William Graves

In Williams v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of third-degree rape based on allegations by a 14-year-old victim that he engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted third-degree rape. This ruling was based on the victim's initial statements to police indicating only attempted intercourse, which created a factual issue for the jury as to whether the acts were completed or merely attempted, requiring instructions on all theories supported by the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a petition by the Commonwealth for a writ of prohibition against a trial judge's order requiring the state Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay up to $5,000 for private mental health testing of death-row inmate Karu Gene White, who sought to prove he was mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that while White was entitled to expert assistance to establish mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance, KRS 31.185 requires use of state facilities unless shown to be impractical, and the judge abused discretion by ordering private expert funding without that showing. The Court further reasoned that the Commonwealth lacked an adequate remedy on appeal because the funds could not be recouped from an indigent defendant, and the issue was capable of repetition causing irreparable injury. The decision prohibits the funding order absent the required impracticality demonstration.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over whether a 2003 agreed order temporarily transferring physical custody of a child to her father during her mother's military deployment modified the parties' original 1996 permanent joint custody decree. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's order awarding custody to the father, ruling that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the permanent order because the 2003 order was temporary and no motion to modify with supporting affidavit had been filed under KRS 403.350. The court explained that the parties had intended only a temporary arrangement tied to the mother's deployment, so the original permanent order remained in effect and any modification required compliance with the statutory standards in KRS 403.340 for showing changed circumstances and the child's best interests.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Shawn Thacker's convictions by a Hardin Circuit Court jury for first-degree robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and first-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a twenty-year sentence, based on his robbery of a convenience store while displaying a revolver. Thacker appealed, arguing that the jury instructions violated Apprendi v. New Jersey and related precedents by failing to require the jury to determine whether the gun was a "deadly weapon," an essential element of first-degree robbery under KRS 515.020, and that the court should overturn precedent treating this as a legal question for the judge. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that whether an object qualifies as a deadly weapon is a matter of law for the court under Hicks v. Commonwealth and that the instructions properly submitted the elements to the jury. A dissent argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser offense of second-degree robbery due to questions about the gun's operability.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a medical battery claim brought by Eva Hoofnel against surgeons Drs. Segal and Galandiuk, alleging unauthorized removal of her ovaries and uterus during colorectal cancer surgery even though she had admitted the medical necessity of those steps. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the doctors on the basis of the signed consent form, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for different reasons, holding that the consent form's authorization for additional medically necessary procedures, along with evidence of conditional verbal consent, defeated the battery claim as a matter of law. The court distinguished medical battery from negligence and found no genuine issue of material fact on the consent issue.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

In Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc. v. County of Boone, a mining company applied for a zoning map amendment to allow underground limestone mining in a rural area not zoned for it; the planning commission recommended approval, but the fiscal court denied the application. Hilltop challenged the denial as arbitrary and claimed bias by two fiscal court members who had publicly opposed mining generally. The circuit court upheld the denial, the court of appeals reversed on procedural due process grounds, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that zoning decisions are legislative functions not requiring an impartial tribunal like judicial proceedings, that general policy biases do not violate due process, and remanding for review of whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Commonwealth v. Kelly, Michael Kelly was indicted on three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance and one count of driving under the influence after police seized evidence during an investigatory stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted Kelly's motion to suppress the evidence and dismissed the indictments, finding the stop unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the Kentucky Constitution; the Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 decision. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion. The court reasoned that the tip from Waffle House employees was not anonymous because the callers identified their workplace and location, the officer made face-to-face contact with the tipsters who pointed out the vehicle, and the officer verified key details before stopping the car, making the tip sufficiently reliable to justify the investigatory stop.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the estate of Charles R. Mifflin, specifically whether a bank account was part of the residuary estate or owned by the widow, with the daughters challenging the trial court's calculations on appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether designating only twenty-eight seconds of videotaped trial record was legally sufficient under CR 75.01 to review the issue of account ownership. The court held that the designation was adequate because ownership was never contested at trial and the record excerpt contained an admission by the widow's attorney that the account belonged to the estate. It reasoned that requiring additional designations would violate the rule against unnecessary record portions and that the appellee failed to designate counter-evidence. The court overruled prior precedent requiring assumptions in favor of undesignated record and remanded to the Court of Appeals.

