The case involved an attorney who sought payment from a decedent's estate for work performed in attempting to probate a will dated November 20, 1958, that named his client as executrix; after hearings, that document was disallowed as not legally executed, and an earlier will was allowed instead. The Probate Court had entered a decree directing the estate to pay the attorney $900 for compensation and expenses under G. L. c. 215, § 39A. On appeal, the court reversed the decree and denied the petition, holding that the statute permits recovery from the estate generally only when the attorney's services conferred a benefit by creating, preserving, or increasing the estate, which did not occur here because the later will was invalid.
This case involved a tort action by the Hill family against Associated Transport, Inc., seeking damages for property damage to their home and personal belongings, personal injuries to Mrs. Hill, and consequential damages to Mr. Hill, all stemming from a detached tire from the defendant's semitrailer truck that crashed into their house in 1957. An auditor found the defendant's driver negligent for failing to properly inspect and tighten the wheel lugs after a tire change, and a jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs on the relevant counts following the auditor's report. The court overruled the defendant's exceptions to the denial of directed verdicts and other rulings, holding that the evidence supported a finding of negligence because the driver should have known the lugs could loosen after driving with a heavy load and that more frequent inspections were needed. The court also determined that Mrs. Hill's injuries were proximately caused by the tire's detachment as a natural consequence of her instinctive reaction to the crash. Exceptions were overruled, affirming the judgments for the plaintiffs.
This case is a probate petition by the executors of Esther Dimick's will seeking instructions on who is entitled to receive distributions of net income from a trust under article Fifth (a), which allocated shares to Dana Goldthwaite and Hilda Shortt for life and then to their 'issue' per stirpes. The court ruled that 'issue' means children, the beneficiary classes close at the deaths of Hilda and Dana rather than remaining open indefinitely, and income is to be paid accordingly to the named individuals and their living children. The core reasoning was that this construction avoids invalidity under the rule against perpetuities by limiting the period of class growth, while remaining consistent with the testatrix's overall testamentary plan as shown by the will's structure and prior drafts.
This case involved a building contractor suing Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. and the trustee of a real estate trust for breaching an alleged oral agreement to hire the plaintiff to erect a warehouse on a cost-plus-ten-percent basis, based on a handshake following negotiations over plans and cost estimates. The plaintiff sought damages equal to its expected profit but presented only varying cost estimates, while the defendants ultimately built the structure themselves. The court affirmed the jury's award of nominal damages of one dollar per defendant, holding that a breach occurred but the plaintiff could not prove with substantial certainty the actual construction costs needed to calculate lost profits, as the evidence consisted of estimates and an incomparable completed building cost.
The case concerned whether the City of Salem could use a three-acre portion of Ledge Hill Park, devised by William Mack in 1895 for perpetual use as public grounds or a park, as the site for a public school building under a 1957 state statute. The city, its park commissioners, and school committee sought a declaratory judgment on the issue after the land had been accepted and maintained exclusively for park purposes since 1896. The court held that the devise created a trust restricting the land to park use, that the city's acceptance formed an enforceable contract, and that school construction would materially conflict with that purpose, rendering the statute ineffective to authorize the new use. It therefore affirmed the lower court's decree barring the school committee from proceeding.
This case involves two consolidated tort actions brought by a credit union against a borrower who allegedly obtained a loan by fraudulently misrepresenting his existing debts to other lenders. The borrower later filed for bankruptcy and moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the debt was discharged under the federal Bankruptcy Act since the plaintiff had notice and the claim was provable. The court treated the motion as a demurrer and held that an adjudication of bankruptcy alone does not defeat the claim, as the debt is not extinguished and any discharge defense must be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant rather than anticipated in the plaintiff's declaration. It reversed the dismissals, ruling that the cases should proceed to a hearing on the merits.
