Roy N. Vance

This case involved a dispute over whether an ex-wife's relationship with a male friend constituted "cohabitation" under a divorce settlement agreement, which would end the ex-husband's maintenance payments. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed that the relationship did not qualify as cohabitation, as the couple maintained separate residences, paid their own expenses, and did not assume marital rights and duties like living together as husband and wife. The court interpreted the term based on its dictionary definition and the parties' intent in the agreement, which linked termination to living in the same house rather than just a sexual relationship. It distinguished this from a prior case about modifying maintenance due to changed circumstances.

family lawproperty

The case arose after an employee of Dix & Associates Pipeline Contractors was killed at work by a vehicle driven by an employee of Bardstown Mills; the employee's estate received workers' compensation benefits from Dix and later settled its tort claim against Bardstown Mills for $250,000. Bardstown Mills then pursued a third-party claim for contribution against Dix, while Dix sought to recover the compensation benefits it had paid under KRS 342.700. The trial court instructed the jury on comparative fault, which apportioned 95 percent to Bardstown Mills and 5 percent to Dix, but ultimately entered offsetting judgments that awarded Bardstown Mills 50 percent contribution (capped at the amount of benefits paid) and allowed Dix to recoup its payments. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that prior precedent required equal division of contribution liability between the parties and that the settlement structure prevented further adjustment of the subrogation rights.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case concerned whether a deceased husband's deposits into joint bank accounts with his children could prevent his widow from claiming her statutory dower interest in one-half of his personal property under Kentucky law. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the widow was entitled to her dower share in the funds, reversing the Court of Appeals. The court reasoned that a spouse's dower rights cannot be defeated by lifetime transfers intended to reduce the estate, and that KRS 391.315 regarding joint accounts does not impliedly repeal or override the dower statute, as the husband lacked the legal power to dispose of the property in a manner that defeated those rights.

family lawproperty

In Stratton v. Parker, a personal injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, one of whom settled before trial while the other proceeded to trial. The jury apportioned 25% fault to the non-settling defendant, 75% to the plaintiff, and 0% to the settling defendant, leading the trial court to enter judgment for 25% of damages against the non-settling defendant and allow credit for the settlement amount. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that under KRS 454.040 and precedents like Orr v. Coleman, liability is several according to the jury's apportionment of causation, so no credit is due when the settling party is found to have zero percent fault.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a pedestrian who was injured after falling on a defective, snow-covered sidewalk abutting a store in Newport, Kentucky, and who sued the property owner and its tenant after failing to provide the city with the required 90-day notice under KRS 411.110. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner and tenant, ruling that a city ordinance requiring abutting landowners to maintain sidewalks did not create liability to injured pedestrians, and denied the plaintiff's attempt to add the city as a defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ordinance issue, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's ruling, holding that the ordinance did not impose such liability. The court's reasoning relied on longstanding precedent that these ordinances shift primary responsibility to the landowner but do not alter the city's underlying duty or create a private right of action for damages against abutting owners.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved appellants who were convicted of second-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and assault after forcing entry into an elderly couple's home, beating one victim with a pistol, and stealing $8,000. The court affirmed the burglary and robbery convictions and consecutive sentences but reversed the assault convictions. It held that the assault merged into the first-degree robbery because the indictment and jury instructions relied on the same elements of physical force and injury to elevate the theft to first-degree robbery under K.R.S. 515.020(1)(a), rather than mere possession of a weapon. The court found the Blockburger test inapplicable here due to the specific charging and instructions used.

criminal law

The case concerned whether a trial court could award attorney's fees under K.R.S. 403.220 to an attorney who had represented an indigent wife pro bono in a divorce action and post-judgment proceedings. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that such an award is permitted even when services were provided without charge to the client. The court reasoned that the statute authorizes fees based on the financial imbalance between the parties rather than on whether the client actually incurred expenses, and that denying fees in pro bono cases would allow the financially stronger spouse to avoid liability while creating conflicts of interest for attorneys. The decision overruled Sullivan v. Levin to the extent it barred fees when the client had not paid or objected to payment.

family lawprocedure

In Mozee v. Commonwealth, the defendant faced charges of complicity to commit murder and first-degree robbery in two consolidated appeals. A jury convicted him of robbery in the first case, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to murder and additional robberies in the second; both cases raised questions about his competency to stand trial, to be sentenced, and to enter a plea due to mild mental retardation, as well as the admissibility of his statements to police under Miranda. The trial court found him competent based on lay observations, his conduct in disciplinary hearings, coherent police statements, and prior expert findings, despite later medical testimony suggesting impairment, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. The court reasoned that competency determinations are not bound solely by expert testimony, that the evidence as a whole supported the findings, and that no new hearings were required absent demonstrated change in the defendant's condition. The topics are criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned disputes among Johnson, Lawrence, Magoffin, and Martin Counties over a proposed regional jail under KRS 441.800, including whether a regional jail authority could employ staff to operate the facility or whether that power belonged exclusively to the county jailer where the jail was located, and whether one county could unilaterally withdraw from the authority. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the statutory questions presented, holding that a validly formed regional jail authority possesses independent authority to manage and operate the jail through its own personnel, distinct from the duties of a county jailer under KRS 71.020. The court reasoned from the statutory definitions separating "jail" and "regional jail," the language of KRS 441.800 granting operational powers to the authority, and the absence of any conflict with county jailer statutes, while also considering the validity of the authority's formation and membership.

criminal lawprocedure

In this tort case, William Floyd sued Carlisle Construction Company and its employee Steven Wood for injuries from a vehicle collision, after settling separately with the driver of the other vehicle, Steven Whittamore, who was never joined as a defendant or third-party defendant. The defendants requested a jury instruction allowing apportionment of fault and damages to Whittamore under Kentucky law, but the trial court denied it and the jury awarded Floyd full damages. The Court of Appeals reversed for a new trial on apportionment. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that apportionment is not available against a joint tortfeasor who settled but was never made a party to the action, because KRS 454.040 permits apportionment only among defendants and the precedents require an active claim against the nonparty. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved George Combs suing Corbin Motor Lodge after he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside their restaurant during severe winter weather on December 27, 1983; Combs knew the conditions were extremely slick when he entered. The trial court granted summary judgment to the lodge, which the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the summary judgment for the defendant, holding that under the precedent of Standard Oil Company v. Manis, a business owner owes no duty to remove or warn about obvious natural outdoor hazards such as ice and snow because the risk is equally apparent to the invitee, resulting in no negligence by the defendant. The court declined to overturn that rule despite the later abolition of contributory negligence as a complete bar in Hilen v. Hays, citing the need for stability in the law absent a compelling reason for change.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved the appellant's conviction for wanton murder and 25-year sentence after he shot and killed Bill Dupin under a bridge, as described in his and a witness's statements to police, though both later repudiated them at trial. The appellant argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence of wantonness to support the jury instruction given and that the trial court should have also instructed on first-degree manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reasonable evidentiary basis for a manslaughter instruction because the facts did not meet the legal definition of extreme emotional disturbance as a temporary state overcoming judgment with a reasonable explanation from the defendant's viewpoint. The court reasoned that the evidence supported the wanton murder instruction without requiring additional options on mental states.

criminal law

The consolidated cases addressed whether personal injury settlement proceeds received by a spouse are marital or nonmarital property in divorce proceedings under Kentucky law. In Weakley v. Weakley, the wife was injured during the marriage and received a settlement solely for pain and suffering; in White v. White, the husband was injured before marriage but settled the claim afterward, with components for medical expenses, lost income, and pain and suffering. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the pain-and-suffering portion of an award is nonmarital property because it exchanges the spouse's pre-marriage pain-free condition, while the portion of an award compensating for lost earnings or earning impairment during the marriage is marital property and any post-dissolution portion is nonmarital. The court reached this result by interpreting KRS 403.190(2) and distinguishing personal-injury recoveries from workers' compensation awards.

