This case concerns whether Poway Unified School District must provide a deaf student, K.C., with word-for-word transcription services (CART) rather than meaning-for-meaning transcription (Type-Well) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to deliver a free appropriate public education (FAPE). An Administrative Law Judge ruled for the student after a due process hearing, finding the district's IEP inadequate and ordering CART services. The district court reviewed the ALJ decision under the Rowley standard, which defines FAPE as specialized instruction that confers some educational benefit, such as enabling the child to achieve passing grades and advance from grade to grade, without requiring services that maximize potential. California imposes no higher requirements, and the court addressed whether the student's academic progress with the offered services satisfied IDEA while considering cross-motions for summary judgment and remanding for further determination consistent with the opinion.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by prisoner David Pringle, who sought relief based solely on a stand-alone claim of actual innocence under Herrera v. Collins after abandoning other claims. The district court had previously denied the petition as time-barred and lacking merit, and now denies Pringle's request for a certificate of appealability. The court reasoned that even assuming such a claim is viable in a non-capital case, Pringle failed to meet the extraordinarily high standard of showing he is probably innocent or that newly discovered evidence clearly establishes his innocence, given his multiple confessions (including a detailed written one naming an accomplice and later confirmed), DNA evidence implicating him, inconsistencies in his alibi, and the lack of specific explanations for recanting prior testimony. The court further noted that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted as Pringle did not sufficiently allege facts that would alter the outcome.
The case involves the Quechan Tribe's challenge to the Department of the Interior's approval of a large solar energy project on federal land in California's Desert Conservation Area, which the Tribe argued would destroy hundreds of cultural, religious, and archaeological sites without adequate compliance with NEPA, NHPA, and FLPMA. The Tribe sought a preliminary injunction to halt the project pending litigation. The court granted the injunction, finding serious questions on the merits regarding the agency's procedural and substantive compliance with federal law, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in the Tribe's favor, and that irreparable harm from destruction of cultural resources was likely. The decision applied the Winter test for injunctive relief under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard for reviewing agency actions.
environmentreligious libertycivil rightsfederal power
In Easter v. CDC, a prisoner proceeding pro se sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with state law claims, by placing him in a yard where he had previously been assaulted, leading to a second attack. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation after no objections were filed, granting in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed claims for monetary damages and supplemental state claims against defendants in their official capacities without leave to amend, dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim as preempted by the Eighth Amendment, dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim with limited leave to amend, and struck the request for injunctive relief as moot. The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against defendants in their individual capacities was allowed to proceed.
Chris Hutton sued the Law Offices of Collins & Lamore, alleging that a dunning letter sent to collect a credit card debt violated the FDCPA and Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to clearly state the total amount owed, due to an unclear reference to possible accruing interest. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing both that the debt was a business obligation not covered by the statutes and that the letter adequately disclosed the amount due. The court found the letter compliant because it specified the outstanding balance of $22,519.17 and only referenced potential future interest, satisfying the requirement to state the total debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). The court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis while denying the anti-SLAPP motion to strike.
This case involves a dispute between the Mesa Grande Band of Mission Indians and the Santa Ysabel Band over beneficial title to several thousand acres of land in California, originating from 19th-century executive orders and patents issued in 1893 that the plaintiff claims mistakenly named the wrong tribe as owner. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior to quiet title and correct the patents after administrative efforts in 1976 failed and usage restrictions began in the 1990s. The court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Quiet Title Act's 12-year statute of limitations barred the claim because it accrued no later than 1976 when the plaintiff had clear notice of the issue. As a result, the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity, depriving the court of jurisdiction to hear the case.
