John Spalding

The case involved homeowners who obtained a building permit for a cottage but had it suspended for lacking 100 feet of frontage on a public or qualifying way, as their lot only had 29 feet on a town road and abutted a private drive for 98 feet without rights to use it. The board upheld the suspension, but the trial judge reversed, finding the planning board's subdivision approval granted sufficient rights to use the private way. The appeals court reversed, holding that approval under the Subdivision Control Law does not confer usage rights on lots outside the subdivision, and no other basis for rights existed, thus affirming the board's decision while staying enforcement for 90 days due to construction hardship.

property

The case involved the convictions of defendant John S. Stewart for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and related assault charges arising from a 1969 armed robbery at a Boston cafe during which he shot and killed a police officer and wounded others. The defendant's primary defense was voluntary intoxication, which he argued prevented him from forming the specific intent required for the crimes, and he challenged the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction on that point. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that under longstanding precedent from the McNeil case interpreting the relevant statute, intoxication is not a defense that negates the intent elements or reduces the degree of murder in such circumstances. The court reasoned that the statutory language and nearly twenty years of consistent interpretation supported this rule, with any potential change better left to the legislature rather than judicial overruling.

criminal law

This case was a tort action brought by a mover injured when a fire escape stairway collapsed due to a hidden defect on premises owned by the defendant landlord. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the trial judge set aside by entering judgment for the defendant, but the appeals court sustained the plaintiff's exceptions and ordered judgment on the jury verdict. The court reasoned that a landlord with actual knowledge of a hidden defect in demised premises owes a duty to warn the tenant, and that the plaintiff as a business invitee of the tenants stood in the same position; evidence supported findings that the defendant knew of the defect in the stairway but failed to warn the tenants of it.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved appeals from a defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, armed robbery while masked, and related charges stemming from a 1967 robbery in which he shot and killed a store owner and wounded another person before fleeing and being arrested. After initially pleading guilty to second-degree murder (which the judge accepted, resulting in a life sentence), the defendant successfully moved to withdraw the plea to pursue a trial where he hoped for acquittal; he was then tried and convicted on the first-degree murder charge, with the jury recommending against the death penalty. The court rejected the defendant's primary argument that the earlier guilty plea created double jeopardy barring trial on first-degree murder, holding that he had not been placed in jeopardy on that charge or had waived any such protection by retracting the plea with full awareness of the consequences. The opinion also addressed and dismissed various other claims regarding evidence, procedure, and sentencing, ultimately affirming all convictions under its review powers.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to a building permit issued by the town of Harwich for construction of a duplex house on a single lot in a residential district, where the zoning by-law limited lots to one principal structure and permitted only detached one- or two-family dwellings. The plaintiff appealed the board of appeals' decision upholding the permit, arguing the original structure with a breezeway connecting two separate dwellings violated the by-law. By the time the case reached the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant had modified the building by removing the breezeway, adding a continuous roof, and creating internal connections, rendering the original facts obsolete. The court dismissed the appeal as moot because the structure had changed substantially since the lower court proceedings but expressed the view that the modified building constituted one principal structure in compliance with the zoning by-law. The case was remanded for entry of a decree dismissing the appeal on mootness grounds without reaching the merits of the original facts.

propertyprocedure

The case involved two juveniles adjudged delinquent in District Court who appealed to the Superior Court under G.L. c. 119, § 56 and requested jury trials, which the court denied before trying them without a jury and committing them to the Youth Service Board. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the denial of jury trials was error. The core reasoning was that § 56 requires juvenile appeals to be tried in the same manner as criminal appeals, and statutes governing criminal cases in Superior Court (G.L. c. 278, § 2 and G.L. c. 263, § 6) provide for jury trials unless waived, with no contrary legislative intent expressed for juveniles; the court found this consistent with G.L. c. 119, § 53's directive to treat juveniles as children rather than criminals.

criminal lawprocedure