The case involves a divorced father's obligation to pay child support for his two daughters following his ex-wife's request for increased payments after an initial 1962 settlement agreement. The court held that the father's support obligation extends until the children reach age twenty-one based on the agreement's reference to "infant" children when the age of majority was twenty-one, and that payments were allocated on a per-child basis. It allowed an increase in support for the younger child still under the age of majority but limited the older child to the previously agreed amount without further modification once she reached eighteen. The core reasoning focused on contract interpretation from the settlement agreement and the trial court's jurisdiction to modify support only for children below the statutory age of majority.
The case involved property owners challenging a city ordinance rezoning a tract of land from commercial (C-D) to residential (R-3) use after the city legislative body rejected the planning commission's recommendation to retain the commercial classification. The circuit court upheld the ordinance, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the rezoning was arbitrary because the city legislative body made no findings of adjudicative facts as required when deviating from the commission's recommendation. The core reasoning was that constitutional due process, as established in prior precedent, mandates that such legislative zoning actions be supported by findings drawn from a trial-type hearing record.
This case centered on the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in a physician's employment contract with the Daniel Boone Clinic. Dr. Mary A. Hall, after working at the clinic under a one-year contract, sought to resign and establish a competing practice in McDowell, Kentucky, prompting the clinic to seek an injunction against her breach of the non-compete clause prohibiting practice within a fifty-mile radius for one year. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the chancellor's permanent injunction enforcing the covenant. The court held that the restriction was reasonable in duration, geographic scope, and purpose, consistent with precedent such as Lareau v. O'Nan, which recognized no overriding public policy against such agreements in professional employment absent serious inequities.
The case involved James Earl Robinson's conviction for raping his sister-in-law Eva McIntosh, with Robinson admitting to intercourse but claiming consent while Eva testified it was without consent; the sole issue at trial was consent. On appeal, Robinson challenged the admission of rebuttal testimony from Eva's sister Delcie Lewis regarding an alleged post-trial statement by Robinson admitting the rape, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The court reversed the conviction, holding that the testimony constituted substantive evidence of guilt on the central issue of consent and should have been introduced during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal, making its delayed introduction prejudicial under established precedents requiring proper foundation and timing for admissions. The court noted that Kentucky law permits a rape conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix if not inherently improbable but reserved ruling on evidentiary sufficiency here.
This case involved an appeal from the denial of an RCr 11.42 post-conviction motion filed by Quarles after he pleaded guilty to robbery (reduced from armed robbery) and received a five-year sentence. Quarles alleged ineffective assistance of counsel due to late appointment and inadequate preparation, coercion into pleading guilty, denial of the right to subpoena witnesses like Torian at the motion hearing, and a due process violation. The court affirmed the denial, reasoning that counsel had conducted an adequate investigation before recommending the plea to avoid a harsher sentence for armed robbery, the trial court had properly inquired into the voluntariness of the plea, the coercion claim was disproved, and the guilty plea waived other defenses; it also noted that the witness subpoena issue had not been raised below.
This case involves an appeal from the denial without a hearing of a motion to vacate judgment under RCr 11.42, filed by an appellant serving a ten-year sentence after pleading guilty to a reduced robbery charge. The appellant argued that he lacked counsel during preliminary proceedings, was subjected to coercion, and received inadequate representation from his appointed attorney who failed to consult sufficiently or prepare a defense. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the guilty plea foreclosed review of preliminary issues and that the record refuted claims of insufficient consultation or preparation, as counsel had appeared timely, secured a continuance, and advised on the plea and jury waiver in exchange for a lighter sentence than the potential death penalty.