The case involved appellant Michael Sontoya, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder while committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree unintentional murder while committing first-degree assault in the death of G.R. The district court entered judgment on the first-degree murder conviction and sentenced Sontoya to life in prison without release. On appeal, Sontoya argued that the medical examiner's expert testimony stating G.R.'s injuries resulted from sexual assault constituted reversible error. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that any plain error in admitting the testimony did not affect Sontoya's substantial rights due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial, including DNA evidence, autopsy findings, and inconsistencies in Sontoya's statements.
In State v. Zabawa, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and related charges for the 2007 killings of Tracy and Alec Kruger and the attempted murder of Hilary Kruger. On direct appeal, Zabawa argued that his statements to police were involuntary and that their admission deprived him of a fair trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding after reviewing the interview circumstances—including its length, Zabawa's condition, repeated Miranda warnings, and lack of coercion—that the statements were voluntary.
The case involved a property owner who applied in 2001 to rezone two parcels in Cook County from residential to commercial use; the county board denied the request at a public hearing but did not provide written reasons for the denial. The owner sued for declaratory judgment, arguing that the denial was automatically approved under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, because the county failed to state its reasons in writing within the statutory deadline. The district court granted summary judgment to the county on grounds that the decision was reasonable and laches barred review, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the lack of written reasons triggered automatic approval. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding after de novo statutory interpretation that the written-reasons requirement is directory rather than mandatory, so the automatic-approval penalty applies only when an agency fails to decide a request within the 60-day period.
In this consolidated foreclosure action, Premier Bank sought to enforce its development and construction mortgages on a residential development project after the borrowers defaulted, while general contractor Kuechle Underground asserted a blanket mechanic’s lien on all 59 lots and attempted to foreclose the entire unpaid amount against only the three model-home lots where its lien had priority. The district court and court of appeals ruled that Minn. Stat. § 514.09 permitted Kuechle to foreclose its blanket lien against fewer than all the lots. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute does not authorize a lien claimant to foreclose a blanket mechanic’s lien against less than the full property subject to the lien. The court reached this conclusion through examination of the statute’s plain language, its unchanged historical text since 1905, and the lack of any apportionment mechanism comparable to the Uniform Construction Lien Act.
The case involved a workers' compensation claim by David Seehus for lower back injuries from two separate work incidents, one in 1989 while employed by Bor-Son Construction and another in 2001 while employed by Wesley Residence. After Wesley's insurer became insolvent, MIGA administered the claim, and the compensation judge joined Bor-Son's insurer CNA to determine responsibility for ongoing medical expenses. The compensation judge apportioned liability equally but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to order MIGA to pay when another solvent insurer was available, directing CNA to cover 100% of the claim. The WCCA reversed, holding that the compensation judge lacked jurisdiction to join CNA and ordering MIGA to pay. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the WCCA, ruling that workers' compensation judges have authority to determine causal responsibility between multiple injuries and reinstated the compensation judge's decision.
This case arose from a bicycle-car collision on Douglas Trail, a Minnesota state recreational trail, where bicyclist Patrick Stewart sued motorist Christopher Koenig for negligence after sustaining injuries. Stewart argued that Koenig qualified as a "trail user" under a DNR regulation (Minn. R. 6100.3400, subp. 6(D)) requiring him to yield the right of way when crossing the trail via a private driveway easement, which would have made Koenig negligent per se. The district court rejected this interpretation, instructed the jury on common-law negligence instead, and the jury found Stewart negligent and Koenig not negligent. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Koenig was a trail user subject to the rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that an easement-user crossing the trail for road access is not a "trail user" under the regulation, so the district court's jury instructions were proper and the verdict stands.