procedureproperty

This case involved the registration and enforceability in Kentucky of a Texas divorce decree under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, specifically a lien on Kentucky property awarded to the wife. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Texas judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over the husband, who resided in Kentucky. The court applied a three-part minimum contacts test and found that the husband had no purposeful contacts with Texas after the couple moved to Kentucky, the claim did not arise from any in-state activities there, and jurisdiction would not be reasonable. It further rejected any waiver argument, concluding that the lack of jurisdiction meant the decree could not impose personal obligations enforceable in Kentucky.

family lawprocedureproperty

In Moody v. Commonwealth, the appellant was convicted by a jury in Christian Circuit Court of first-degree cocaine trafficking and first-degree persistent felony offender, receiving a 20-year prison sentence, based on testimony from a confidential informant and police detective about a drug purchase. The appellant appealed, primarily arguing that the Commonwealth violated a discovery order by not timely disclosing the informant's identity, warranting dismissal or a longer extension, and raised other evidentiary issues. The court reviewed the trial court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, upheld the determination that verbal disclosure six months earlier was sufficient, found no abuse of discretion in granting only a three-day extension, and concluded other claims were without merit or unpreserved, leading to affirmation of the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Fuartado, a Jamaican citizen convicted after a 1997 guilty plea to marijuana trafficking filed a post-conviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because neither the court nor his attorney advised him that the plea could result in deportation. The trial court denied relief on the ground that deportation is a collateral consequence outside the scope of required advice. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the denial, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses only direct consequences of a guilty plea and the criminal prosecution itself. The court reasoned that collateral civil matters such as federal immigration proceedings are irrelevant to the fairness of the trial or determination of guilt and are beyond the trial court's authority.

criminal lawimmigration

This case concerned whether Farmers Bank breached a loan commitment to Willmott Hardwoods when it refused to close a $780,000 real estate loan after the original August 10, 1996 deadline passed, allegedly due to an oral extension and changes in Willmott's operating bank arrangements needed to pay off an existing Fifth Third Bank loan. The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the bank on all claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and equitable estoppel. The Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated that judgment, holding that the commitment letter's unambiguous expiration clause was enforceable, that the statute of frauds under KRS 371.010(9) required any extension to be in writing, and that no writing existed and equitable estoppel did not create an exception. The Court of Appeals had reversed, but the high court found the draft loan agreement and oral discussions insufficient to satisfy the writing requirement or avoid the statute of frauds.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a claim by Steven Barnett against Dr. Julio Melo for breaching medical confidentiality and violating privacy by disclosing Barnett's HIV-positive status in consultation notes sent to his employer as part of a workers' compensation claim for a work-related cat bite injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to the doctor on grounds that workers' compensation statutes required the disclosure, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the dismissal, holding that KRS 342.020(8) and related regulations require an employee seeking benefits to waive physician-patient privilege for conditions related to the claim and mandate that providers release reasonably related medical information to the employer or insurer for payment. The court reasoned that Barnett's pursuit of compensable medical benefits under the workers' compensation scheme triggered these mandatory disclosure rules, which prevail over general HIV confidentiality protections in KRS 214.181.

