Neil L. Lynch

The case involved a defendant convicted of criminal contempt for violating an injunction after a Superior Court trial. The sole issue on appeal concerned the Commonwealth's use of peremptory challenges to exclude three prospective jurors with Irish-sounding surnames, which the defendant argued was based on ethnicity. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the conviction, agreeing with the Appeals Court that the prosecutor failed to provide adequate neutral explanations for the challenges. The court reasoned that an implicit finding of a discriminatory pattern had been made, surnames could support an inference of ethnicity here, and the challenges violated the defendant's right to nondiscriminatory jury selection.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case arose from the defendant's convictions on thirteen indictments, including aggravated rape, indecent assault and battery, kidnapping, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Following the Appeals Court's determination that the Commonwealth improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the prosecutor had excluded those jurors on the basis of race. The court upheld the trial judge's ruling that the challenges were permissible, concluding that the prosecutor offered legitimate, race-neutral explanations tied to each juror's individual circumstances, such as equivocal responses about police testimony, family connections to the area, limited education affecting comprehension of time concepts, and planned travel. The judge's acceptance of these explanations was supported by the record and the deference afforded to trial courts in evaluating juror demeanor and responses during voir dire. The judgments were therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Carlos A. Luna, a Boston police officer, who was convicted of perjury and filing false police reports after admitting in an affidavit that he had included false statements in a search warrant application related to a drug investigation that resulted in the death of his partner. Luna appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing primarily that his affidavit was involuntary, which compelled him to testify at trial in violation of his constitutional rights, along with various claims about jury instructions and extraneous influences on the jury. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions and the denial of the new trial motion, holding that the affidavit was voluntary under the humane practice rule, that Luna's testimony corroborated rather than contradicted the affidavit so Harrison v. United States did not apply, and that the other claims of error lacked merit.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a Worcester County grand jury investigation targeting a closely held corporation and its two brother shareholders and directors. The individuals invoked their privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to refuse to produce corporate records in response to a subpoena duces tecum directed at the corporation. The Commonwealth sought to compel the appointment of an alternate keeper of records to deliver the documents, but a Superior Court judge denied the motion and quashed the subpoena, reasoning that Article 12 provided broader protection than federal precedent. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed on interlocutory appeal, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is personal and does not extend to corporations or their records, so the corporation must comply with the subpoena. The court reasoned that while individuals retain their personal protections, those do not shield corporate documents, and the corporation itself has no Article 12 rights.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant, a Roman Catholic priest, who was convicted after a jury-waived trial of violating G. L. c. 272, § 29A(a) by taking photographs of a ten-year-old boy in a locker room that depicted portions of the boy's pubic and genital area while the boy posed partially clothed. The defendant argued that his conduct did not fall within the statute because the nudity was not intentional or encouraged and that the statute and its definition of nudity in § 31 were unconstitutional as overbroad or criminalizing protected expression. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence supported findings that the defendant knowingly permitted and encouraged the exhibition for lascivious purposes, that the statute's requirement of lascivious intent cured prior overbreadth concerns identified in earlier cases like Commonwealth v. Oakes, and that no separate state constitutional claim had been preserved.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved a physician appealing the revocation of his medical license by the Board of Registration in Medicine after findings that he had sexual contact with four patients, constituting malpractice, gross misconduct, and negligence under state statutes and regulations. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to separate hearings on his objections to the administrative magistrate's recommended decision and on any sanctions, that combined proceedings violated due process, and that the board's decision lacked substantial evidence. The court affirmed the revocation, holding that statutes and regulations did not require separate hearings, due process was satisfied by notice and an opportunity to be heard during the evidentiary process, and the record contained substantial evidence supporting the findings. The plaintiff had declined to participate in the final board hearing after his request for separate proceedings was denied.

procedurehealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the retrial of a defendant on a first-degree murder charge after a prior mistrial due to jury deadlock on self-defense, resulting in a conviction that the defendant appealed along with the denial of his new trial motion. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that a single erroneous jury instruction misstating the burden of proof on manslaughter and self-defense was isolated and did not violate due process when viewed in the context of the full charge. It rejected the ineffective assistance claim for failure to request specific racial bias voir dire questions, found no error in allowing a defense witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and cease testimony, and determined there was no basis to order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim by a mother and her two minor children against an attorney who represented the children's father in divorce and related care and protection proceedings. After the father abducted the children during a supervised visit arranged with the attorney's recommended supervisor, the plaintiffs alleged that the attorney owed them a duty of care because they relied on his recommendation and he should have known of the abduction risk. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, holding that no attorney-client relationship existed and that recognizing a duty to the adverse parties would create an unacceptable conflict with the attorney's obligations to his client. The court further noted that the father's and children's interests were potentially adverse, as shown by the abuse allegations and differing visitation positions, and found no legislative intent to impose such a duty under child welfare statutes.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether Boston's ordinance limiting entertainment in licensed establishments to before 2 a.m. violated the First Amendment. The city sought to enforce the ordinance against Back Bay Cultural Association, which had resumed operations at a nightclub and applied for an entertainment license extending past 2 a.m. The Superior Court upheld the ordinance and ruled that a prior 1985 agreement exempting the club was invalid. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was a content-neutral time restriction on protected expressive activity but was not narrowly tailored to serve the city's significant interest in peace and quiet.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a student at Essex Agricultural and Technical Institute who was injured while working at a farm placement required by her curriculum; she sued the school for negligence and breach of contract after the farm failed to provide workers' compensation insurance as stated in the placement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the school owed no duty to inspect the workplace or confirm insurance coverage, as the public duty rule applied and the agreement explicitly assigned those responsibilities to the employer rather than creating any special relationship or voluntary assumption of duty by the school.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment

The case concerned three criminal complaints against Derek Connelly for breaking and entering, being a disorderly person, and trespassing. A District Court judge dismissed the complaints with prejudice after denying the prosecutor's request for a continuance on the trial date due to the absence of a police witness, and the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that dismissal with prejudice requires a showing of egregious prosecutorial misconduct or a serious threat of prejudice to the defendant, neither of which was present as the prosecutor's lapse did not meet that standard and no prejudice to the defendant was shown. The court remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of a defendant on charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and rape and abuse of a child under sixteen, based on repeated sexual acts against his daughter between the ages of eight and nine. The defendant appealed, claiming error in the admission of the victim's mother's testimony as fresh complaint evidence after a twenty-one month delay and arguing that the indictments should be dismissed due to misleading the grand jury about whether the victim's videotaped statements were given under oath. The court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in admitting the fresh complaint testimony because child sexual abuse cases allow flexibility for delays caused by a child's fear, ignorance, and intimidation, and that the grand jury presentation caused no impairment since the videotaped account was consistent with the victim's trial testimony and not shown to be false.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a defendant in a capital murder case could recover attorney's fees and costs after a single justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the Commonwealth's application for leave to appeal from a Superior Court order granting a new trial. The defendant sought such fees under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(8)(B) following the denial, but the single justice rejected the request, noting the absence of explicit statutory or rule-based authority, and the full court affirmed. The court reasoned that absent a specific statute or court rule authorizing fee awards, each party bears its own litigation costs, and the procedures under G.L. c. 278, § 33E governing leave to appeal in capital cases do not provide for such reimbursement. It further explained that rule 30(c)(8)(B) applies only to actual appeals taken to the Appeals Court with entry of a rescript, not to the preliminary single-justice gatekeeping function under § 33E. The court acknowledged an inconsistency in the rules but held that no authority existed to award fees in this procedural posture.

