Margaret H. Marshall

The case involved the conviction of a defendant for conspiracy to commit murder after he and another student planned a Columbine-style attack on their high school involving shootings, explosives, and targeted killings of students and staff. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent, that the court should have applied a renunciation defense because he eventually reported the plot to police, and that failing to do so violated due process. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence established the required intent, that renunciation is not recognized as a defense to conspiracy under Massachusetts common law, and that adoption of such a defense must be left to the legislature.

criminal law

This case concerned a dispute between phase I and phase II owners of units in the Cape Codder Condominium over amendments to the master deed and declaration of trust recorded in 1999 and 2000. The phase II owners claimed the amendments' allocation of smaller percentage interests in common areas to their units and provisions granting phase I owners majority board control and veto power over certain amendments violated sections 5(a) and 10(a) of the condominium statute, G. L. c. 183A. A Land Court judge granted summary judgment to the phase I owners, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on direct review. The court held that the developer had validly waived the statutory proportionality requirement for common area interests through a 1998 settlement agreement that bound later purchasers with notice of the amendments, and that the management provisions did not contravene the statute's governance requirements.

property

The case involved Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC, and two of its partners suing attorney Edward Mahlowitz for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and related claims after he secured an attachment on one partner's interest in company property during divorce proceedings on behalf of the partner's wife. Mahlowitz filed counterclaims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution arising from the defendants' lawsuit against him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge's ruling in favor of Mahlowitz on his abuse of process counterclaim against all defendants, concluding that the record supported findings that the defendants' suit was motivated solely by a desire to remove Mahlowitz as counsel and that they acted in concert. The court did not reach the malicious prosecution claim due to identical damages, remanded for recalculation of two discrete damages issues, and upheld the denial of sanctions against the defendants' attorneys.

torts & liabilityfamily lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved a consumer's claim against the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund for alleged unfair settlement practices under G.L. c. 176D, § 3(9), after the Fund took over obligations from an insolvent insurer in a negligence suit; the plaintiff sent a c. 93A demand letter that went unanswered and sued for damages. The Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Fund, concluding it was not subject to consumer actions under G.L. c. 93A. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the 1996 amendment to G.L. c. 176D, § 1(a) expressly included the Fund (and joint underwriting associations) within the definition of "person," thereby making it subject to suits under c. 93A, § 9(1), consistent with the Legislature's response to prior decisions that had exempted it from such liability.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a defendant convicted of cocaine distribution and possession based in part on certificates of drug analysis admitted into evidence without testimony from the state laboratory analysts who prepared them. At the time of trial, Massachusetts precedent permitted such certificates as nontestimonial public records, but after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Melendez-Diaz decision held that the certificates are testimonial and implicate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause, the defendant raised the issue on appeal. Because any objection at trial would have been futile under then-binding law, the court reviewed the constitutional error as if preserved and applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The court concluded that the certificates were not harmless because they supplied essential proof that the substances were cocaine and other evidence was insufficient to render their admission inconsequential, leading to reversal of the convictions and remand for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether defense counsel's undisclosed intimate personal relationship with an assistant district attorney in the appellate division of the prosecuting office created an actual or potential conflict of interest that deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal from a first-degree murder conviction. A single justice allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his second motion for a new trial on this limited ground. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the relationship did not give rise to a conflict because counsel and the ADA lived separately, did not discuss the case or share confidential information, and their professional work did not overlap. The court reasoned that an intimate relationship alone does not automatically create a disabling conflict absent evidence of divided loyalties or compromised representation, and it distinguished the facts from cases involving cohabitation or shared professional interests.

criminal lawprocedure