family lawpropertytorts & liability

This case concerned whether double jeopardy barred retrial on a persistent felony offender charge after reversal of a prior conviction that had relied solely on hearsay testimony from a probation officer about a previous felony conviction. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that retrial was allowed and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court explained that the reversal at the first trial stemmed from trial error in admitting incompetent evidence rather than from legally insufficient evidence overall. It distinguished this from precedents like Burks v. United States, which bar retrial only when evidence was insufficient, and followed Hobbs v. Commonwealth, which permits retrial after evidentiary errors.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Theta M. Dale sued defendant Alan M. Carta for injuries from a car accident, seeking damages including medical expenses and lost wages. Both parties were insured by the same company under Kentucky's Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, which had not been rejected, and the insurer paid basic reparations benefits to Dale but did not intervene in the suit. The trial court allowed the jury to award damages for medical expenses and lost wages despite Carta's objection under KRS 304.39-060(2)(a), which abolishes tort liability to the extent basic reparations benefits are payable. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the statute eliminated liability for those items, that Carta had standing to appeal in his own name, and that the insurer was not a necessary party to the appeal because its failure to intervene did not transfer its rights to the plaintiff when an objection was raised at trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The consolidated cases involved claims for basic reparation benefits under Kentucky's Motor Vehicle Reparations Act after Norman Rains was struck with a baseball bat while entering his parked car and after Charles Smith and passenger James Marshall were shot by a third party while Smith was driving. The trial courts granted summary judgment to the insurer, State Farm, finding no coverage, the Court of Appeals reversed in Rains' case but affirmed in the Smith/Marshall case, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals in Rains while affirming in Smith/Marshall, denying benefits in all instances. The court reasoned that the statutes require injuries to arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, that the claimants were not victims of motor vehicle accidents, and that any connection between the intentional assaults and the vehicles was merely incidental with no causal relationship shown. The court rejected arguments that coverage extends to any injury occurring while a person is using a vehicle regardless of cause.

torts & liability

The case involved a products liability claim where James Finck was injured by an exploding pump manufactured by Reda Pump Co. and sought damages for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that under KRS 411.320(3), the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if a substantial cause of the injury, completely bars recovery in a products liability action, even if the defendant was at fault or the product was defective. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language mandates this absolute bar, consistent with the Products Liability Act's purpose to limit such actions, and rejected arguments for comparative negligence or unconstitutionality. The jury's comparative negligence finding was thus inapplicable, entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law.

torts & liability

The case involved Raymond McClellan, who was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, and kidnapping after he forced entry into an apartment occupied by his estranged wife and her ex-husband Gary Stutzenberger, shot and killed Stutzenberger, and abducted his wife; he received a death sentence on the murder count. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. It held that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on first-degree criminal trespass as a lesser offense, since the jury could have found that McClellan entered without intent to commit a crime, and that burglary could not serve as an aggravating circumstance to make the defendant death-eligible when the only intended crime was the murder itself, as this would not properly narrow the class of death-eligible offenders under Eighth Amendment standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Billy Douglas Lantrip's conviction on two counts of rape against his adopted daughter, with one count occurring before and one after her twelfth birthday. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from two other witnesses about the defendant's improper sexual advances, which had been offered to show lustful inclination under precedent that was overruled in Pendleton v. Commonwealth. The court also found error in allowing a clinical social worker to testify about statements made by the victim during an evaluation (not treatment) and about the sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, because the syndrome lacked scientific acceptance and could not prove the fact of abuse. The defendant was entitled to be tried solely on the charged offenses without prejudicial extraneous evidence. Other claims, including a motion to elect specific instances, were rejected as untimely or without merit.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Holder, three defendants were jointly tried and convicted of burglary and theft after being represented at trial by the same attorney, but the trial judge did not comply with RCr 8.30 by explaining potential conflicts of interest or obtaining statements from each defendant waiving the issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that failure to follow the rule is harmless error absent any possibility of prejudice on the record, but here one defendant's confession implicated the other two, whose defenses directly contradicted it and created a built-in conflict that separate counsel could have used for plea negotiations or other strategies. The court therefore reversed the convictions of Brown and Martin due to the demonstrated possibility of prejudice while affirming Holder's conviction, as the evidence against him was overwhelming and unaffected by the joint representation.

criminal lawprocedure