Boyce G. Clayton

The case involved a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit brought by Mary Stutler, as administratrix of her husband's estate, against surgeon G.B. Reams, M.D., alleging that negligence in post-operative monitoring and tube care after a subtotal gastrectomy caused a fatal stump blowout and peritonitis. A jury in Boyd Circuit Court awarded $75,000, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issues of negligence and proximate cause to the jury but reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial due to errors in permitting leading questions to the defendant's expert witnesses during the plaintiff's case-in-chief, an improper admonition barring counsel from conferring with his own witness, and flaws in the jury instructions regarding recoverable damages such as funeral expenses and pre-surgery medical costs.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

In this case, a fifteen-year-old boy was injured when his unlicensed trail bike was struck by a passing truck while he was riding on a public highway at night, with his father following behind in a truck. The boy, through his guardian, sued his father after settling with the truck driver; the trial court granted summary judgment to the father on grounds of contributory negligence and parental immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the immunity ruling while reversing on contributory negligence. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the father was not protected by parental immunity under the narrow exceptions recognized in Rigdon v. Rigdon, which cover only acts of discipline or provision of legally required necessities, because the father's conduct did not fall within those categories. The court further held that whether the boy's possible contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the injury presented a factual question for the jury rather than a basis for summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

family lawtorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a Breathitt Circuit Court decree dissolving the marriage of Ovia James Hollon and Thelma Watkins Hollon, dividing their marital property, and awarding maintenance to the wife. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the trial court's rulings on property division and maintenance, remanding for further proceedings. The core reasoning was that the trial judge failed to make specific findings of fact separating non-marital from marital property, dividing the latter in just proportions under KRS 403.190 after considering required factors, or adequately addressing the standards for maintenance under KRS 403.200, and that the statutory requirements overrode the usual rule barring relief when parties did not request more detailed findings.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Brian Douglas Schaefer's conviction for bribing a witness under KRS 524.020, based on his payment of $500 to a detective during a meeting about a client's narcotics case. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the prosecution's repeated references to a suppressed tape recording of the meeting, despite the trial court's order, constituted prejudicial error that could have improperly influenced the jury's assessment of the conflicting accounts of bribery versus extortion. It also ruled that the admission of irrelevant expert testimony about typical cocaine dosages and quantities was prejudicial error, as it allowed the jury to draw improper inferences unrelated to the bribery charge. The court rejected claims regarding peremptory challenges and the applicability of an extortion defense under the specific bribery statute at issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In Seay v. Commonwealth, the appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, rape, kidnapping, burglary, and sexual abuse arising from two separate armed incidents in June 1978 at an apartment complex, resulting in a total sentence of 261 years. On appeal, the court rejected arguments that evidence was insufficient for one rape count, that the indictments should have been severed for separate trials, that the prosecutor made improper closing remarks, and that cumulative errors denied due process, finding the evidence overwhelming and no prejudice from the rulings. The court did reverse one kidnapping conviction (of Charles Hilton) under the exemption in KRS 509.050 because the restraint was incidental to the robbery, while upholding the others as exceeding ordinary incidental interference.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether the bulk transfer provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the sale of assets of a restaurant-bar business, which would have allowed certain creditors to pursue the sellers for an unpaid judgment. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the UCC bulk transfer rules did not apply to the transaction. As a result, the creditors' action was barred by the six-month statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Article VI of the UCC is designed to protect creditors of businesses whose principal activity is the sale of merchandise from inventory, but a restaurant's main business involves providing services rather than selling goods from stock, consistent with UCC comments and decisions in other states.

business & regulatory

The case involved three Louisville police officers who were convicted of two counts of wanton endangerment and two counts of third-degree criminal mischief. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, finding the evidence insufficient to support the verdicts. On discretionary review and after rehearing, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in full and reinstated all convictions. The court held that the defendants had failed to preserve the sufficiency-of-evidence issue by not moving for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence, as required by the procedural rule established in Kimbrough v. Commonwealth and Rudolph v. Commonwealth.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved appeals in a civil action for interference with contract from the Boyd Circuit Court and a criminal conviction for disorderly conduct from the Bullitt Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed both sets of appeals because the notices failed to designate a final, appealable judgment as required by CR 73.03 and RCr 12.04(2). The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals, holding that the constitutional right to appeal under Section 115 may be conditioned on strict compliance with procedural rules and that such rules are not overridden by substantive rights. The court rejected arguments for substantial compliance or waiver based on timing of dismissal motions, noting that the notices referenced only non-final orders like jury verdicts and post-trial denials.

procedurecriminal lawtorts & liability

The case involved the convictions of Johnny Ray Douglas and Jesse Irvin Payne for first-degree robbery stemming from an armed robbery at a Holiday Inn motel in Jefferson County, Kentucky, on December 31, 1977, in which employees were forced to surrender wallets and the cash register was emptied. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing errors including the trial court's refusal to instruct on the presumption of innocence, its definition of reasonable doubt, its handling of the defendants' custody status in front of the jury, the submission of multiple robbery counts for separate thefts, and the admission of statements made after invoking Miranda rights. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury instructions did not violate due process under federal precedents, the custody measures were minimal and practical necessities, the thefts constituted distinct offenses under the robbery statute, and the statements were voluntary rather than the product of prohibited police questioning. The court reasoned that each claimed error either aligned with existing law or did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial given the overall circumstances and evidence.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Glenn Jackson against his former employer, General Refractories Company, for permanent total disability from silicosis developed over 27 years of employment. Jackson stopped working in 1972 on medical advice due to dust exposure but did not learn of his silicosis diagnosis until 1975, at which point he notified his employer within a month. The Workmen's Compensation Board found the notice timely under KRS 342.316(2)(a) because Jackson was not aware of the occupational disease until the diagnosis, a finding affirmed by the circuit court but reversed by the Court of Appeals. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the award, holding that the timeliness of notice is a factual question for the Board and that its determination was supported by substantial evidence, which cannot be overturned on appeal even if the court might have reached a different conclusion. The dissent argued that the majority's approach effectively nullified the statute's "distinct manifestation" clause.

labor & employmentprocedure

Walter Collins was convicted of theft by unlawful taking, trafficking in heroin, and being a persistent felony offender after police discovered a key to a bus station locker containing heroin during a warrantless search of an air conditioner in his motel room. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest. The court held that under Chimel v. California, the air conditioner was within the area of the arrestee's immediate control from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence, and that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to assess the probability of such access before conducting the search. The decision relied on precedents like U.S. v. Robinson and Watkins v. U.S. to conclude the search was reasonable given the arrestees' proximity to the unit.

criminal lawprocedure

In this dissolution of marriage case, the trial court awarded the wife a judgment for her share of marital property payable over five years at 4% interest. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that under KRS 360.040, the judgment must bear 6% interest from its date, and that a subsequent statutory amendment increasing the rate to 8% applies prospectively to the unsatisfied judgment starting from the amendment's effective date. The court reasoned that interest on judgments is a matter of statutory grace rather than contract, so the rate changes with the law, reversing the 4% rate and directing 6% until June 19, 1976, and 8% thereafter.

family lawproperty

In Moore v. Commonwealth, two defendants appealed their convictions for armed robbery of a Kentucky service station, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to hold a suppression hearing on potentially tainted in-court identifications from suggestive single mug-shot displays, by excluding evidence related to an Indiana offense, and by refusing to order production of a police report held by out-of-state authorities. The court agreed that the pretrial identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and that a hearing should have been conducted if requested, but held that the in-court identifications were nonetheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances and that any errors were harmless. The court further concluded that the report was not in the prosecution's possession so production was not required, that other evidentiary rulings did not warrant reversal, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, which were therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Charles Ervin Williams's convictions for armed robbery and murder arising from a 1974 incident at a Louisville restaurant, where he received life sentences. On appeal, Williams challenged the prosecutor's failure to disclose that the key witness's prior robbery conviction had been vacated after the first trial, with the charge left pending, potentially in connection with the witness's testimony. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that this nondisclosure violated the defendant's right to a fair trial under Brady principles, as the information was material to the witness's credibility and the defense had made a specific request for such evidence. The court reasoned that the prosecution's omission created a substantial basis for questioning the fairness of the proceedings, particularly given the witness's recantation and changed testimony between trials.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the murder convictions of first cousins John and Leroy Campbell, each sentenced to 20 years in prison for the stabbing death of Pearl Campbell in Clark County, Kentucky, on July 10, 1976. The court reversed both convictions, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support John's conviction for murder or aiding and abetting because he was never identified at the scene and his mere prior association with the victim was inadequate to prove involvement. For Leroy, while the evidence of his presence and actions at the scene was sufficient to support a conviction, the court found that prosecutorial misconduct—specifically, improper comments during cross-examination and closing argument about Leroy's post-arrest silence—deprived him of a fair trial in violation of due process under Doyle v. Ohio. The opinion directed a new trial for both and noted that John would be entitled to acquittal if the evidence remained substantially the same.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case concerned whether Hershell Murray, the natural but illegitimate son of Dr. Hershell B. Murray, could inherit a share of his father's estate under Kentucky's anti-lapse statutes (KRS 394.400 and 394.410) after the grandfather to whom half the estate was devised predeceased the testator. The lower courts had dismissed the claim, relying on KRS 391.090(2), which barred illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers, and on an interpretation that the will made a different disposition excluding Hershell. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that KRS 391.090(2) is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause following Trimble v. Gordon and Pendleton v. Pendleton, and that the will contained no explicit different disposition sufficient to override the anti-lapse statutes. As a result, Hershell, along with the two adopted daughters, each takes one-third of the share originally devised to the grandfather.

family lawcivil rights

In Pace v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter after shooting her husband and receiving a 20-year sentence. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense despite the defendant's primary claim of an accidental shooting during an altercation. The court reasoned that inconsistent defenses like accident and self-protection may both be presented to the jury if supported by the evidence, drawing on precedent that such instructions are required when facts raise the issue. A dissent argued that the mutually exclusive nature of the defenses and the defendant's testimony could prejudice the case if an inconsistent instruction were given.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Alvin Manuel Harris, who faced four counts of first-degree robbery from separate incidents at Louisville service stations and a grocery store in December 1975 and January 1976; the charges were consolidated for trial, resulting in convictions on three counts and concurrent sentences of twenty and ten years. Harris appealed, claiming error in the joinder of offenses, the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence on a witness's in-court identification after a pretrial photo lineup, and the refusal to give precautionary jury instructions about evidence of his prior forgery conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the offenses were similar in character and closely related in time and circumstances so joinder was within the trial court's discretion with no prejudice shown, that the witness's identification rested on her observations during the robbery without indication of taint from the photo procedure, and that a proper pretrial hearing had occurred followed by a limiting admonition to the jury on the prior conviction evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether two State Farm automobile insurance policies issued to Drury William Christian, Jr. provided uninsured motorist coverage of $10,000 each and medical payments coverage under one policy for injuries to his 17-year-old son Mark, who was struck by an uninsured driver while riding his own motorcycle. The trial court ruled that the motorcycle was covered as a matter of law and held State Farm liable for $21,000 after a jury verdict against the uninsured motorist. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, determining that the policies' definitions limited coverage to four-wheel vehicles and excluded the two-wheel motorcycle, which was not listed in the declarations. The court further held that such exclusions are reasonable and consistent with the terms and conditions allowed under Kentucky's uninsured motorist statute, KRS 304.20-020, given the high risks of motorcycle use.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Charlotte Louise Edwards, who was convicted by a jury of murdering U.S. Army Major Thomas B. Basehart after shooting him at a shopping mall in 1976, claiming he had taken her child despite no prior contact with the family; she was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Edwards appealed, arguing among other things that the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, that an expert witness was improperly handled, and that the prosecutor made improper racial references in closing argument. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity under KRS 504.020 by showing a mental disease or defect caused her to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or conform it to the law, and that the evidence here established mental illness but did not satisfy that legal standard. The court also found no error in the trial court's handling of the expert witness or the prosecutor's statements, which it deemed a fair inference from the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure