Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams, Inc.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1975-05-12 · cited 5×
This case involved a dispute over a defective cooling system installed for Blue Grass Hams, Inc., a business engaged in quick-curing hams. Blue Grass sued Frantz, Inc., the mechanical contractor that supplied the system under an oral agreement based on specifications from an expert, after the system repeatedly froze up and ultimately failed. Frantz brought in additional parties, including Brock-McVey, the designer, and the jury returned a verdict holding Frantz and Brock-McVey jointly and severally liable to Blue Grass while allowing Frantz recovery from Brock-McVey. The court affirmed the judgment against Frantz, ruling that it qualified as a seller and merchant under Kentucky's UCC (KRS Chapter 355, Article 2) because it contracted to supply the goods and guaranteed its work, thereby implying it could meet the required temperature and humidity standards. Brock-McVey's appeal was dismissed because it was taken only from the denial of a post-verdict motion rather than from a final judgment.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Ginsburg
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1974-12-06 · cited 7×
This case involved a condemnation action in which the Commonwealth took 4.19 acres of unimproved land from an 18.49-acre tract for a highway project, and a jury awarded the owners $200,000. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a juror who was herself a defendant in a similar pending condemnation case on the same project, forcing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory challenge, and that the award was excessive and unsupported by evidence. The court held that denying the challenge was erroneous because the juror's involvement created bias, but reversal was not required absent a showing of prejudice, which the Commonwealth failed to establish since it did not demonstrate that the biased juror affected the verdict or that peremptory challenges were exhausted in a way that caused harm. The court also found the verdict supported by substantial evidence from multiple witnesses on the land's pre- and post-taking value, including for resort-commercial use, and therefore affirmed the judgment.
propertyprocedure
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Roark
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1974-11-22 · cited 6×
The case involved whether State Farm could enforce a subrogation clause in its auto policy after paying the Roarks $1,000 in medical expenses following their accident with an uninsured driver; the Roarks had settled their injury claims with the other insurer for $13,500 and sued State Farm to obtain the $1,000 draft and for punitive damages, claiming the insurers conspired to pressure their settlement. The trial court invalidated the subrogation provision and a jury awarded the Roarks $1 in compensatory damages plus $5,500 in punitive damages. On appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that a medical-payments subrogation clause is valid under Kentucky law because it creates a lien on settlement proceeds rather than an assignment of an unliquidated personal-injury claim, and that no evidence supported a conspiracy or resulting damages to the Roarks.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Sharp v. Sharp
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1974-10-25 · cited 19×
This case involves appeals by Brown Sharp from a divorce judgment and subsequent orders in Sharp v. Sharp, concerning the division of marital property, alimony (maintenance) payments to Sarah Sharp, attorney fees, court costs, and visitation rights after the dissolution-of-marriage act took effect. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings, including the award of $54,584 plus personal property to Mrs. Sharp, $200 monthly maintenance as long as she lives unmarried, and related fees and interest. The court reasoned that the trial court's findings on earnings, property values, debts, and maintenance standards under KRS 403.200 were not clearly erroneous, that additional evidence on post-divorce conduct was properly excluded or did not warrant modification under KRS 403.250, and that prior mandates from remand were followed without abuse of discretion.
family lawproperty
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1974-06-14 · cited 20×
This case involved a dispute between Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. over which insurer was responsible for defending and indemnifying driver H.C. James after an accident while using a loaner vehicle from a repair shop. Both policies included 'other insurance' clauses attempting to limit or escape coverage when alternative collectible insurance existed, with State Farm providing primary coverage to James and Ohio Casualty issuing a garage liability policy to the shop. The trial court and Kentucky Supreme Court held that the conflicting escape clauses were mutually repugnant and irreconcilable, requiring both insurers to share liability equally up to the lower policy limit of $20,000, with State Farm covering any excess up to its higher limits. The core reasoning centered on the policies' identical attempts to defer primary responsibility, rendering pro-rata provisions inapplicable and mandating joint defense and indemnification obligations.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Carrico v. City of Owensboro
Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) · 1974-06-14 · cited 18×
In Carrico v. City of Owensboro, a citizen, resident, property owner, and taxpayer sued to enjoin the city from implementing a Neighborhood Development Plan, arguing it violated a 1963 voter referendum that had halted prior urban renewal efforts, and seeking to block related federal grant requests. The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, finding the new plan sufficiently different from the old one and the referendum no longer binding. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he alleged no special or peculiar injury to himself, no expenditure of city funds as a taxpayer, and no statutory authorization allowing a citizen suit based solely on municipal residency. The court emphasized that private individuals generally must demonstrate damage distinct from that suffered by the public at large to challenge official acts via injunction.
procedure