This case arose from a police pursuit of a mentally disturbed woman who refused to stop after a 911 call from her therapist, during which officers rammed her vehicle, causing it to strike and kill a pedestrian. The pedestrian's wife sued the driver for negligence, and the driver brought federal constitutional claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments plus state tort claims against the officers and City of Minneapolis. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim but not on the Fourth Amendment claim, and denied official immunity on the state tort claims, thereby also denying vicarious immunity to the city. The core reasoning applied the 'shocks the conscience' test to the due process claim while distinguishing the objective reasonableness standard for the Fourth Amendment and finding no basis for official immunity under state law.
This case involves a pedestrian, Kristen Thompson, who was injured when an SUV driven by Michael Litz struck her while fleeing from Minneapolis police officers in a detox van. Thompson sued Litz, the officers, and the City of Minneapolis for negligence, alleging the officers' failure to use emergency lights and sirens during the pursuit caused her injuries. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and officers based on official immunity for the discretionary decision to pursue, but the court of appeals reversed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and remanded for fact-finding on whether the officers initiated a vehicular pursuit under the city's policy and whether they used lights and sirens as required, because official immunity does not apply to ministerial duties once a pursuit begins and factual disputes prevent resolution at this stage.
This case involves a workers' compensation dispute between an employee named Ellingson and the employer Brady Corporation. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals issued a decision in the matter on June 28, 2005. On further review, the state supreme court was evenly divided and therefore affirmed the lower court's ruling without issuing an opinion. One justice took no part in considering or deciding the case.
The case involved Geralyn Engler, who was in the zone of danger during a car accident that seriously injured her young son and who later sought underinsured motorist coverage for emotional distress damages exceeding the settlement with the at-fault driver. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court and court of appeals, which had limited recovery to distress arising only from Engler's fear for her own safety. The court held that a plaintiff asserting negligent infliction of emotional distress may recover damages for distress from fearing for the safety of or witnessing serious injury to a close relative, provided the plaintiff still meets the three required elements: presence in the zone of physical danger, reasonable fear for her own safety, and resulting severe emotional distress with physical manifestations.
The case involved Hy-Vee Food Stores challenging its three-year disqualification from the WIC program by the Minnesota Department of Health after a cashier at one of its stores accepted a WIC voucher that included payment for a pack of cigarettes along with eligible food items. The court affirmed the disqualification, concluding that federal regulations and corresponding state rules require a three-year vendor disqualification for any exchange of tobacco products for WIC vouchers. The core reasoning was that the rules contain no intent element, so inadvertence or mutual mistake by the parties does not avoid the violation or the mandatory sanction.
This case involved three Minnesota clinics owned by a non-licensed individual that provided chiropractic, physical therapy, and massage therapy services; the clinics sued insurers for unpaid bills, and the insurers counterclaimed that the clinics' corporate structure violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, rendering their contracts illegal. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers on that ground, but the court of appeals reversed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the common-law doctrine prohibits lay-owned corporations from practicing chiropractic but does not extend to physical therapy or massage therapy, and remanded for further proceedings. The court reached this result by examining the doctrine's historical application to learned professions, Minnesota statutes regulating the relevant fields, and the absence of precedent barring corporate practice of physical therapy or massage.
