Robert Braucher

The case involved a bank creditor suing to recover the proceeds of real estate that a debtor had fraudulently conveyed to his wife and then to the defendant (the wife's brother-in-law) to shield the asset from collection, after which the defendant sold the property to good-faith buyers and turned the net proceeds over to the debtor. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the Superior Court's judgment for the bank and entered judgment for the defendant. The court held that the defendant was not personally liable, reasoning that under G.L.c. 109A the extent of a transferee's participation in the fraudulent scheme determines liability and that returning the proceeds to the debtor, as in Modin v. Hanron, was sufficient to discharge any obligation where participation was not substantially active. The sale to bona fide purchasers had already placed the property beyond the bank's reach.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a company president, as assignee of his bankrupt company's claims, suing a bank for wrongfully dishonoring 26 checks under the UCC (G.L. c. 106, § 4-402) and for unfair practices under G.L. c. 93A, § 11, after the bank exercised a set-off on a revolving loan secured by accounts receivable and inventory. A Superior Court judge awarded the face amount of the checks plus attorneys' fees, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed that damages award on appeal. The court held that the bank's set-off came too late under UCC §§ 4-303 and 4-109 because the checks had already been posted, making the dishonor wrongful, and that the 93A claim was valid and assignable; however, the plaintiff could recover only nominal damages of $1 because no additional proximate consequential damages were shown, while upholding the award of attorneys' fees and costs.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a plaintiff's tort lawsuit, arising from events in 1973 when he was thirteen, was barred by the statute of limitations after he filed it in 1980 at age twenty. The court held that the action was time-barred, ruling that the tolling of the limitations period during minority ended when the plaintiff turned eighteen in 1977 under the 1973 change in the age of majority, after which he had two years to sue. The core reasoning was that the 1973 statutes—one extending the tort limitations period to three years and one lowering the age of majority to eighteen—were to be applied according to their plain language without correlation between the two reforms, and that the resulting two-year period after reaching majority provided a reasonable time to file, consistent with due process. The court affirmed judgment for the defendants.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a town seeking to recover its costs of fighting a fire on the defendant corporation's land, where the defendants had allegedly dumped hundreds of thousands of used tires in violation of health regulations, creating a fire hazard. The town based its claims on common law tort liability for negligence and nuisance, as well as misrepresentation, and on two statutes: G. L. c. 266, § 8, and G. L. c. 111, § 145. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court reasoned that there is no common law authority for a municipality to recover firefighting expenses incurred on private land, that the cited statutes do not authorize recovery in this situation, and that fire protection services are provided for the public benefit without expectation of compensation from property owners.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

