In State v. Greenlaw, the respondents were jointly tried and convicted of robbery after allegedly using force to take a taxicab from its driver, George W. Berry, during an incident on April 4, 1961, in Portland, Maine. The defendants appealed, challenging the trial court's jury instructions on the elements of robbery and larceny, the denial of directed verdicts, and the refusal of certain requested instructions, as well as the denial of their motions for new trials. The court held that the instructions were inadequate because they failed to clearly convey the requirement of animus furandi—an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property—as an essential element of larceny underlying the robbery charge, and that an additional erroneous instruction about considering nonexistent evidence may have misled the jury. As a result, the court sustained the exceptions, granted the motions for new trials, and ordered new proceedings. The decision centered on ensuring the jury properly understood the distinction between temporary taking and felonious theft under Maine statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile liability insurance policy required the insurer to defend and indemnify a permissive driver against a bodily injury claim brought by the named insured's son, who was also a resident insured. The court decided that the insurer was obligated to defend the driver and pay any damages awarded within policy limits. The core reasoning was that the policy explicitly required payment for bodily injuries to "any person" without applicable exceptions, and the insurer had the opportunity to include exclusions for injuries to other insureds but did not.

torts & liability

This case involved real property actions brought by the Portland Renewal Authority, a public body created to eliminate slum and blighted areas, seeking possession of land it had taken from the defendants by eminent domain in 1960. The defendants remained in possession and argued that the Authority's right to possession did not arise until it had relocated them, claiming this obligation was a condition precedent under the governing statute and federal urban renewal laws. The trial court ruled for the Authority, finding that title had vested and possession followed immediately, as the parties had stipulated that all procedural requirements for the taking were met and no appeal had been taken from the condemnation. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the 1951 statute vested fee simple title with a right to immediate possession and did not condition possession on prior relocation, which instead relates to damages rather than a bar to possession. The federal statutes were found not to impose any such precondition either.

propertyprocedure