The case arose from a coal-mining contract dispute in which Cheyenne Resources obtained a $9.5 million judgment against Elk Horn Coal; Elk Horn stayed enforcement with a supersedeas bond while pursuing appeals, including a denied motion for discretionary review. The trial court then assessed a 10% penalty under KRS 26A.300 against Elk Horn for the delay caused by the second-level appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS 26A.300 violates equal protection under the Kentucky and U.S. Constitutions because it arbitrarily imposes the penalty only on unsuccessful appellants in non-first appeals, and also violates separation of powers under the Kentucky Constitution by legislating appellate procedure. The court therefore vacated the portion of the judgment imposing the penalty.
This case involved the Fayette County Board of Education's attempt to terminate school principal Melinda Cobb after allegations of insubordination, conduct unbecoming a teacher, inefficiency, and incompetency, including issues with staff conflicts, inaccurate student counts, and bringing a gun onto school property. An administrative tribunal found Cobb guilty of only two charges and imposed a reprimand and unpaid suspension rather than termination. The Board appealed, arguing the tribunal lacked authority to impose lesser sanctions and that procedural errors occurred during the hearing, while Cobb cross-appealed on other grounds. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings upholding the tribunal, holding that the tribunal had discretion under KRS 161.790 to select sanctions within the allowed range, that the hearing officer's instructions and presence during deliberations were not improper, and that substantial evidence supported the findings with no denial of a fair hearing.
William Vernon Matthews was convicted of first-degree rape and being a second-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a life sentence. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing a mistrial after a witness mentioned his prior incarceration, admitting evidence of a prior misdemeanor charge, and allowing the victim's hospital records into evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that none of the challenged rulings constituted reversible error under the applicable evidentiary and procedural standards.
In Hale v. Commonwealth, the appellant pled guilty to first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, kidnapping, criminal attempt to commit murder, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, and received a thirty-year sentence. He appealed on grounds that the trial court should not have accepted the pleas before completing a post-plea psychological evaluation or holding a competency hearing, arguing the evaluation order itself raised competency doubts under KRS 504.100. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the evaluation was properly ordered for sentencing purposes under KRS 532.050(3) without any reasonable grounds to question competency, as shown by the coherent Boykin colloquy and absence of any party raising the issue. Because the evaluation confirmed competency and no reasonable grounds for doubt existed before or after, no hearing was required and the pleas were valid.
In Shabazz v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of two felony drug offenses and found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender, resulting in a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Shabazz argued that the prosecutor's redirect questions and closing statements about uninvestigated aspects of the case, along with a witness's response during cross-examination, warranted a mistrial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the PFO determination. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that any improper questions were addressed by sustained objections and withdrawals without causing sufficient prejudice for a mistrial. Regarding the PFO, the court found that evidence of the defendant's 1997 probation combined with the 2001 offenses created a reasonable inference that he was on probation at the time of the new crimes, meeting the statutory requirements under a directed verdict standard.
In Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude, an insurance company petitioned for a writ of prohibition after a trial court ordered it to respond to sixteen discovery requests in a bad faith claim stemming from an auto accident personal injury lawsuit against its insured. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' denial of the writ, finding most requests proper but a few improper. The court reasoned that the requests were generally aimed at relevant information about claims handling and that the company had not adequately shown irreparable harm from trade secret disclosure or undue burden to justify extraordinary relief.