An employee of a subcontractor on a school renovation project fell from a ladder and was injured; after receiving workers' compensation benefits, he and his wife sued the general contractor for negligence. The contractor filed a third-party complaint against the subcontractor and its insurers, alleging an express contractual indemnity obligation arising from the subcontract's incorporation of the main contract's broad indemnity clause covering claims from concurrent negligence. The Superior Court dismissed the third-party complaint, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the subcontract language sufficiently imposed the same indemnity duties on the subcontractor as the contractor owed to the town, that such express agreements are valid and enforceable under Massachusetts law following the majority rule, and that the insurers' motions should be reconsidered on remand.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Becton, Dickinson & Co., a New Jersey-based manufacturer operating in multiple states, which sought an abatement of its Massachusetts foreign corporation excise tax for fiscal year 1968 after acquiring and integrating the Electrodyne division that made medical devices. The company argued that Electrodyne operated autonomously enough to warrant separate accounting for its income under G.L. c. 63, § 42, which would have shown a loss rather than the roughly $500,000 in Massachusetts income determined by the statutory three-factor apportionment formula in G.L. c. 63, § 38. The Appellate Tax Board ruled against the taxpayer on the merits, finding it engaged in a unitary business, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court held that common ownership, financing arrangements, and managerial oversight demonstrated mutual benefit and interdependence sufficient to meet the unitary business principle under the Due Process Clause, allowing apportionment of total income, and the taxpayer did not prove by clear evidence that the result was distortive or that the commissioner abused discretion in rejecting separate accounting.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved two defendants convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit robbery and possession of burglarious implements, based on items found in their car during a warrantless search following a traffic stop in a snowstorm. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions and ordered entry of judgments of not guilty on all charges. It held that the initial stop of the vehicle was justified by reasonable suspicion but that the subsequent search of the interior and especially the trunk lacked probable cause, as the UPS driver's account of being followed, combined with the defendants' movements and criminal records, fell short of justifying a full search under the Fourth Amendment and state law standards for Terry stops and vehicle searches.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Harris, the defendant was convicted after a jury-waived trial of possessing class C (LSD) and class D (marihuana) controlled substances, and he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. The LSD was found during a routine security search at the Suffolk County Court House after the defendant activated a metal detector, leading to a frisk that revealed a vial, while the marihuana was discovered during an inventory search at the police station following his arrest. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the courthouse search was a valid administrative search justified by the need to protect against threats of violence to sensitive facilities, comparable to airport searches, and limited in scope with elements of consent. The officers' actions were reasonable, courteous, and not pretextual, with probable cause arising once the vial's contents were suspected to be LSD, making the seizure and arrest valid. The subsequent inventory search was also deemed proper.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a black defendant convicted of rape and other charges stemming from the 1978 assault of a white woman in her apartment; the defendant appealed on grounds that the trial judge improperly denied his request for individual questioning of prospective jurors about racial prejudice under G. L. c. 234, § 28. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, finding no error under prior precedent because the judge had given a general bias instruction and some individual follow-up. However, the court held that, going forward, interracial rape cases present a substantial risk that extraneous issues will influence the jury as a matter of law, so the statute's second paragraph requires that prospective jurors be examined individually and outside the presence of other jurors regarding racial bias. The decision rested on the statutory text as amended in 1975, prior case law interpreting the substantial-risk standard, and recognition that interracial rape can serve as a catalyst for racial prejudice.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved a grievance arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement where an arbitrator found that a school committee had violated the agreement by denying a tenured teacher a promotion to an administrative position because of her sex. The arbitrator ordered the teacher promoted with back pay and interest, and a Superior Court judge confirmed the award with a modification to the interest rate. The Appeals Court ruled the grievance arbitrable but held that ordering the promotion would violate the nondelegability doctrine protecting the school committee's managerial authority over educational policy, and remanded for a new remedy. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Superior Court's confirmation of the award, recognizing an exception to the nondelegability doctrine when a denial of promotion is based on sex discrimination, which violates the state constitution and statutory prohibitions. The court reasoned that an arbitrator's order in such circumstances is no more intrusive than a decision by an independent commission and does not unreasonably interfere with managerial authority.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned a successor trustee of a testamentary trust established under Everett H. Black's will, who faced removal and surcharge by the Probate Court after income beneficiaries and a guardian ad litem challenged his management of investments, payment of inheritance taxes, and employment of an investment advisory firm he controlled. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trustee's removal and the appointment of successors but reduced the surcharge to $11,724.02 plus interest at 6 percent from the dates of realized losses, finding that most investment decisions complied with the prudent man rule from Harvard College v. Amory while only specific failures to sell certain holdings and a delayed tax payment constituted breaches. The court remanded for reconsideration of fees and expenses, directing apportionment between issues where the trustee prevailed and those where he did not, with approved amounts to be paid from the trust rather than personally by the trustee.

propertyprocedurefamily law

The case involved a defendant convicted of escaping from the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord while serving a life sentence for second-degree murder. The defendant claimed his escape was justified by necessity because he faced an imminent threat to his life from guards and inmate groups after reporting misconduct. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction after transferring the case to address questions about the necessity defense in prison escapes. The court held that the trial judge's jury instructions, drawn from standards in cases like People v. Lovercamp, adequately explained the doctrine, and that the Commonwealth bore the burden of disproving necessity beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue was raised by evidence. Evidentiary issues concerning the defendant's silence upon recapture were deemed not to require reversal, as objections were not properly preserved and the evidence was used to contradict testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the defendant's convictions on multiple counts of larceny by false pretenses stemming from 1977 insurance transactions in which premiums were collected from customers but policies were either not obtained or were for lower value than ordered. On appeal, the court addressed challenges to the search warrant authorizing seizure of all records of the unlicensed Yankee Insurance Agency, the sufficiency of evidence on two indictments, and the denial of a motion to sever. It agreed with the Appeals Court that the warrant was sufficiently particular and supported by probable cause due to the agency's unlicensed status and evidence of concealment, while ordering acquittals on two indictments and remanding the rest for further proceedings consistent with the Appeals Court's opinion on instructional errors and other issues.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over funding for the Suffolk County Court House after the 1978 Court Reorganization Act shifted judicial system costs to the Commonwealth while leaving courthouse ownership with local governments. The Trial Court sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Suffolk County and the city of Boston from reducing services by terminating temporary employees responsible for security, elevators, and maintenance, arguing that such cuts would impair judicial functions. The single justice granted the injunction, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding a substantial likelihood that the city retained responsibility to provide facilities and that the Act did not intend for courthouses to close during rent negotiations under G. L. c. 29A, § 4. The court balanced the irreparable harm to court operations against speculative harm to defendants and concluded the injunction was warranted pending resolution of funding issues.