criminal lawprocedure

The plaintiff sued his former employer for age discrimination after being involuntarily retired, bringing claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, G. L. c. 151B, and G. L. c. 93, §§ 102 and 103. A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to the defendants on the c. 93 claim, reasoning that c. 151B already provided comprehensive remedies for employment discrimination and that the omission from c. 93 was deliberate. The Appeals Court, following its recent decision in Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., held that a c. 93, § 103 claim is unavailable if a remedy under c. 151B exists, but noted that no determination had yet been made on whether c. 151B applied given jurisdictional questions such as the employer's number of employees in Massachusetts. Because the availability of c. 151B remained unresolved and the issue was therefore premature, the court discharged the reported question and remanded the case for further proceedings.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves an employee who alleged he was terminated due to his age or national origin and sought relief under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (G.L. c. 93, §§ 102 and 103) after failing to file a timely complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination as required by G.L. c. 151B. The Superior Court dismissed the action, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where c. 151B applies to employment discrimination claims, plaintiffs must comply with its administrative procedures, and failure to do so bars claims under the Equal Rights Act. The court reasoned that c. 151B establishes a detailed framework for handling such claims, including an exclusivity provision in § 9, short statutes of limitations, and mandatory conciliation, reflecting legislative intent to create a primary and exclusive avenue for redress rather than allowing parallel remedies. It further noted that the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of existing statutes when enacting the Equal Rights Act and intended consistency with prior law. The decision emphasizes precedents confirming that resort to courts is unavailable without first timely complaining to the MCAD for matters within its jurisdiction.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Hudson, the defendant was convicted on four counts of rape of a child under sixteen based on allegations that he repeatedly abused his stepdaughter between the ages of five and nine. The defense challenged the victim's credibility by suggesting her reported symptoms had other causes, while the prosecution introduced expert testimony describing symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) commonly associated with child sexual abuse, including nightmares, stomachaches, and delayed reporting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the convictions, holding that the PTSD evidence was improperly admitted because it did not legitimately assist the jury in assessing credibility and risked being used as affirmative proof of the abuse itself. The court reasoned that the expert's general description of PTSD symptoms lacked sufficient scientific reliability for diagnostic purposes in this context and that the prosecutor's closing argument compounded the error by inviting the jury to view the symptoms as evidence of guilt. The case was remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved four beneficiaries of a testamentary trust suing the attorneys for the two trustees after the trustees disagreed over offers to sell the trust's primary asset, a newspaper company, leading to a decline in its value. The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries, and aiding and abetting the trustees' fiduciary breaches, claiming the attorneys owed them a duty of care due to their foreseeable reliance. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the dismissal of the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the attorneys owed no duty to the beneficiaries because such a duty would create impermissible conflicts with their obligations to the trustees. The court rejected arguments for liability based on contract or statutory provisions allowing beneficiaries to sue on behalf of the trust. The decision emphasized that trustees' attorneys advise only their clients to avoid divided loyalties in trust administration.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a defendant convicted of cocaine trafficking who sought extraordinary relief from the Supreme Judicial Court under G.L. c. 211, §§ 3 and 4A after significant delays in the post-trial process, including late transcript production and the trial judge's delay in ruling on motions for a new trial and other relief. The single justice denied the petition, and the full court affirmed that denial. The court reasoned that appellate speedy-trial rights do not apply, and due process is implicated only by deliberate blocking of appellate rights or significant prejudice, neither of which was shown here despite the delays. The defendant could still pursue his claims through ordinary appellate review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of second-degree murder on a joint venture theory after a jury trial in Superior Court. The Appeals Court had reversed the conviction, but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed it, holding that a prior inconsistent grand jury statement by a witness was properly admitted as substantive evidence under the standards from Commonwealth v. Daye. The court reasoned that the statement, which concerned the defendant's knowledge of the victim's prior drug theft and the shooter's intent, was supported by sufficient corroborating evidence including the defendant's actions at the scene, his jacket exchange, and his flight from arrest. This evidence allowed the jury to infer the defendant's participation in the joint venture with the requisite knowledge and intent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a single justice's denial of relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, from a District Court abuse prevention order issued against the plaintiff under G.L. c. 209A. The plaintiff argued that the complainant lacked standing because they did not have a 'substantive dating relationship' as defined in the statute, citing her living situation with another man, and also claimed the order had been vacated by her voluntary dismissal request. The court determined that documents provided by the plaintiff himself demonstrated an ongoing emotional and sexual relationship sufficient to qualify under the statute, which does not preclude multiple such relationships, and that judicial action is required to modify or vacate a c. 209A order rather than voluntary dismissal alone. The court further noted the plaintiff's failure to comply with appellate procedural rules but found no abuse of discretion or error of law by the single justice even considering the merits, and affirmed the denial of relief.

family lawprocedure