Mack E. Barham

In State v. Coleman, two defendants were convicted of simple burglary of an apartment based on eyewitness identification of them carrying stolen items and their presence near the scene days later, after which they were sentenced to nine years in custody. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. The court held that its review was limited to whether any evidence supported the verdict, which it found existed, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict or new trial; arguments for applying a different sufficiency standard under the 1974 state constitution were rejected because the case arose in 1973.

criminal law

This case involved Exchange National Bank suing the guarantors of a loan to Place Vendome Corporation to recover a deficiency after the corporation's properties were sold in federal bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. The trial court and court of appeal sustained the defendants' exception of no cause of action, finding that the bank failed to comply with Louisiana's Deficiency Judgment Act requirements for the sale. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to property sales conducted under Chapter X of the federal Bankruptcy Act, which authorizes such sales under the discretion of the federal judge for reorganization purposes rather than liquidation. The court reasoned that the federal proceedings divested the debtor of title and governed the sale process independently of state executory proceeding rules.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power

The case involved defendant Clarence Louis Curtis, Jr., who was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued at $500 or more and initially sentenced to ten years in prison; after being adjudged a multiple offender under Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, his sentence was increased to twenty years. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the theft conviction, holding that the trial court properly admitted the owner's testimony on the value of the stolen truck and that any improper opinion testimony by a police officer was cured by the court's instruction to the jury. The court reversed the habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence, however, because the state failed to introduce the certificates of prior imprisonment with photographs and fingerprints required by La.R.S. 15:529.1 to establish the defendant's identity as the person previously convicted.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gomez, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana after customs agents found the substance in his suitcase at the New Orleans airport and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's excusal of a prospective juror who arrived with a crying infant and no childcare arrangements, arguing it violated his right to full voir dire under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and Constitution, and the admission of testimony from a state chemist identifying the substance as marijuana. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that trial judges have discretion under La.C.Cr.P. art. 783 to excuse venire members before voir dire for hardship without abuse shown here, and that the expert's qualifications supported his competency under La.R.S. 15:466 with no manifest error in the ruling.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted in Louisiana trial court of failing to stop at a stop sign and resisting an officer, based on two bills of information under state statutes. After evidence was presented, the trial judge refused to allow defense counsel any closing argument and later denied without argument a motion for new trial, then imposed fines or jail time. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed both convictions and sentences, holding that the total denial of closing argument violated the defendant's rights under the Louisiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as established in prior state precedent and Herring v. New York. The court also addressed but did not reach the new trial motion due to procedural defects in its form and timing under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. London, the State moved to dismiss the defendant's appeal from a conviction on the ground that no sentence had yet been imposed. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the dismissal, holding that under the Code of Criminal Procedure a defendant may appeal only from a final judgment of conviction after sentence is imposed. The court relied on Articles 912 and 912.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and prior precedent establishing this requirement. The Clerk of Court had confirmed that no sentence had been entered in the record.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved William L. Bruins, who was convicted of driving while intoxicated based in part on a hospital blood test report showing a high alcohol level that triggered a statutory presumption. The defendant objected to the admission of the report because the state did not present evidence that the individuals who drew and analyzed the blood met the certification and qualification requirements under Louisiana law. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that even if the hospital records act made the report admissible, the state must still affirmatively show compliance with the qualification statutes for the blood test results to carry evidentiary weight and invoke the presumption of intoxication.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a conviction for driving while intoxicated in Louisiana city court, based primarily on results from a Photo-Electric Intoximeter test measuring blood alcohol concentration. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the test results were inadmissible under La.R.S. 32:663 because the state failed to produce the actual health department permit certifying the operator's qualifications and did not show that the test followed methods approved by the department. The court applied the best evidence rule to require physical production of the permit rather than relying on testimony and noted that the department had not adequately promulgated detailed procedures for test administration, maintenance, and certification. The decision clarified that the state could still attempt to prove intoxication through other evidence like officer observations but could not rely on the statutory presumption without compliance.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. McGuffey, the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated following a bench trial, and the central dispute concerned the trial court's admission of results from a Photo-Electric Intoximeter Test administered to him. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the State had not complied with the statutory requirement under La.R.S. 32:663 to introduce the test operator's certification permit into evidence. The court applied the best evidence rule and followed its holding in the companion case State v. Jones, noting that neither the relevant permit nor acceptable substitute proof of its contents was produced at trial. Dissenting justices maintained that other eyewitness testimony provided sufficient evidence of intoxication to support the verdict independently of the test results.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted in a bench trial of driving while intoxicated based in part on results from a Photo-Electric Intoximeter (PEI) breath test. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. Under La.R.S. 32:663, chemical test results are valid only if performed according to methods approved by the state department of health and by a permitted individual. The State introduced no evidence at trial that the PEI procedure used had received the required departmental approval, even though later documentation showed the department had approved the device in 1969 and 1974. Following its companion decision in State v. Jones, the court held that the statutory prerequisite had not been met.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Peters, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery after a trial in which the court admitted his signed inculpatory statement. Peters moved to suppress the statement, claiming police officers beat him during interrogation to compel the confession in violation of state law requiring statements to be free and voluntary. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the motion to suppress. The core reasoning was that the trial court's credibility assessment—crediting the officers' testimony over that of Peters and his family due to inconsistencies, the defendant's prior convictions, and the short duration of questioning—was entitled to great weight and not clearly erroneous.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a carpenter who sued his employer and its insurer for workers' compensation benefits, claiming total and permanent disability from a knee injury sustained on the job in 1966. The trial court awarded limited benefits based on medical and lay testimony showing the plaintiff's inability to perform his duties, but the court of appeal reversed, applying a rule that lay testimony could not be considered when medical evidence was not in conflict. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to address that evidentiary rule, clarified that lay testimony must be weighed with medical evidence according to its relevance and reliability, reversed the appellate decision, and awarded total and permanent disability benefits for 400 weeks from the date of injury.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved John W. Carlisle, charged in Louisiana with driving while intoxicated as a third offender based on two prior convictions for the same offense. The defendant moved to quash the bill of information, arguing that his 1972 conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, holding that the prior uncounseled conviction could not be used for enhancement under Argersinger v. Hamlin and related state precedent, as the city court's collective advisement of rights did not constitute an affirmative showing of waiver and the minutes lacked any record of an express waiver. The court found that the defendant's failure to request counsel did not equate to a valid waiver. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Nicholson, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the aggravated rape of an eleven-year-old girl and sentenced to death. After the jury indicated it was deadlocked following several hours of deliberation, the trial court denied a motion for mistrial and delivered a modified Allen charge urging jurors to reach a unanimous verdict, after which the jury convicted the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, holding that the Allen charge was coercive and infringed on the defendant's right to a fair trial by pressuring jurors to abandon honest convictions, and prospectively banned the use of Allen charges or any coercive modifications thereof in Louisiana courts.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved whether Edison L. King, who married in good faith despite his wife's prior undissolved marriage, could recover damages for her wrongful death in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligence. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a putative spouse may maintain a wrongful death action under La.C.C. art. 2315 as a civil effect of marriage pursuant to articles 117 and 118. The court overruled prior precedent to the contrary, reasoning from the civil code provisions and historical context of the wrongful death statute that good faith spouses are entitled to such remedies.

family lawtorts & liability

The case concerned James Jones's conviction for marijuana possession after police stopped his vehicle for a faulty taillight, arrested him for driving while intoxicated, and discovered a marijuana roach inside the car during an on-scene inspection prompted by suspicions that the vehicle was stolen. Jones moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the trial court denied the motion and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held that officers had probable cause to search based on the absence of an ignition key and registration papers combined with the defendant's behavior, and that the search was also justified as a routine inventory of an impounded vehicle; the opinion includes a dissent. The court pretermitted other issues after finding the evidence admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Verret v. Norwood concerned an application for a writ in a Louisiana property dispute involving the removal of a cloud on title. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied the writ application, holding that the result reached by the lower court was correct. The court noted that while a prior decision had recognized an action to remove cloud from title, the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure provides for real actions that can achieve the same outcome, and some justices suggested the older precedent should be overruled as no longer authorized.

propertyprocedure

In Kavlich v. Kramer, a customer sued the owner and insurer of a self-service convenience store after slipping on a piece of banana on the floor near the entrance mat and severely injuring her knee. The trial court and court of appeal denied recovery, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for assessment of damages. The court reasoned that a storekeeper owes an affirmative duty to keep aisles and floors safe from hazards that could cause slips and falls; once the plaintiff established the banana's presence and its role in the fall, the burden shifted to the defendant to show it was not negligent. The defendant failed to carry that burden because its employees, who were in a position to see the visible debris and had been instructed to monitor the floor, did not remove it during the two hours since the last scheduled cleaning.

torts & liability

In State v. Gaines, the defendant was indicted for armed robbery and first-degree murder by an all-male grand jury empaneled in late 1974 under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, which permitted the exclusion of women from jury service unless they opted in. The indictments were returned on January 6, 1975, after the 1974 Constitution took effect on January 1, prohibiting arbitrary sex-based discrimination in jury selection and authorizing court rules on exemptions. The defendant moved to quash the indictments on grounds of systematic exclusion of women, and the trial court granted the motions. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the grand jury was illegally constituted under the new constitution because the proceedings did not commence before its effective date and thus received no protection from the transition provisions preserving prior proceedings. The court also noted the likely impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Nomey v. State, holders of retail liquor permits challenged Act 41 of 1974 after the Jackson Parish Police Jury called a parish-wide local option election under that statute to prohibit alcohol sales, following the invalidation of a prior act in Tolar v. State. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, declaring Act 41 unconstitutional, and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted supervisory writs to review the matter before the scheduled July 1975 election. The court held that Act 41 was unconstitutional because it constituted a special law limited to twelve enumerated parishes that affected elections and regulated trade, in violation of La. Const. Art. IV, § 4 (1921) and Art. III, § 12 (1974), which prohibit local or special laws on those subjects. The core reasoning was that the act's parish-wide election provisions could not be utilized by the remaining parishes, which were restricted to ward or municipal elections, and that the police jury had a mandatory duty to enact ordinances based on the election results.

electionscriminal lawbusiness & regulatory