Reuben Oppenheimer

In this divorce case, the wife sought a divorce a vinculo on grounds of her husband's desertion and adultery, which he admitted, while he alleged that she too had committed adultery with another man with whom she shared a house. The trial court dismissed her bill after finding that the circumstances conclusively established she had sexual relations with the man, despite their denials. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence showed only opportunity for adultery but no proof of any adulterous disposition by either party, and that the trial judge's disbelief of their testimony could not substitute for affirmative evidence required to overcome the presumption of innocence. The court emphasized that adultery findings demand evidence of both opportunity and inclination, and mere cohabitation without manifestation of such inclination is insufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

family law

This case under Maryland’s Workmen’s Compensation Act involved Thomas Lupton, who was injured while helping cut trees for Carl Milburn, who had a contract with Clifton McDonald. Lupton claimed McDonald as his employer to seek compensation, but the Commission and lower court found he was a casual employee, denying the claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Lupton’s employment was casual because it was temporary, lasting only one day to finish a specific small job on a particular tract, and was irregular and incidental rather than regular or ongoing. The court reasoned that the undisputed facts showed the hiring was for a single occasion with no prior or future arrangements, making the Act inapplicable regardless of whether Milburn was a subcontractor.

labor & employment

The case involved a Buddhist defendant convicted of murder in Maryland who challenged the composition of the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him. He argued that Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which required jurors to believe in the existence of God, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because his faith does not include such a belief. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins, which struck down a similar religious test for public office, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the juror qualification was unconstitutional under the federal Constitution and could not be enforced. The court reasoned that jurors exercise a governmental function in an office of trust, making the religious requirement an impermissible establishment of religion as applied to the states. It addressed the retrospective effect of the ruling but found the juries in this case had been selected under the invalid provision.

criminal lawreligious libertycivil rights

The case involved an appeal by Brown after his conviction for first-degree murder of his former partner in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. Brown challenged the denial of a directed verdict, claimed his trial counsel's representation denied him due process, and argued the death sentence was illegally imposed after an initial life sentence had been suspended to allow a motion for a new trial that was later withdrawn. The court reviewed the evidence, including prior threats and Brown's confession detailing the stabbing, and found it sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction under the applicable standard of review. It rejected the ineffective counsel claim and determined that the death sentence violated local court rules treating the initial sentence as suspended rather than vacated, which barred an increase. The conviction was affirmed, but the death sentence was stricken and life imprisonment reinstated.

criminal lawprocedure