Charles H. Reynolds

This case arose from a workplace accident in which a bulldozer operator was injured when the vehicle lost braking power on a steep slope; he sued the manufacturer Caterpillar for defective design of the braking system in a products liability action. The Sixth Circuit certified a question of Kentucky law asking whether the comparative fault statute, KRS 411.182(1), had negated the earlier products liability statute, KRS 411.320(1), which had barred recovery when a product was altered or modified. The Kentucky Supreme Court answered yes, holding that the comparative fault statute applies to products liability claims and requires apportionment of fault among all parties, including the product owner and operator for maintenance and use issues. The court reasoned that the plain language and legislative history of the 1988 comparative fault statute expressly encompass products liability actions and cannot be harmonized with the prior statute without undermining its purpose.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Danny LaFollette entered a conditional guilty plea to felony marijuana cultivation after police used an informant's tip and a warrantless helicopter flyover equipped with Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) to detect excess heat from his indoor grow operation, then obtained a search warrant leading to the seizure of evidence. The trial court denied suppression of the evidence, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the FLIR surveillance did not constitute a search under Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution or the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that FLIR is a passive device measuring only heat emissions or "waste" from the exterior of a structure without penetrating it or infringing on any reasonable expectation of privacy that society would recognize, drawing on precedents such as Katz v. United States and comparisons to other non-intrusive techniques like drug-sniffing dogs or garbage searches. The informant's tip was deemed sufficient to bolster probable cause once the FLIR data was deemed admissible. The opinion notes a dissent arguing that the FLIR use violated privacy interests akin to those in Katz.

criminal lawcivil rights

In this case, a group of nonvoting shareholders of the insolvent Kentucky Central Life Insurance Company sought to appeal a trial court order approving a Participation Agreement between the company's liquidator, state guaranty associations, and Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company. The agreement implemented an earlier-approved Term Sheet for handling policyholder claims and included a right of first refusal for the guaranty associations on the company's real estate assets. The shareholders argued that the right of first refusal would depress asset values and that the liquidator had a duty to maximize value for all parties. The Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the nonvoting shareholders lacked standing because prior rulings had denied their motions to intervene, statutory authority limited challenges to the board of directors, and they had not participated as parties of record in the relevant proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Associated Industries of Kentucky, a business association, to various provisions of the Kentucky Code of Legislative Ethics and Executive Branch Code of Ethics, which regulate lobbying activities including registration, disclosure, reporting, and prohibitions on contingent fees and certain campaign activities by lobbyists. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that many of the constitutional challenges, including those related to fines, penalties, and reporting requirements, lacked a justiciable controversy or standing because the association was registered and no proceedings were pending, and the affected lobbyists were not parties to the suit. The court declined to address the merits of claims regarding vagueness or overbreadth in several provisions due to these jurisdictional issues.

free speechelectionscriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Montgomerys suing attorney James Milam for slander of title after he prepared and filed a mechanic's and materialman's lien on their property in July 1991 on behalf of the Rogers, who had worked on a golf course development. The trial court dismissed the December 1992 complaint as barred by the one-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.140, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the slander of title claim accrued when the lien was filed and recorded, creating a cloud on title, rather than when actual damages like foreclosure occurred. Additional claims, including conspiracy and wrongful attachment, were also dismissed, with procedural errors like an improper third-party complaint failing to toll the limitations period.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved claims by Steelvest, Inc. against Scansteel Service Center, Inc. and related parties for breach of fiduciary duties arising from tortious acts, seeking damages at law. After remand, the trial court denied a jury trial under Civil Rule 39.01(c) on grounds that the case's complexity, peculiar questions, and great detail of facts made it impractical for a jury. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state constitution's Section 7 guarantees an inviolate right to jury trial in actions at law as it existed in 1791, and that CR 39.01(c) unconstitutionally expands beyond historical equitable exceptions like complicated accounts to permit denial based on complexity. The court reversed the bench trial ruling and remanded for a jury trial on the claims against Scanlan and Scansteel, while affirming dismissal of claims against other defendants.

