Edward F. Merrill

In Ross v. Diamond Match Co., the plaintiff sued the defendant seller for breach of an implied warranty under Maine statute after purchasing Flintkote composition siding material to use on the walls and roof of a new chicken house, which later pulled loose during winter weather. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in damages, prompting the defendant to file a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. The court granted the motion and ordered a new trial, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the material was unfit for the disclosed purpose because he had not painted the walls as he had informed the seller he would, and no evidence showed the material would have failed if used exactly as represented. The court noted that damages for the unpainted walls appeared to have been included in the verdict without supporting proof of breach.

business & regulatory

The case concerned plaintiff Rowe's real property in Garland, Maine, which faced tax liens from the town; Rowe appointed defendant Hayden as his agent via power of attorney to obtain funds to redeem the property but Hayden instead arranged for the town to convey title to himself and, with defendant Eaton, placed a mortgage on the property that also secured Hayden's separate debts and taxes. Rowe sued in equity to recover the property. The court held that Hayden must convey the equity of redemption back to Rowe and that Eaton's mortgage could be enforced against the property only to the extent of the $2,006.44 advanced to pay Rowe's taxes, with an accounting for wood removed and other adjustments. The core reasoning was that Hayden acted as Rowe's fiduciary agent under the recorded power of attorney, so he could not take title for himself or encumber the land beyond Rowe's authorization, and Eaton, having knowledge of the agency relationship, could not in equity assert a broader claim.

propertytaxes

The case concerned an indictment charging defendant Maurice Simon with attempted bribery of Governor Burton M. Cross under R.S. Chap. 122, Sec. 5, by offering the Governor a commission of one-quarter cent per gallon on sales of "Rode-Rite" asphalt to the State of Maine. The defendant demurred to the eight-count indictment, arguing the alleged conduct did not involve a matter pending or that might legally come before the Governor in his official capacity. The Superior Court overruled the demurrer, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the proposed purchases and related standardization decisions fell within the Governor's executive oversight of the state's highway and purchasing functions, making the offer a direct attempt to influence official action or judgment under the statute. The court concluded that each count sufficiently alleged an offense, as all executive department activities, including highway maintenance contracts, are matters that may come before the Governor.

criminal law

This case was an action for deceit brought by an automobile dealer against a customer who traded in a truck as partial payment for a new car. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely represented his 1947 Chevrolet truck as a 1949 model to obtain a higher trade-in allowance of about $700, and that this misrepresentation caused the plaintiff damages when he later resold the truck. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant based on the requirement that the plaintiff prove he could not have discovered the falsity through reasonable care. The appellate court held that this requirement does not apply where there is evidence of an intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, as the facts here fell within an established exception to the general elements of deceit, and thus sufficient evidence existed to present the case to the jury.

torts & liability

The case involved a manslaughter indictment against the respondent for causing a fatal car crash through criminal negligence while driving a tractor-trailer under the influence of alcohol on December 24, 1951. The State presented evidence that the respondent had consumed multiple drinks, drove erratically at high speeds on the wrong side of the road, nearly collided with other vehicles, and struck a car that swerved to avoid him, resulting in the victim's death. The trial court convicted the respondent, and on appeal he sought a new trial citing insufficient evidence and constitutional violations. The court overruled the exceptions, denied the motion for a new trial, and entered judgment for the State, holding that the evidence supported the jury's finding of reckless operation as the cause of death and that the trial had been fair with credibility issues properly left to the jury.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over title to real estate in Maine, where the plaintiffs sought possession through a writ of entry after acquiring the property via a deed from one of two named executors under a will granting a power of sale. The defendant challenged the validity of the deed, arguing that the single qualifying executrix could not exercise the power alone since the other had declined to serve. The court held that the deed conveyed valid title and directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. The reasoning centered on the distinction between a naked power of sale and one coupled with an interest, concluding that under the statute of 21 Henry VIII (adopted via Maine's legal history) and modern interpretations, qualifying executors may exercise such a power unless it reflects a personal confidence reposed in all named individuals specifically, which was not the case here given the will's language and surrounding statutes on executor duties.

property

The case involved a dispute over the distribution of a residue from Fred E. Knapp's will, specifically a bequest to the "Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" for use in Androscoggin County, Maine, which the administrator paid to the Maine State Society for the Protection of Animals. The testator's brother, Roy C. Knapp, petitioned to reopen the distribution decrees, alleging fraud because he believed the wrong entity received the funds, which should instead pass to him as intestate property. The Supreme Court of Probate found no fraud and determined that the payment aligned with the testator's intent based on admissible evidence identifying the recipient. The Law Court overruled exceptions, holding that probate decrees cannot be reopened without clear and convincing proof of fraud and that sufficient evidence supported the identity of the beneficiary.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case is an automobile accident dispute in which a pedestrian plaintiff was struck by the defendant's car on a two-lane highway after dark. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, apparently on the ground that the plaintiff violated a statute by walking on the roadway rather than using an available sidewalk. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the plaintiff's exceptions and remanded for trial, ruling that the record presented jury questions on whether sidewalk use was practicable under the circumstances and whether any statutory violation was a proximate cause of the collision. Conflicting testimony existed about each party's location and conduct, and the court noted that violation of the statute does not automatically bar recovery as contributory negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an action by the State of Maine to collect a tax assessed on 39,469 cases of sardines packed by the defendants in oval cans during 1951-1952 under a 1951 statute imposing a self-imposed tax on sardines for an industry development fund. The sole disputed issue was whether the defendants' one-pound oval cans qualified as "15-ounce oval cans" under Subsection III of Section 245 of the statute, which would make them taxable. The court held that the cans were "15-ounce oval cans" within the statute's meaning, entering judgment for the State in the amount of $9,867.25 plus interest and costs. The reasoning centered on trade usage and legislative history showing that "15-ounce oval cans," "1-pound ovals," and "#1 ovals" referred to the same size and type of can manufactured by American Can Company, with labeling variations not altering the can's identity or taxability under the statute.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a physician who sued the mother of a minor child for payment of emergency surgical services to treat the child's ruptured appendix and subsequent infection. The mother had received temporary and then permanent custody of the child through divorce proceedings, with the father ordered to pay weekly support, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant mother. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict as against the law and evidence. The court reasoned that the custody decree shifted the father's common-law duty to support the child to the mother, substituting the decree's support order and implying the mother's obligation to pay for necessary medical care, while the father had no remaining liability absent a contract or modification of the decree.

family lawprocedure