Herbert P. Wilkins

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured at a New England Patriots football game in Foxborough when fans carrying part of a goalpost caused it to touch a high-voltage power line; he sued the town for failing to provide adequate police protection and prevent the removal of the goalpost from the stadium, obtaining a $100,000 judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment against the town. The core reasoning was that a 1993 amendment to G.L. c. 258, § 10, which bars claims against municipalities for failure to provide police protection or prevent harmful consequences of third-party conduct, applied retroactively to this pending case and granted the town immunity, as confirmed in the companion decision Carleton v. Framingham. The court rejected arguments for exceptions based on the town's revenue from the event or paid police details, applying the statute as written. The settlement with a private security company did not moot the claim against the town due to the statutory cap.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved claims by the families of two people killed in a car accident caused by a drunk driver, alleging that a Framingham police officer was negligent in failing to investigate or take the driver into protective custody after encountering him shortly before the crash. A jury found the town liable on multiple negligence theories and awarded damages, but the Appeals Court ordered a new trial on some issues related to discretionary functions and causation. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a 1993 legislative amendment to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, adding immunity provisions under G.L. c. 258, § 10(j) and related sections for harms caused by third-party conduct, applied retroactively to bar the claims against the town. The court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was constitutional because it was reasonable and necessary to address public policy concerns about municipal liability without violating due process or contracts clause protections.

torts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted under Massachusetts' new stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43, after repeated harassing phone calls and threats to his ex-wife in violation of a restraining order; he challenged the statute as facially vague. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the definition of "harasses" in subsection (d) could be read to require that a defendant engage in multiple patterns of conduct or series of acts, rather than a single such pattern or series combined with a threat, creating uncertainty about what conduct was prohibited. It therefore reversed the stalking conviction but affirmed the convictions for violating the restraining order and announced a prospective construction of the statute to clarify that a single pattern or series suffices. The court found the facial vagueness claim adequately preserved despite procedural issues.

criminal law

The case involved a lawsuit by Paul Mulford against his coemployee Joseph Mangano for injuries sustained when Mulford fell from Mangano's car in the restaurant parking lot after work. Mangano sought summary judgment claiming immunity under the Massachusetts workers' compensation act as a coemployee acting in the course of employment. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment, holding that coemployee immunity requires the defendant to have been acting in the course of employment under the same standard as for workers' compensation benefits. The court reasoned that Mangano's presence at the restaurant was partly for personal reasons like watching a basketball game, and not sufficiently tied to his job duties as a cook, so factual issues precluded summary judgment on immunity.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case concerned whether landlords could refuse to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple based on their religious beliefs that such cohabitation is sinful, in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the landlords, finding the statute's application unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the landlords violated the anti-discrimination law but that neither party was entitled to summary judgment on the constitutional claims, vacating the judgment because further factual development was needed to assess whether the statute substantially burdened the landlords' religious exercise and if it was the least restrictive means to achieve the state's interests.

religious libertycivil rightsproperty

The case concerned a challenge by plaintiffs to the Massachusetts Attorney General's certification of an initiative petition for "An Act for Initiative and Referendum Reform," which would restrict the use of corporate funds to support or oppose ballot questions while permitting corporations to create separate funds for such purposes. The plaintiffs argued that the proposal was inconsistent with rights protected under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of peaceable assembly, and also contested the Attorney General's summary and form of the petition. The court affirmed the Attorney General's certification, allowing the measure to proceed to the Legislature and potentially to voters. The core reasoning focused on the Attorney General's limited role in certification under Article 48, the fact that the proposal permitted alternative means of corporate political expression through separate funds, and the determination that the initiative did not abridge the relevant state constitutional rights as they exist under Massachusetts law, drawing on but not being bound by federal precedents.

electionsfree speech

This case involves the wrongful death of Karen Edwards, who was stabbed in her room at the Lenox Hotel in Boston shortly after checking in. The administrator of her estate sued the hotel owners and managers, alleging negligence in providing inadequate security that allowed an intruder to access her room. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of causation between any negligence and the death. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff's evidence could allow a jury to conclude it was more probable than not that the assailant was a trespasser whose actions were a foreseeable result of the hotel's security failures, such as inadequate monitoring and patrols.

torts & liability

The case involved a tenant who was raped by an unidentified assailant in the basement and parking areas of a commercial office building in Newton after entering on a Sunday evening with a key to her employer's leased space. She sued the building's owner for negligence, claiming inadequate security in common areas, and a jury awarded her damages. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment, holding that the landlord owed no duty to protect against the attack. The core reasoning was that commercial landlords must guard only against reasonably foreseeable criminal intrusions into common areas, and the evidence showed no prior similar incidents or other circumstances making this assault foreseeable; the lease also imposed no additional security obligations.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned whether the Supreme Judicial Court had the authority to remove Janet Rowe Dugan from her position as clerk of the Northampton Division of the District Court Department, or if she could only be removed through constitutional processes of impeachment or address as a judicial officer. The court had previously entered a judgment removing Dugan for cause under G. L. c. 211, § 4. In this motion for relief from judgment, Dugan argued that her role as a clerk made her a judicial officer subject only to removal by the Legislature. The court decided that District Court clerks are not judicial officers under the Massachusetts Constitution, as they are appointed rather than elected, their office is not provided for in the Constitution, and their limited quasi-judicial functions do not transform them into such officers, allowing the court to deny the motion and uphold the removal.

procedure

In Commonwealth v. Murchison, the defendant, convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute as a second offender, appealed on the ground that the trial judge's immediate instructions to the jury after defense counsel's closing argument were improper. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that counsel's argument suggesting Springfield police officers lied in their testimony to obtain a conviction, though excessive in parts, was supported by permissible inferences from the evidence regarding witness motivations and inconsistencies. The court reasoned that the credibility of police witnesses is a proper subject for comment by counsel, that jurors may consider whether such witnesses have reason to want a conviction, and that judges should not invade the jury's province by directing them not to consider fair arguments drawn from the record. The judgment and sentence were therefore vacated.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hamilton v. Ganias, the case concerned whether social hosts could be held liable for injuries sustained by a nineteen-year-old guest who became intoxicated from voluntarily consuming alcohol and then negligently operated a motorcycle. The court decided to affirm the dismissals of the actions against the hosts, holding that no duty was owed to the underage drinker who injured himself. The reasoning was that a nineteen-year-old is considered an adult under Massachusetts law with various rights and responsibilities, and the principles from prior precedent denying social host liability to intoxicated adult guests who injure themselves apply equally here, distinguishing it from cases involving harm to third parties.

torts & liability

The case involved two defendants convicted of second-degree murder in 1980 for participating in a group beating that killed a sailor in East Boston, with their convictions affirmed on direct appeal in 1983. In 1989 they filed motions for a new trial raising claims, including challenges to supplemental jury instructions given without defense counsel present, that could have been but were not raised on the original appeal. The court affirmed denial of the new-trial motions, ruling that post-appeal collateral attacks on non-constitutional grounds are subject to a standard that generally treats unraised issues as waived and requires a showing of substantial risk of miscarriage of justice before relief will be granted. The reasoning stressed the importance of finality in criminal judgments, the Commonwealth's interest in efficient administration of justice, and the need for motion judges to exercise and disclose discretion before reaching the merits of waived claims.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Antwine, police officers executing a search warrant for the defendant at his apartment knocked and identified themselves as police but did not announce their purpose before forcing entry after about twenty seconds, relying on three outstanding arrest warrants for the defendant. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the entry violated the common-law knock-and-announce rule. The court held that the motion was properly denied under the "useless gesture" exception, which excuses full compliance when police are virtually certain the occupant already knows their purpose. This certainty arose because the defendant was known to be home, did not respond to the knocks, and the late-night arrival of officers with arrest warrants would have made their intent obvious. The court also affirmed the underlying conviction of unarmed robbery, finding no error in the trial judge's interruption of closing argument.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Augat, Inc. and its subsidiary Isotronics against Aegis, Inc. and others, stemming from the solicitation of key managerial employees by Isotronics' general manager while still employed there, in violation of his duty of loyalty. Following an earlier decision establishing liability on that theory, the trial court awarded substantial compensatory damages, doubled under G.L.c. 93A, along with fees and costs. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the findings of willful violation of c.93A and joint and several liability but determined that the damages calculation was flawed in multiple respects, including improper assumptions about sales growth, overly restrictive standards for competent employee replacements, and reliance on inadmissible evidence regarding production issues. The court therefore remanded the case for a redetermination of damages.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved anti-abortion activists, including Operation Rescue: Boston, who organized blockades and invasions of Massachusetts abortion clinics on multiple occasions between 1989 and 1991, preventing patients and staff from entering facilities through physical obstruction, trespass, and use of locks. The plaintiffs, including Planned Parenthood and the state Attorney General, sued under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) seeking a permanent injunction to stop such interference with access to abortion services. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the injunction against the defendants, rejecting challenges to standing and the scope of the order. The court reasoned that the defendants' coordinated actions violated rights protected by the MCRA by intentionally interfering with clinic access through force and trespass, and that the injunction appropriately addressed these violations while the Attorney General could represent the public interest in enforcement.

abortioncivil rightsfree speech

The case concerned a dispute among owners in the Oyster River Condominium Trust over expansions of individual units into the common areas without unanimous consent of all unit owners. The trial judge ruled that the expansions violated G. L. c. 183A because they altered each owner's percentage interest in the common areas without an amended master deed approved by all affected owners. The judge declined to order removal of most of the existing additions on equitable grounds, ordered limited removals and an injunction against further unauthorized construction, and directed amendments to the condominium documents plus recalculation of ownership percentages. Only the plaintiffs appealed, raising issues including their right to bring the action directly and the availability of mandatory injunctive relief for encroachments.

propertyprocedure

Boston Edison appealed a decision by the Department of Public Utilities rejecting its request to be excused from a prior obligation to enter a long-term contract to purchase power from a non-utility generator under state regulations implementing the federal PURPA statute. The company argued that a subsequent finding by the Energy Facilities Siting Council of projected capacity surpluses, along with the withdrawal of its own plant proposal, constituted changed circumstances making the purchase unnecessary. The department had maintained that Edison failed to justify reconsideration of its 1991 order setting minimum purchase requirements. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the department's decision lacked an adequate statement of reasons addressing the new circumstances and therefore set the decision aside and remanded the matter for further consideration.

business & regulatory

In Colella v. Commonwealth, Diane Colella was injured when a piece of concrete fell from a state highway overpass onto her vehicle traveling on a municipal road, and she sued the Commonwealth under the State Tort Claims Act for personal injuries. The Commonwealth sought to dismiss the action, arguing that the exclusive remedy was under the road defect statute G.L. c. 81, which applies to defects in state highways. The court decided that because Colella was not traveling on a state highway at the time of the injury, G.L. c. 81 did not apply, allowing her claim to proceed under the State Tort Claims Act. The reasoning focused on the explicit language of G.L. c. 81 limiting liability to persons traveling on state highways, without extending it to this scenario despite the legislative intent behind the Tort Claims Act.

torts & liability

The case concerned a probation revocation hearing in which a Superior Court judge denied the defendant's request, made through counsel, to present a closing argument before revoking probation based on evidence of domestic violence. The defendant appealed, arguing that the denial violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held that due process does not require an absolute right to closing argument in probation revocation proceedings, which are flexible and informal and do not demand all criminal trial safeguards. The court noted the lack of supporting authority for such a right and observed that the defendant had not pressed for written findings that might have clarified any confusion over the basis for revocation.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lopes v. City of Peabody, the plaintiff challenged a Peabody zoning ordinance that created a wetlands conservancy district overlay, preventing construction on his lot near Devil's Dishfull Pond because its elevation fell below the 88.5-foot contour line. After remand from the U.S. Supreme Court following Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether the regulation constituted a taking by denying all economically beneficial use of the land. The court ruled that a subsequent purchaser may challenge the ordinance's validity, that this action concerns validity rather than damages, and that the city did not intend to impose a restriction lacking justification under nuisance or property law principles. It set out burdens of proof for determining if the regulation advances legitimate interests or eliminates all viable use and directed further proceedings on those issues.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory