Robert O. Lukowsky

The case concerned the validity of a family or household exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy that denied coverage for bodily injury to relatives living in the insured's household. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions and ruled that such exclusions are invalid under the state's Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA). The court reasoned that the MVRA establishes a compulsory insurance system requiring minimum security for both basic reparation benefits and tort liability arising from vehicle operation, with no permitted exclusions that would reduce coverage below statutory minimums of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident for personal injury. Prior cases upholding family exclusions were overruled to the extent they conflicted with the MVRA, and the insurance commissioner's approval of the policy could not override the statute's public policy.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved the Commonwealth's appeal from a Fayette Circuit Court order dismissing a murder indictment against Larry Brown, who was charged in connection with a burglary and killing in Marion County. The dismissal stemmed from pre-trial rulings that barred the prosecution from granting immunity to accomplice witnesses who invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege, applying the former corroboration rule for accomplice testimony, and excluding the accomplices' confessions as substantive or impeachment evidence if they refused to testify. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Kentucky prosecutors lack statutory or constitutional authority to grant immunity to compel testimony, and that introducing confessions or calling witnesses known to invoke privilege would violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions. The reasoning emphasized that any immunity power requires legislative action, as supported by precedent and the absence of inherent prosecutorial authority, and that such evidence would unfairly prejudice the defense without cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Kentucky's property valuation administrators (PVAs) and the Department of Revenue over whether the Department could direct the PVAs to increase their property assessments to match the Department's estimates of fair cash value after the PVAs had submitted their recapitulations. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions that had sided with the PVAs, holding that the Department has the authority to issue such directives and withhold salaries for noncompliance. The court's reasoning centered on statutory provisions establishing that PVAs are subject to the supervision and directions of the Department, including KRS 132.420 and KRS 133.040, which require assessments to comply with the Department's instructions and standards for fair market value.

taxesproperty

The case involved Franklin County property owners challenging increased 1980 real property tax assessments that ranged from 1% to 400% higher than 1979 values, claiming the changes violated the uniformity requirement of Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the owners and ordered use of the prior year's assessments, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 171 governs only the uniformity of tax rates for property classes while Section 172 requires assessments at fair cash value, which inherently allows varying percentage increases based on prior underassessments. The court further reasoned that the owners failed to exhaust their administrative appeal remedies before the county Board of Assessment Appeals under KRS 133.120 before filing suit. It remanded the case with directions to dismiss the judicial action.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between parties over the amount of minimum royalties due under a mineral lease, which they submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators awarded the lessor $37,214.67, and the circuit court enforced this award. The Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence for an award below $75,000 and ordered that amount, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that arbitrator awards are not reviewable for sufficiency of evidence absent gross mistake amounting to fraud or misconduct. The core reasoning is that allowing courts to reexamine the evidence would substitute judicial judgment for the parties' agreed-upon arbitration process, undermining its finality.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved John Boulder, who was convicted in Fayette Circuit Court of first-degree assault and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, with both sentences enhanced under the persistent felony offender statute based on a prior 1976 assault conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the assault conviction and ordered a new trial because the jury instructions improperly allowed conviction on either an intentional or wanton theory, but the evidence only supported the intentional theory, violating the requirement of a unanimous verdict. The court affirmed the handgun possession conviction but struck the PFO enhancement of that sentence and barred any future PFO enhancement of the assault charge using the same prior felony, reasoning that a defendant's felon status cannot be used repeatedly to establish an offense and then to enhance punishment under multiple statutes without specific legislative authority. The matter was remanded to reduce the handgun sentence to three years and retry the assault charge.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case involved Jerry Clifford Gregory's conviction in Greenup Circuit Court for first-degree sodomy against his two young sons, based entirely on circumstantial evidence from family members and medical experts, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence. Gregory appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the required element of penetration and that collateral estoppel from a prior Greenup District Court dependency proceeding—which found he had not subjected the children to deviate sexual intercourse—should have barred the criminal trial. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence may establish penetration in sodomy cases, that the evidence here was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict, and that collateral estoppel did not apply because the civil dependency findings were not essential to the court's decision committing the children to state care and civil judgments generally do not bind subsequent criminal proceedings. The court noted that the dependency hearing focused on the children's best interests rather than criminal liability.

criminal lawprocedure

Brock was convicted in Kentucky on armed robbery charges and sentenced to terms to run concurrently with an existing Indiana sentence pursuant to a plea bargain; after serving time in Indiana and being paroled, Kentucky authorities detained him without crediting the prior time served. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' denial of his habeas corpus petition, holding that the Kentucky Bureau of Corrections must honor the concurrent sentencing arrangement despite the lack of explicit statutory authority for interstate concurrency. The core reasoning was that plea bargains must be enforced, Kentucky statutes on concurrent sentences treat the Kentucky term as beginning on the date of the first confinement and merging with the longest unexpired term, and Indiana law treats parole as continuing custody so that it satisfies the concurrent Kentucky sentence unless the Indiana maximum term has expired.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether assets acquired by one spouse after the couple's actual separation but before entry of a dissolution decree qualified as marital property subject to division. The Supreme Court held that the three items of post-separation property were marital in their entirety and reversed the Court of Appeals' contrary ruling. It reasoned that KRS 403.190(2) creates an exhaustive list of exceptions to the definition of marital property, that the term "decree of legal separation" refers only to a court-ordered separation under KRS 403.140(2), and that no statutory exception applies to mere actual separation. The court further explained that the "joint efforts" concept is relevant only to equitable distribution of marital property, not to its initial classification.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether a trial judge could close the courtroom to the public and press during testimony by ten male victims under age 12 in a sodomy prosecution, with the closure ordered to reduce the witnesses' emotional trauma and with transcripts to be released afterward. The court held that the total exclusion of the public and press was improper. The reasoning was that Kentucky strongly favors open trials, which may be restricted only in rare instances where justice cannot otherwise be served, and that embarrassment or trauma to witnesses in sensitive cases does not justify barring a reasonable portion of the public or the press, although limited exclusions remain permissible.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

This case concerns a defendant, Ivey, who was convicted of burglary, detaining a female, malicious striking and wounding, and armed robbery, and who later filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42 raising claims about juvenile waiver and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The circuit court denied the motion without appointing counsel, finding no material factual issues, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the claims were known at trial and should have been raised earlier. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS 31.110 entitles a needy person to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings upon request, as the statute complements and expands on the minimum standards in RCr 11.42(5) to prevent indigent defendants from being barred from raising valid grounds in successive motions. The court affirmed the denial of relief on the existing claims but reversed and remanded with directions to appoint counsel so Ivey could present supplementary grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ronnie Litton’s convictions for second-degree burglary of a pharmacy and adjoining clinic in Kentucky, for which he received consecutive ten-year prison sentences. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the convictions and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the trial court’s jury instructions improperly defined an “inhabited building” as one routinely occupied rather than one with persons actually present at the time of the entry. The court reasoned that the 1978 statutory scheme for burglary degrees distinguishes second-degree from third-degree offenses based on the presence of others, which heightens the risk of physical injury, and that the evidence showed no such presence, warranting instructions only on third-degree burglary. The court also upheld the admission of automatically taken photographs as properly authenticated but remanded the denial of a suppression motion regarding evidence from a warrantless vehicle search for reconsideration under existing precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

Heady was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of KRS 527.020(1), which was upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony due to his prior conviction for armed robbery involving a deadly weapon, resulting in a four-year sentence under KRS 527.020(5). The Commonwealth then sought further enhancement by having him declared a persistent felony offender in the first degree under KRS 532.080, leading the jury to impose a twenty-year sentence. The court affirmed the underlying conviction and four-year sentence but reversed the persistent felony offender enhancement and twenty-year sentence. It held that the specific weapons statute controls over the more general persistent felony offender statute under established rules of statutory construction, and the legislature did not indicate an intent to allow double enhancement when it amended the statutes.

criminal lawguns

This case involved Joe Eddie Hudson, convicted after a 1978 trial of a 1975 armed robbery and murder. The jury recommended the death penalty under a 1976 statute that revised procedures for imposing capital punishment, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed that sentence. The court held that KRS 446.080(3) bars retroactive application of the 1976 statute because the legislature did not expressly declare such effect, and the maximum permissible penalty for a 1975 murder was life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed after the court found other claims of error to be without merit or moot. The death sentence was replaced with life imprisonment.

criminal law

Mrs. Deutsch sued Dr. Shein for physical and mental pain and suffering after he failed to test her for pregnancy before ordering diagnostic x-rays, which later prompted her to obtain an abortion based on medical advice about potential fetal harm. The jury found Dr. Shein negligent for not obtaining a pregnancy test but concluded his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her claimed injuries. The court affirmed the negligence finding, held that the negligence was a legal cause of the irradiation during pregnancy and resulting trauma as a matter of law, and remanded for a new trial limited to damages only.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether future workers' compensation benefits payable during disability could be commuted to a lump sum under KRS 342.320 to pay a claimant's attorney's fees (or under KRS 342.150 for other claimant benefits) without violating the U.S. or Kentucky constitutions. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that such commutation is constitutional. It reasoned that once the workers' compensation system itself is upheld as a valid alternative to common-law remedies, the legislature has broad authority to set the timing and manner of payments, including authorizing the Workmen's Compensation Board to accelerate final payments based on the claimant's life expectancy from mortality tables; this creates vested rights in the commuted portion and poses no arbitrary risk of overpayment to employers or the Special Fund, as any excess benefits simply remain with the payer.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether Kentucky's requirements for state approval of private and parochial schools, including use of approved textbooks, certified teachers, and school accreditation, could be enforced against church-operated schools under compulsory attendance laws without violating parents' rights under Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution. The trial court ruled that these standards, backed by threats of prosecution, infringed on First Amendment and state constitutional protections. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the state could not impose its full accreditation, certification, and textbook rules on the church schools. The core reasoning drew on the history and debates surrounding Section 5, which was intended to prevent compelling attendance at schools to which parents are conscientiously opposed while still allowing regulation of basic subjects like reading and math.

religious liberty

This case concerned whether a Kentucky circuit court could modify the child support provisions of a New Mexico divorce decree when the custodial parent and children lived in another state but the noncustodial parent resided in Kentucky. The Hardin Circuit Court increased the support amount over the father's objection, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding no jurisdiction. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding that KRS 403.250(1) grants authority to modify any support decree, including foreign ones if modifiable under the rendering state's law, and that child support jurisdiction is separate from custody jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Kentucky was the appropriate forum since it was the father's home state with strong interest in his economic obligations.

family lawprocedure

In this case, Cynthia Simpson sought custody or visitation rights with her stepson Hart during divorce proceedings against his father Word Simpson. The trial court dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction and on the ground that nonparents cannot obtain visitation, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the visitation issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that jurisdiction had been properly invoked because Hart resided with Cynthia when she filed her amended petition, that Word was entitled to custody as a matter of law because Cynthia could not prove him unfit, and that a hearing was required to determine whether visitation with Cynthia would serve Hart's best interests given her in loco parentis relationship. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on visitation.

family law

In Wagner v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of first-degree rape and third-degree assault, with his sentence enhanced to life imprisonment upon a finding that he was a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the warrantless inventory search of the defendant's automobile after his arrest violated Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. The court reasoned that the search was investigative rather than a proper inventory of an impounded vehicle and that the state constitution imposes stricter limits on such searches than the Fourth Amendment. The opinion also noted that a reasonable doubt instruction must be given at the guilt phase under the criminal rules but found the search ruling dispositive.

criminal lawprocedure