In Richardson v. Stone, a state prisoner convicted of first-degree murder under California Penal Code section 187 sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona were improperly admitted at trial and that the trial court erred in refusing a proposed instruction on malice. The court denied the petition, holding that the instructional claim did not present a federal question, was not properly preserved under the deliberate bypass rule, and conflicted with California's felony-murder doctrine. On the Miranda claim, the court extended the reasoning of Stone v. Powell to conclude that federal habeas review was unavailable because the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state courts, the claim did not bear on his innocence, and any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including eyewitness testimony and admissions to third parties. The court further found that the statements were properly admitted after Miranda warnings were scrupulously honored.
The case challenged the City of Petaluma's growth control ordinances, known as the Petaluma Plan, which capped annual new housing units at roughly 500 (one-third to one-half of recent market demand), established an urban extension line limiting ultimate population to about 55,000, and restricted annexations and city services outside that boundary. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, issuing declaratory and injunctive relief that prohibited enforcement of the numerical housing limits and related restrictions. The court found that the plan was deliberately designed to curb demographic growth and immigration of new residents, thereby substantially burdening the fundamental right to travel and interstate commerce; because the measures affected that right, they required a compelling justification that the city had not shown. The opinion noted that the plan's effects on housing supply and population were not incidental but intentional, distinguishing it from ordinary zoning upheld under rational-basis review.
The case involved the United States seeking to enjoin Yaron Laboratories, Inc. from manufacturing and exporting the drug "PAX" (Chlordiazepoxide Hydrochloride) without an approved New Drug Application. The company operated in a Foreign Trade Zone, purchasing raw materials from Italy and producing tablets solely for export to places like Vietnam, claiming compliance with foreign specifications and labeling. The court found that "PAX" was a new drug under federal law and that its production and shipment from the Foreign Trade Zone constituted introduction into interstate commerce, which did not qualify for the export exemption. Consequently, the court granted both preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the introduction of "PAX" and similar unapproved new drugs into interstate commerce until FDA approval is obtained.
This case concerns whether taxpayer J. Adrian Palmquist qualified for head-of-household tax rates in 1960 and 1961 under Section 1(b)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and whether he could deduct legal and related expenses incurred in divorce and property settlement proceedings. The court held that neither the 1960 Lercara judgment nor the 1961 McGee judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for head-of-household status, because the first was not a decree of divorce or separate maintenance and the second, while a separate maintenance decree, did not render the parties legally separated under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. The court further ruled that most of the claimed legal expenses were nondeductible under Section 212(2) as they arose from personal divorce litigation rather than management of income-producing property, citing Supreme Court authority, though a factual dispute remained over the portion attributable to tax advice under Section 212(3).
This case involved a petition by the NLRB Regional Director for a temporary injunction under Section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act against a union local for allegedly engaging in unlawful recognition or organizational picketing under Section 8(b)(7)(B). The union had picketed a retail shoe store after losing a Board-conducted election among the employees by a unanimous vote, with signs and leaflets urging the public not to patronize the store due to non-union conditions, though the union disclaimed any intent to seek recognition or a contract without voluntary employee support. The court found insufficient evidence of reasonable cause to believe the picketing had a proscribed object of forcing recognition or employee acceptance of the union, noting the absence of demands tied to the picketing and the union's explicit statements limiting its purpose to public information. The court denied the injunction, concluding that injunctive relief should be applied cautiously where evidence of an unfair labor practice is not clear.