healthcarelabor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In Williams v. Commonwealth, police received a tip from a reliable confidential informant that Jermaine Williams would be driving a specific vehicle to an apartment complex while carrying crack cocaine hidden in his body; officers stopped Williams without a warrant, searched his car with consent (finding nothing), then conducted a warrantless body cavity search that recovered the drugs, leading to his conviction for first-degree trafficking and persistent felony offender status. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that a tip from a known, reliable informant, when corroborated by police observation of the described vehicle and location, provided probable cause for the arrest and search under the Fourth Amendment and Section Ten of the Kentucky Constitution, as reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop can escalate to probable cause based on the totality of circumstances. The opinion distinguishes this from cases involving anonymous or uncorroborated tips and rejects the argument that only innocuous details were verified.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a product liability lawsuit by Yu Hsia Gregory against Toyota after she sustained injuries from an airbag deployment in her 1993 Toyota Corolla during a minor collision. Gregory alleged design defects, failure to warn, and related claims, arguing the airbag deployed too aggressively. The trial court admitted expert testimony comparing various airbag systems and instructed the jury that Gregory needed to prove a feasible safer alternative design; the jury found for Toyota. The Court of Appeals reversed on evidentiary and instructional grounds, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the verdict, holding the expert evidence followed accepted industry protocols and was admissible, and that the jury instruction aligned with Kentucky strict liability standards for design defects. The court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts at that time.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Karen Hampton's appeal from her convictions in Laurel Circuit Court for the 1998 murder of her husband and tampering with physical evidence, for which she received consecutive sentences totaling 55 years. On appeal, Hampton challenged the admission of lay witness testimony comparing signatures on loan documents and argued for parole eligibility after 20 years under recent precedent interpreting violent offender statutes. The court held that the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted under KRE 701 as rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to the jury. It further concluded that, despite the law of the case from a prior appeal, Hampton was entitled to parole consideration after 20 years based on the intervening Hughes decision, while declining to reconsider that precedent. The judgment and sentence were affirmed with this clarification on parole.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Peter Trzop, a student at private Centre College, who was dismissed after a survival knife was found in his dorm room following reports of threats against another student. Trzop sued the college claiming violations of contractual due process rights, state statutory due process, and other claims, alleging inadequate notice and opportunity to defend himself. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed summary judgment for the college, holding that the student handbook permitted dismissal in unusual circumstances without the standard judiciary process and that Trzop received reasonable process under the circumstances. The court reasoned that as a private institution, constitutional due process did not apply, and the college acted reasonably to protect the campus community.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved a bidding dispute under Kentucky's Model Procurement Code for construction of the University of Louisville's Papa John's Cardinal Stadium, in which RAM Engineering was twice the low bidder on a site development package but had its initial contract voided by an agreed order in separate litigation brought by another bidder (MAC) without RAM being joined as a party; the University then terminated the contract for convenience, rebid the package at a lower amount, and faced RAM's breach-of-contract suit seeking damages. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' summary judgment for the University, ruling that RAM was an indispensable party to the MAC litigation under CR 19.01 because its contract rights were directly at stake, and that the agreed order did not create the substantial change in circumstances needed to invoke the termination-for-convenience clause. The core reasoning centered on the requirement that parties whose interests would be divested by a judgment must be joined, combined with the absence of any external event or delay justifying the University's unilateral cancellation after RAM's valid contract award.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Bishop v. Caudill, the defendant was indicted for murder and the trial court ordered a competency evaluation by KCPC staff after defense counsel raised the issue of his capacity to stand trial. After the initial report, the trial court allowed both sides to seek independent evaluations, but the defendant objected to the Commonwealth's request for its own exam on grounds that he was not raising an insanity or mental illness defense at trial. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS 504.100 and Criminal Rule 8.06 authorize only a court-appointed examination and report for competency determinations, and do not permit the Commonwealth to conduct its own independent mental health evaluation when competency alone is at issue rather than a defense of mental illness or insanity under KRS 504.070. The Court therefore granted the writ of prohibition to bar the Commonwealth's independent exam, reasoning that the statutes and rules provide no authority for such a prosecution-initiated examination in this context.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Norman Christopher Hart's conviction for first-degree rape of a minor, based in part on DNA expert testimony presented via closed-circuit television from a remote location. At trial, the defense sought to introduce the underlying autoradiogram and computer printout supporting the expert's DNA match and statistical probability calculations, but the trial court excluded them as non-evidentiary demonstrative materials. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the documents admissible but unavailable due to the remote testimony setup and noting the lack of objection to the video format or request for a continuance. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in excluding the evidence was not preserved for review under KRE 103 because the defense failed to make a sufficient offer of proof or avowal to allow assessment of prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure