing Texas homestead lien rules and legislative history on agricultural exemptions, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatorytaxes

The case involved plaintiff Charles Rex Acker, a 63-year-old former Southwest Regional Sales Manager, suing his employer deBoer, Inc. under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act after his termination in late 2002. Acker claimed his firing was motivated by age bias, while deBoer asserted it resulted from his suspected involvement in a scheme with a departing supervisor and a competitor, based on emails and increased contacts with the competitor. The court denied deBoer's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether age was a motivating factor and whether the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation was pretextual. The decision relied on evidence such as emails referencing Acker's role, the circumstances of his termination, and disputes over his communications with the competitor, without weighing credibility.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a products liability lawsuit filed by the Bryant family against Giacomini, the manufacturer of a propane gas valve, after a 2002 trailer fire in Texas that caused severe burn injuries and one death. The plaintiffs claimed the valve had design, manufacturing, and marketing defects under strict liability and negligence theories, plus breach of post-sale duties to warn or recall and express or implied warranties. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the design defect claims. It granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on manufacturing defect, marketing defect, post-sale duty to warn, and all warranty claims due to a lack of supporting evidence, but denied it on the design defect claims because genuine issues of material fact remained under Texas law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a Texas inmate serving a 45-year sentence who challenged a prison disciplinary conviction for an unauthorized commodity exchange. The inmate received punishments including 15 days of solitary confinement, privilege restrictions, classification changes, and forfeiture of 30 days of previously earned good-time credits, which he argued violated due process because the credits affected his mandatory supervised release date. The court initially granted relief but, on the respondent's motion to alter the judgment, vacated that order and denied the petition. The core reasoning was that the 30-day loss of good-time credits was de minimis in light of the inmate's lengthy sentence (representing about 0.18 percent of the total term), consistent with Fifth Circuit guidance in cases such as Malchi v. Thaler and Richards v. Dretke, and therefore did not implicate a protected liberty interest or require constitutional due process protections.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a declaratory judgment action in which insurer Mid-Continent Casualty Company sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify its insureds (Camaley Energy, Rodessa Operating, and Kenneth Tally) in an underlying Texas state-court lawsuit. The underlying suit alleged that the insureds' drilling of an oil well caused the wellbore to deviate, trespass onto a neighboring leasehold, and damage the plaintiffs' property rights. The court granted summary judgment to Mid-Continent, holding that the petition's allegations of property damage arising from the insureds' operations fell within policy exclusions and did not trigger coverage under either the bodily-injury/property-damage or personal-injury provisions. Because no coverage existed, the insurer had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify as a matter of law.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case concerns the Dallas Housing Authority's motion to approve construction of public housing on the Hillcrest Road site, which had been acquired under a prior race-conscious remedial order in a long-running desegregation lawsuit against DHA and HUD. The court granted the motion after finding that DHA's 2001 decision to develop the site was made solely on race-neutral grounds, evaluating it against HUD site and neighborhood standards, court-imposed criteria for suitability, availability of services, and overall livability. The core reasoning was that DHA no longer applies race-based selection rules, the Hillcrest site was chosen for its objective merits without regard to demographics, and the prior remedial policy had not been shown to produce ongoing segregative effects that would taint the current neutral process.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involves ongoing efforts to enforce a 2001 settlement agreement aimed at reducing racial segregation in Dallas public housing by expanding the use of Section 8 vouchers in predominantly white suburban areas. Plaintiffs sought to require the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) to extend public facility financing and bond authority to support housing development outside the City of Dallas, while also attempting to add and enjoin a Texas Assistant Attorney General from disapproving such bonds. The court granted the motion to enjoin DHA from limiting its financing to within Dallas city limits, finding that such geographic restrictions hindered the settlement's desegregation goals and that providing suburban financing was an appropriate remedy under state law interpretations allowing residential development support. The court denied the motion to add the Assistant Attorney General as a defendant, citing broad discretion over party joinder and the lack of formal bond disapproval at that stage.

civil rights

The case involved plaintiffs Roger and Sue Melton, on behalf of their disabled son Jason who uses a wheelchair, and Advocacy, Inc., suing Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) for alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs claimed that DART discriminated against Jason by ending its prior practice of providing paratransit pickups in the alley behind their home, instead requiring him to travel to the curb at the alley's entrance, and by failing to make reasonable modifications to its curb-to-curb service policy. DART moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy complied with federal requirements and was justified by safety concerns, with support from the Federal Transit Administration. The court granted DART's motion and denied plaintiffs' partial motion, holding that the policy was facially neutral, did not discriminate on the basis of disability, and that the relevant ADA provisions contained no reasonable modifications requirement applicable to this paratransit service. The Rehabilitation Act claims failed for the same reasons, as the statutes track each other and DART receives federal funding.

civil rights

The case concerned trademark rights in the term 'march madness' and the domain name marchmadness.com, with plaintiff MMAA suing Netfire, SMI, and Jones for cybersquatting, trademark infringement, false representation, unfair competition under the Lanham Act, and related state-law claims, while defendants maintained that the term was generic and their use of the domain was lawful. After prior summary judgment rulings favoring MMAA on some counterclaims and a bench trial, the court issued findings of fact on the domain's acquisition history, the term's commercial use by the NCAA and IHSA, consumer survey evidence, dictionary definitions, and media references. The court concluded that 'march madness' was not generic, had acquired secondary meaning as a source identifier, and was entitled to trademark protection, resulting in liability findings on the infringement and cybersquatting claims.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned the estate of Ruth A. Kimbell, who before her death in 1998 transferred most of her assets into a revocable living trust, then into a newly formed LLC and limited partnership that she effectively controlled through her son as manager. After the IRS audited the estate tax return and determined that the full value of the transferred assets should be included in the gross estate under Internal Revenue Code section 2036(a), the executor paid the additional tax and sued for a refund of over $800,000. The court granted the government's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the executor's cross-motion, ruling that the transfers were includible because the decedent had retained enjoyment and control of the assets, the partnership did not alter the existing management structure or pool interests with outsiders, and the arrangement was essentially testamentary rather than a bona fide sale for full consideration. The decision rested on undisputed documentary evidence of the entities' ownership, governance, and the decedent's retained powers.

taxesproperty

In Reed v. Cockrell, a Texas inmate serving a death sentence for capital murder filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhausting state remedies, raising thirteen claims including perjured testimony, racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, flawed jury instructions on circumstantial evidence and lesser-included offenses, and delays in the state appellate process. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions in full, overruled the petitioner's objections, and denied relief. Applying the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the court determined that the state courts' adjudication of the claims was neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a Texas inmate serving a sentence for delivery of a controlled substance, who challenged the validity of a prison disciplinary proceeding that imposed sanctions including loss of 90 days of good-time credits. The court addressed the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the petition was timely. It reasoned that while the limitations period began running from the March 2001 disciplinary decision date, equitable tolling applied during the period the inmate was required to exhaust the state's mandatory two-step prison grievance process, which concluded in August 2001, extending the deadline past the April 2002 filing date.

criminal lawprocedure

Carrot Bunch Companies, a Texas corporation, sued Computer Friends, Carrots Inks, and Jimmie Moglia in Texas federal court for alleged violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, the Lanham Act, unfair competition, misappropriation, and Texas business tort law, claiming the defendants registered domain names resembling the plaintiff's trademarks to sell competing inkjet products. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims against Moglia and Carrots Inks for lack of personal jurisdiction and, alternatively, to transfer venue to Oregon. The court denied the motion in full, holding that it had specific jurisdiction over Moglia because he purposefully directed tortious conduct at Texas by registering the domain names while aware of the likely injury to the plaintiff, and that venue transfer was unwarranted as it would only shift inconvenience from one party to the other.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned Fina's request for a declaratory judgment on whether numerous asbestos exposure claims by workers at its facilities counted as multiple occurrences under a Travelers comprehensive general liability policy with a $300,000 per-occurrence limit, or as a single occurrence that would exhaust coverage after one settlement payment. The court granted Fina's motion for partial summary judgment and declared that the claims constituted multiple occurrences. It reasoned under Texas law that the policy defined an occurrence to include continuous or repeated exposure to conditions causing injury, but the separate exposures of individual claimants at different times and locations did not arise from one cause at a single site and thus qualified as distinct occurrences.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves a trademark dispute over the phrase "March Madness," originally used by the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) for its high school basketball tournament and later associated with the NCAA's college basketball tournament. Plaintiffs MMAA and IHSA sued defendants Netfire and SMI for trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition, and cybersquatting after the defendants registered related domain names and used the phrase commercially. Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the phrase was not protectable as it had become generic, while plaintiffs cross-moved on the issue of protectability and IHSA sought dismissal of a conversion counterclaim. The court denied the motions regarding the trademark claims, finding genuine issues of material fact about whether the phrase retained source-identifying significance based on historical usage, licensing, and survey evidence. However, it granted IHSA's motion and dismissed the conversion counterclaim with prejudice.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

Marisol Perez sued her former employer, MCI World Com Communications, alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment, sex-based discrimination, and retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act after her coworker and ex-boyfriend subjected her to abusive behavior following their breakup, which she claimed affected her work performance and led to her termination. The defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice, holding that the harassment was sex-neutral and arose from the ended personal relationship rather than from the plaintiff's sex, with no evidence of sexual overtones or demands for further relations. The court also overruled the defendant's objections to the plaintiff's evidence.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Randy Ballard, an HIV-positive CT/X-ray technologist employed by Health Images (later acquired by Healthsouth), who alleged that supervisors learned of his status after he disclosed it for safety reasons, leading to negative performance evaluations, counseling, probation, and harassment that created a hostile work environment; he also claimed sex discrimination. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims. The core reasoning was that Ballard failed to produce evidence showing the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively abusive work environment, and other aspects of the claims lacked sufficient support.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a plaintiff alleging that police officers in the City of Burkburnett detained her without probable cause, searched her vehicle and person, maced her eyes to coerce consent for a strip search, conducted a non-consensual strip search, and caused injuries, resulting in federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments plus state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery. The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, dismissing the claims against the City and officers in their official capacities without prejudice for failure to plead facts supporting municipal liability under Monell, dismissing the Eighth Amendment claim with prejudice, and denying dismissal of the remaining claims against the individual officers. The core reasoning was that the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims requires specific facts rather than conclusory allegations, the complaint's detailed facts sufficed to state claims and overcome qualified immunity and other defenses, and municipal liability could not rest on respondeat superior without allegations of a policy or custom of deliberate indifference.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure