Catherine D. Kimball

This case concerned a legal malpractice claim filed by Laurie Jenkins against her attorney Larry Starns after a default judgment was entered against her in a contract dispute and later efforts to annul it failed, leading to garnishment of her bank account. Jenkins sued Starns on November 5, 2008, alleging negligence in failing to file responsive pleadings and appear at hearings, but Starns raised an exception of peremption under La. R.S. 9:5605, arguing the one-year period had expired. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the continuous representation rule, derived from contra non valentem, cannot suspend the one-year or three-year peremptive periods for legal malpractice claims, as peremption extinguishes the right if not timely exercised and the statute does not allow for such suspension. The court reasoned that Jenkins had notice of potential harm by January 2007 when served with the default judgment, making her November 2008 filing untimely regardless of ongoing representation.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a challenge to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 496, which permits issuance of an arrest warrant upon filing a bill of information without a prior judicial determination of probable cause. After a district court declared the article unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, the state appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that article 496 must be read in pari materia with article 202, so that a warrant may not issue unless an accompanying affidavit shows probable cause for arrest. The court addressed mootness arguments arising from the defendant's later court appearances and dismissal of charges but reached the merits due to the public interest and recurring nature of the issue.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves defendants Knight Oil Tools Inc. and associated individuals applying for a writ of certiorari and/or review from a Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision that originated in the 15th Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writ application. Chief Justice Kimball indicated that she would have granted the writ, and Justice Knoll was recused from consideration of the matter.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Dorsey, Felton Dejuan Dorsey was indicted and tried for the first-degree murder of Joe Prock during a 2006 home invasion in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, with the state seeking the death penalty based on aggravating factors such as armed robbery and risk to multiple persons. After jury selection that included a Batson challenge by the defense over the state's peremptory strikes of black prospective jurors, the trial proceeded with the state presenting extensive evidence; the jury convicted Dorsey of first-degree murder and recommended death, which the district court imposed. On direct appeal under the Louisiana Constitution, Dorsey raised twenty-six assignments of error, primarily concerning jury selection, evidentiary rulings, and penalty-phase procedures, but the Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded that none constituted reversible error, thereby affirming the conviction and death sentence.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerned whether a state-employed seaman injured while working on a Louisiana vessel could pursue a damages claim against the state under the federal Jones Act in state court, or whether such claims were limited to the state workers' compensation system. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision allowing the Jones Act suit to proceed. The court reasoned that the state constitution waives sovereign immunity for personal injury suits and that the legislature has not restricted this waiver with respect to Jones Act claims by state employees, while also noting that the workers' compensation statute itself excludes coverage for employees with Jones Act remedies.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

In this dispute over alleged defects in a newly constructed home, homeowners sued the general contractor Venus Construction in 2003 for foundation issues, and Venus filed a 2006 third-party indemnity demand against subcontractor Post-Tension Slabs. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the demand was perempted under La. R.S. 9:2772, reversing the court of appeal and reinstating the trial court's grant of the exception. The court determined that the peremptive period began with the 1997 certificate of occupancy, the five-year period from the 2003 amendment applied to the claim, and Venus's indemnity right had not vested prior to the statutory changes that shortened the period from ten to five years.

propertyproceduretorts & liability