Cites Williams v. . Thorn — 'Campbell v. Foster (35 N. Y., 361) and Olutev. Bool (8 Paige, 83) limited and distinguished. Graff v. Bonnett (31 N. Y., 9), Scott v. Nevius (6 Duer, 672), Locke v. Mdbbett (2 Keyes, 457), S. C. (3 A
This case, brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, involved a claim by the administratrix of the estate of the pilot of United Air Lines Flight 826 for damages from a mid-air collision with a TWA flight over Miller Army Air Base in 1960, alleging negligence by FAA air traffic controllers. The court determined that the United States was not negligent and that the UAL pilot was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The reasoning centered on the pilot's failure to adhere to the assigned clearance limit, which initiated the collision, and the lack of any reasonable opportunity for controllers to intervene or avert the accident given the circumstances and the air traffic control system's operations. The doctrine of last clear chance was found inapplicable due to absence of knowledge or reckless negligence by the controllers.
This admiralty case concerned a dispute over rights to a large propeller from the abandoned 1902 shipwreck Acara off Long Island, which the plaintiff had spent about ten months detaching through diving and specialized equipment before temporarily leaving the site. The defendants, aware of the plaintiff's ongoing work, removed the propeller, sold it for scrap, and divided the proceeds. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that the first salvor in lawful possession of distressed property holds rights that admiralty courts will protect against wrongful interference or dispossession by others, unless the original salvors clearly had no prospect of success.
This case involves a longshoreman injured in 1959 aboard a foreign vessel while unloading cargo in New York, who sued the shipowner for negligence and unseaworthiness after prior complaints were discontinued. The defendant moved to vacate service made on its English agent in 1965 and to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper process. The court ruled that the amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied in good faith and that New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302) conferred personal jurisdiction because the defendant had transacted business in the state by purposefully discharging cargo there for profit. It further held that the federal rules and CPLR provisions permitted out-of-state service on the general agent in a pending action, rendering the 1965 service valid. The motion was denied.
In Spencer v. Alcoa Steamship Company, a Jamaican resident sued a New York corporation in federal court for personal injuries sustained in Jamaica when he was struck by a pontoon while assisting on the defendant's vessel, resulting in the amputation of his leg. The defendant moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b) for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, arguing that all witnesses, medical treatment, and relevant events were located in Jamaica and that Jamaican law would govern key issues such as the plaintiff's status and the stevedore operations. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction, relying on the doctrine of forum non conveniens as articulated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, because the balance of conveniences strongly favored trial in Jamaica where the plaintiff resided, the incident occurred, and witnesses were available, while the plaintiff's choice of forum did not outweigh these factors. The court noted that litigating in New York would complicate matters involving foreign law and potential third-party claims against the stevedore. The action was dismissed with leave to refile in Jamaica.
In this case, plaintiffs sued United Air Lines and Trans World Airlines for property damage and personal injuries arising from a 1960 mid-air collision that caused one plane to crash into their Brooklyn apartment, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiffs moved under Rule 41(a) to dismiss their federal complaint without prejudice, arguing that diversity was lacking because TWA's principal place of business was in New York. The court denied the motion, finding that TWA's principal place of business is in Missouri. The decision rested on the pleadings, a prior ruling in a related case from the same collision, and an analysis of TWA's corporate operations showing Missouri as its center of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
The case involved the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts suing defendant Hollingsworth for trademark infringement and unfair competition based on his use of terms like "Safety Scout," "Safety Scout Master," and "Scout" in connection with a commercial safety program, radio and television promotions, and the sale of goods including clothing, toys, and school supplies. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin these uses, require destruction of related materials, cancel registrations, and recover damages. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction while denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that the defendant's terms were confusingly similar to the plaintiffs' registered and common-law trademarks, likely to deceive the public into believing the goods and services originated from or were sponsored by the Scouts, and that such use diluted their goodwill even absent proof of actual deception.