procedurecivil rights

The case concerned the Franklin Circuit Court's approval of the Kentucky Insurance Commissioner's plan to rehabilitate and then liquidate Kentucky Central Life Insurance Company (KCL) after the insurer became deeply insolvent due to risky real estate investments, a declining market, and a surge in policy surrenders. The current board of directors appealed, contending that the process violated Kentucky's insurer rehabilitation and liquidation statutes as well as the constitutional rights of KCL and its shareholders. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders, finding that the Commissioner had properly exercised the state's police power to protect policyholders, that a fair and open two-phase bidding process led to the selection of JP as the purchaser for $341 million, and that the actions were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive. The court noted that KCL was permitted to pursue its own rehabilitation efforts but that no viable capital infusion materialized, confirming the necessity of liquidation.

business & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned Joseph Lynch's conviction under Kentucky's DUI statute (KRS 189A.010) for operating a vehicle while intoxicated on his private driveway after police responded to a 911 call. Lynch challenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing it exceeded police power by applying 'anywhere in this state' rather than limiting it to public highways and violated his privacy rights on his own property. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the 1968 legislative amendment explicitly extended the prohibition beyond public roads to the entire state to address the dangers of impaired driving. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language is unambiguous, reflects a valid exercise of police power due to the high potential for harm from intoxicated operation of vehicles, and does not unconstitutionally infringe on individual privacy given the public safety interest.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved John Masler, who sought uninsured motorist coverage from State Farm after being injured by a rock that entered his windshield from an unidentified passing truck, with no direct contact between the vehicles. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the policy did not provide coverage because the hit-and-run provision required the unidentified vehicle to strike the insured's vehicle, which did not occur here. The court's reasoning centered on the policy's clear language mandating actual physical contact to prevent fraudulent claims, consistent with prior interpretations of the uninsured motorist statute, KRS 304.20-020, which is fault-based and does not extend to indirect contact.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved Gregory Tate, convicted of second-degree robbery and related charges after robbing grocery stores to obtain money for drugs to support his addiction. The central issue was whether drug addiction qualifies as a mental disease or defect under KRS 504.020 that could support a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. The trial court excluded expert testimony on addiction as a mental illness and entered a conviction, while the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of older precedent. The court overruled that precedent, holding that evidence of narcotics addiction alone does not constitute proof of mental illness or retardation sufficient to raise the defense or require jury instructions, particularly absent any showing that the defendant lacked capacity at the time of the offenses, and therefore reinstated the conviction.

criminal law

The case concerned the constitutionality of 1988 amendments to Kentucky's FAIR Plan statutes under House Bill 552, which expanded the residual insurance market mechanism to additional casualty and property lines and altered its funding by requiring assessments and potential surcharges across a broader base of all property and casualty insurers, including automobile insurers. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company challenged the changes, arguing they imposed unfair burdens on its auto lines, which already participated in a separate residual market mechanism and could not benefit from the FAIR Plan. The trial court and Court of Appeals held the amendments unconstitutional under due process and equal protection principles of the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, reasoning that the new assessment and surcharge system lacked a rational relationship to the statutory goals, arbitrarily shifted financial burdens without corresponding benefits, and created an unequal classification for automobile insurers. The court concluded that the funding mechanism exceeded constitutional limits on legislative power.

business & regulatorycivil rights

The case concerned whether Kentucky federal retirees could obtain refunds of state income taxes paid on federal retirement benefits under a pre-1990 statute that exempted state retirement annuities fully but limited federal ones to $4,000. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Davis v. Michigan decision finding such disparities unconstitutional under intergovernmental tax immunity, Kentucky amended its law in 1990 to equalize treatment, but the retirees sued for refunds covering up to five prior years. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Davis applies retroactively, yet state refund statutes (primarily KRS 134.590) control and limit recovery to the two-year period before litigation began, as this provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy satisfying federal due process; it also rejected attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

taxesfederal power

The case involved Christine Jones, who was convicted in district court of disorderly conduct under KRS 525.060 after shouting obscenities at military units during the 1991 Pegasus Parade in Louisville, refusing to leave a designated safety zone, and directing profane language at a police officer responding to a complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on free speech grounds, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction. The court held that the case was not solely about the content of speech and that the jury had sufficient evidence to find Jones guilty of making unreasonable noise, based on testimony about the volume of her voice exceeding normal levels in the circumstances, or alternatively creating a hazardous condition under the statute. The opinion emphasized that reasonableness of noise depends on time, place, and context, and that appellate review must view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution without reweighing credibility.

criminal lawfree speech

This case involved a challenge to Kentucky House Bill 1, which imposed a 2% tax on the gross revenues of physicians and other health care providers to generate state funds for the Medicaid program and qualify for federal matching money. The Franklin Circuit Court ruled that the tax violated Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution as impermissible special legislation because it applied to all physicians but primarily benefited those participating in Medicaid. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed, holding the tax constitutional. The court reasoned that the legislature has broad discretion in tax classifications under rational basis review, and the tax met federal requirements by being uniform and broad-based across all providers, serving a vital state interest in funding Medicaid for over 500,000 residents.

taxeshealthcare

In Jacobs v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his convictions for capital murder, kidnapping, and attempted first-degree rape, along with his death sentence, arising from the abduction and killing of a college student in Knott County, Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in denying a change of venue because extensive pretrial publicity had created substantial community prejudice, as evidenced by a public opinion poll and voir dire in which the vast majority of potential jurors expressed preconceived opinions of guilt. The court also addressed the improper presentation of an insanity defense over the defendant's objections and the use of the term 'recommend' in jury instructions regarding the death penalty, directing that these issues be corrected on retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Jeffery Canler, charged with first-degree criminal abuse of a five-month-old infant left in his care, where the Logan Circuit Court suppressed his confession and upheld the constitutionality of KRS 508.100. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the statute's constitutionality but reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the confession was admissible, instead upholding the trial court's suppression. The core reasoning was that the confession was involuntary, as it followed a polygraph exam conducted under a specific agreement limiting questioning, without counsel present after a Miranda waiver, and the trial court's finding was supported by substantial evidence under RCr 9.78; the court distinguished precedents like Wyrick v. Fields because the agreement here explicitly restricted post-polygraph interrogation.

criminal lawprocedure

In Derossett v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his murder conviction and 40-year sentence after shooting the victim multiple times at a public location, claiming lack of memory due to extreme emotional disturbance and citing the victim's prior threats. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed claims of error in failing to strike two potential jurors for cause (one who drove near the scene and one acquainted with the victim's family), improper prosecutorial statements during closing arguments, and the introduction of prior bad acts to impeach the defendant's character. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in jury selection, that the prosecutor's comments were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, and that any evidentiary issues did not merit a new trial, as neither challenged juror sat on the panel and no prejudice was shown. A dissent argued that cumulative errors, including the failure to excuse a juror with close ties to the victim's family and improper cross-examination, required reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from convictions for first-degree burglary, fourth-degree assault, and second-degree persistent felony offender, arising from the appellant kicking in the door of his estranged wife's home in violation of an emergency protective order and then assaulting her. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that testimony about prior EPOs was properly admitted under KRE 404(b) as relevant to motive, state of mind, and the immediate circumstances of the crimes, and that the burglary conviction was supported by evidence that the appellant knowingly entered the dwelling unlawfully with intent to commit a crime, rejecting claims of jury confusion over the intent element.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involves James Blakeman's appeal from the denial of a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a civil contempt order issued by Judge Daniel Schneider in Jefferson Circuit Court. The underlying dispute arose from Blakeman's divorce proceedings, in which he was found in contempt for intentionally failing to pay approximately $200,000 in maintenance, medical expenses, and other obligations to his ex-wife despite evidence of available assets, leading to an order of confinement until payment or satisfactory arrangements were made. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' denial of relief, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Blakeman had the ability to pay or arrange payment, that he failed to meet his burden of proving inability, and that the conditional imprisonment was properly characterized as civil contempt rather than criminal. The court reasoned that findings of fact on ability to pay were not clearly erroneous under CR 52.01, that Blakeman had notice and opportunity to be heard, and that he could not voluntarily create his own inability to comply as a defense.

family lawprocedurecriminal law

In Commonwealth v. Grubb, the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed convictions of Treva Lynn Grubb on four counts of trafficking in Schedule II controlled substances (Percodan and Dilaudid) arising from a single undercover sale and subsequent search. The Court of Appeals had reversed two of the convictions, holding that the double jeopardy clause of the Kentucky Constitution barred multiple punishments for trafficking different substances listed in the same statutory schedule during one transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision, reasoning that KRS Chapter 218A does not clearly create separate offenses for each substance within the same schedule and that any ambiguity in the statutes must be resolved against fractionalizing a single transaction into multiple crimes. The court emphasized that penalties under the controlled substances laws are not intended to be additive for different drugs in one schedule absent explicit legislative direction.

criminal law