procedureproperty

In this case, tenants sued their landlord for injuries sustained when they jumped from a second-floor window to escape a fire, alleging violations of statutory duties under G.L. c. 143 to provide adequate fire escapes and extinguishing apparatus. After a bench trial, the Superior Court found the landlord negligent for removing a fire escape and failing to supply fire extinguishers, entering judgment for the plaintiffs; the Appeals Court reversed, but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the plaintiffs' judgment. The court held that the landlord's violation of the statute requiring fire extinguishing apparatus on each floor constituted evidence of negligence, and the trial judge's factual finding that this violation contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries—based on evidence they searched for firefighting means and that extinguishers could have provided safety until rescue—was not clearly erroneous under Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The court did not reach the alternative ground of liability from removal of the fire escape.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned a challenge to Executive Order 189, in which the Governor declared an emergency, took possession of MBTA lines and facilities, and authorized continued operations despite the MBTA exceeding its approved $302 million budget for 1980. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the order was generally beyond the Governor's powers and invalid, except for a temporary authorization allowing the MBTA to operate until December 5, 1980. The core reasoning was that the Governor lacked statutory or constitutional authority to override the Advisory Board's budget decisions or incur unauthorized expenditures on an ongoing basis, though limited interim operation was justified to permit the Legislature time to convene and address the crisis under principles allowing deferral of remedies for legislative action. The court entered partial summary judgment to that effect.

business & regulatory

The case involved Edward Starling Jr.'s conviction for second-degree murder of a 22-month-old child who died from severe blunt force trauma to the abdomen while in his care as a babysitter. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction after reviewing the evidence, which included medical examiner testimony on the cause of death, the defendant's inconsistent accounts to police, and his flight from the jurisdiction. The court held that the evidence supported an inference of malice aforethought, as the jury could find the defendant inflicted the fatal blow and that such force on an infant constituted the required mental state for murder in the second degree. It rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for a directed verdict, the jury instructions on malice, and requests under G.L.c. 278, § 33E to order a new trial or reduce the verdict to manslaughter.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a former wife who, after divorce, sued her ex-husband for division of property under G. L. c. 208, § 34, where the divorce decree had incorporated a stipulation on alimony. The husband died during a trial adjournment, his executrix was substituted, and the action was dismissed as having abated. The court reversed the dismissal, ruling that the action did not abate in these circumstances. The core reasoning was that the alimony agreement could survive the husband's death, allowing the probate court to determine post-death payments due, modify the decree as to arrears or future amounts, and consider property assignment as a question related to alimony under G. L. c. 208, § 37.

family lawproperty

In this case, defendants convicted of murder in 1974 sought reconsideration of the court's 1978 affirmance of their convictions and denial of a new trial, arguing that the court had inconsistently applied standards from later decisions in Commonwealth v. Ferreira and Commonwealth v. Garcia regarding jury instructions on reasonable doubt. The court distinguished the cases based on procedural differences, noting that Ferreira and Garcia involved direct appeals under G.L.c. 278, § 33E where the evidence varied in strength, while the defendants' matter was a collateral attack via motion for new trial. It adhered to its prior ruling under state law, found no grave prejudice or miscarriage of justice, and deferred to the federal appeals court's conclusion that the overall charge did not violate due process. The court also rejected a new claim of unconstitutional unequal treatment, affirming the order denying a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Doe v. the Governor, plaintiffs using pseudonyms sued Massachusetts officials responsible for protective services, alleging systemic failures in handling abused and neglected children that violated state law and the constitution, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to fix issues like staffing shortages and delays. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and on appeal the Supreme Judicial Court held that the amended complaint was defective because it failed to allege any specific injury or grievance to the individual plaintiffs. The court reasoned that standing requires a real and specific aggrieved individual to have suffered legal harm, that this requirement applies even with pseudonyms and for class claims, and that the plaintiffs should be given leave to amend their complaint to supply the missing details. Other issues such as justiciability and parallel federal litigation were deferred.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure