The case involved a conservator petitioning the probate court under a new 1969 statute for permission to distribute $33,000 in gifts from the estate of an 87-year-old incapacitated ward to the conservator (the ward's daughter) and other relatives, in order to create an estate plan that would reduce income, estate, and inheritance taxes. The court addressed three reserved questions on whether the statute violated due process under the state and federal constitutions, whether it improperly delegated legislative power to the courts, and whether the conservator could receive gifts under the statute. The court answered no to the first two questions and yes to the third. Its reasoning emphasized the probate court's longstanding discretionary authority over the estates of wards, the statute's requirements that gifts be consistent with the ward's likely intentions and tax-minimization goals, and the absence of any constitutional bar to such managed distributions of excess assets.
This case involved a landlord's summary process action to recover possession of rental premises at 13 Edmands Street in Somerville after serving a notice to quit on a tenant at will. The tenant appealed from a judgment for the landlord, arguing that leaving the notice at his last and usual place of abode (the demised premises) did not constitute valid "giving of notice" under G. L. c. 186, § 12, as he denied receipt and no one was shown to have received or been informed of it. The Superior Court found for the landlord, but the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the tenant's exceptions, holding that the requests for rulings should have been granted. The court reasoned that the statute requires the notice to be given to the other party without prescribing a method, and prior cases establish that merely leaving the notice at the tenant's residence without evidence of delivery to the tenant or a coresident providing presumptive notice is insufficient. The constable's return was not in the record, and the facts did not show any interaction that would support effective service.
The case involved claims by J. T. Healy & Son, Inc., a jewelry findings manufacturer, against former officers, directors, and employees including James A. Murphy and others who left to form a competing company, Murphy Co. The suit sought an injunction against use of alleged trade secrets, an accounting for compensation and damages, and constructive trusts on stock, while related actions claimed recovery of wages paid to a former employee and sought replevin of dies and items. The court affirmed the master's report as modified, holding that no trade secrets existed to bind the defendants, that former employees were free to use their general knowledge, experience, and skills without contracts restricting them, and that no records or customer lists had been taken. As a result, the equity bill was dismissed against several defendants, and judgments were entered for the defendants in the contract/tort and replevin actions.
The case involved a bankruptcy trustee seeking declaratory relief interpreting a 1966 conditional sale contract for equipment between a Massachusetts bankrupt company and an Indiana corporation, after the corporation repossessed the equipment. The Superior Court sustained the defendant's answer in abatement and plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the bill. The court held that the Massachusetts long-arm statute (G. L. c. 223A) applied to the suit, was effective before the filing, covered equity proceedings, and permitted the method of mail service used, but that service was invalid because it failed to comply with requirements for serving designated officers or agents of a foreign corporation under G. L. c. 223, §§ 37-38. The court affirmed the jurisdictional ruling but reversed the dismissal to permit proper service.
The case involved claims by Reynolds Boat Company and the Reynolds family that the City of Haverhill was negligent in failing to maintain adequate water pressure and facilities for fire hydrants near their property, which prevented the fire department from containing a blaze and caused damage. The plaintiffs alleged that the city had promised or undertaken to provide sufficient water service for fire protection. The court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed the action. The reasoning was that fire protection is a governmental function performed for the public benefit without creating any contract or tort liability to individual property owners, consistent with longstanding Massachusetts precedent distinguishing such functions from commercial ones; any policy change to impose liability would require legislative action.
The case involves two contract actions by Hub Associates seeking payment for architectural and engineering services on a shopping center in Leominster, Massachusetts, and a proposed warehouse in Connecticut. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the contracts violated state laws (G.L. c. 112, §§ 60K, 60L) that regulate who may practice architecture, including requirements for supervision by registered architects and corporate officer qualifications. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to grant summary judgment or resolve the cases on the existing record, citing incomplete facts about the services performed, who performed them, whether the contracts were oral or written, and statutory compliance. It remanded the matters to the Superior Court for further proceedings, emphasizing that summary judgment requires no genuine issues of material fact and that inferences must favor the non-moving party.