Thomas F. Gallagher

In State v. Adkison, the defendant was charged with criminal negligence after a fatal car accident and pleaded guilty in district court following an earlier conviction for driving after license revocation. On appeal, he argued that his guilty plea resulted from a misunderstanding of his legal position, allegedly induced by advice about possible maximum sentences and the Habitual Offender Act, and that his court-appointed counsel had provided inadequate representation. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the record showed the defendant had been fully informed of the charges, penalties, and rights; had explicitly confirmed that no promises or threats influenced his plea; and had received adequate consultation from counsel with no evidence of misadvice or deficient preparation. The court found no basis to withdraw the plea or reverse on due process grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Donald Stokes, an employee of J.L. Shiely Company, who sought workers' compensation benefits after a November 1963 truck accident caused injuries including a sore ankle and later fainting spells or blackouts. A referee awarded temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, which the Industrial Commission affirmed, but the commission later denied Stokes' petition to vacate the award for a rehearing. The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded to the Industrial Commission to set aside the award and grant a new hearing. The court reasoned that evidence unavailable at the original hearing, including information on the potential permanence of Stokes' fear of trucks and the origin of his blackouts, justified reopening the matter under Minn. St. 176.461 in the interest of justice.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether an employer had simultaneous workers' compensation coverage from two insurers on the date an employee was injured, and whether one insurer could obtain contribution from the other for benefits paid. The Industrial Commission found no coverage by American Insurance on the injury date of May 17, 1965, and denied Bituminous Casualty's claim for contribution; the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that production of the policy by Bituminous did not establish a prima facie case of coverage because Bituminous was neither the insured nor a beneficiary, and the evidence supported the commission's finding that the employer never accepted American's policy, which was returned for flat cancellation. The court noted that issuance of a policy is only an offer that requires acceptance to form a binding contract, and the commission's findings had sufficient evidentiary support.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a petition for habeas corpus by a defendant convicted of aggravated robbery after pleading guilty to robbing a liquor store while armed; he was sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. The relator claimed the trial court erred by denying his right of allocution before sentencing, failing to order a presentence investigation, and denying the habeas petition without a hearing. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial, reasoning that an extensive pre-sentencing examination of the defendant by the court, combined with statements from his attorney on mitigating factors, satisfied allocution requirements and provided adequate background information, distinguishing the facts from prior cases like Searles where sentences were vacated.

criminal lawprocedure

A 71-year-old widow living in a Duluth apartment building was injured when a discarded water heater fell on her in the basement. She sued the building owner, who had hired a plumber to replace a leaking heater, and the plumber, claiming negligence in leaving the old heater in a dangerous position. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against the owner only, and the trial court denied the owner's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, indemnification from the plumber, or a new trial. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence that the owner breached his duty to keep the common basement area reasonably safe, that the plumber was not negligent, and that the basement qualified as a common area under the owner's supervision.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned a habeas corpus petition challenging a third-degree murder conviction based on a confession obtained during police interrogations while the petitioner was in custody on a related arson charge. The Washington County District Court granted the writ, finding that the Hennepin County trial court had failed to make a reliable preliminary determination of the confession's voluntariness before submitting it to the jury, violating the petitioner's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the procedure used at trial did not comply with the requirements established in Jackson v. Denno and that this constitutional standard applies retroactively. The court remanded the matter to the trial court for a separate hearing to determine whether the confession was voluntary, with a new trial required only if it was found to be coerced.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Rasmussen v. Prudential Insurance Company, the plaintiff, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, sued the insurance company claiming negligence after the husband died before an agent could present a counteroffer for a modified life insurance policy. The applicant had applied for a specific policy in November 1964 and paid the premium, but the company rejected it and prepared a different policy with higher premiums and fewer benefits, which the agent did not deliver until after the applicant's death on December 28. The trial court allowed the case to proceed on a negligence theory for the agent's delay in delivering the counterproposal and the jury awarded $8,000. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that an insurance company owes no legal duty to submit a counterproposal after rejecting an application and that mere delay in presenting one does not create a cause of action in tort.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Sanders v. Boulevard Del., Inc., plaintiff sued the operator of a delicatessen for injuries sustained when she tripped and fell in a hole on the business premises while carrying bags as a customer, claiming negligence; the defendant raised contributory negligence. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on alleged errors in jury instructions regarding the duties of business invitees and premises owners. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's instructions as a whole adequately explained negligence, contributory negligence, and the parties' respective duties of reasonable care, and that plaintiff had not preserved objections to certain instructions for review. The court found no prejudicial error in refusing additional requested instructions on a business visitor's right to assume safe premises.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a subrogation action by Buffalo Insurance Company against United Parking Stations, Inc., seeking to recover payments made to its insured for a stolen car that was parked in the defendant's lot. The municipal court dismissed the suit, ruling that the insurer failed to prove payment and assignment through documentary evidence like canceled checks or a written assignment. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial, holding that the insured's testimony about receiving payment was sufficient to create a factual issue regarding the amount paid and the right to subrogation, as the best evidence rule applies only to proving the contents of writings and not as a general requirement for the most reliable evidence.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by defendant Frank Brunner, who had been charged in 1963 with receiving stolen property valued at $50 under the old Minnesota Criminal Code. Brunner argued that the municipal court erred by denying a continuance for a court reporter at his preliminary hearing and that his guilty plea in district court was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of knowledge about sentencing consequences under the new Criminal Code. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the denial without a hearing, holding that Brunner showed no prejudice from the absence of a reporter since he did not challenge jurisdiction at arraignment and the magistrate's notes satisfied statutory requirements, and that his counsel's statements did not negate the plea or require an evidentiary hearing on the allegations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved former employees of Coming-Donohue Company who were hired by Guaranteed Concrete Company after it purchased their employer's ready-mix concrete operations. The plaintiffs, members of a union that had a collective bargaining agreement with both companies, filed a grievance seeking to 'dovetail' their seniority lists rather than being placed at the bottom of Guaranteed's list. An arbitrator denied the grievance, finding no contractual obligation under the agreement's successor clause to preserve the plaintiffs' prior seniority. The plaintiffs then sued in district court to enforce the collective bargaining agreement, vacate the arbitration award, and obtain injunctive relief, claiming the union had failed to fairly represent them by taking a neutral position at the hearing. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal law under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act governed, the union had not breached its duty of fair representation, and the arbitration award could not be vacated under applicable standards.

labor & employment

Montgomery Ward & Co. operated a multistate merchandising business and accumulated up to $300 million in liquid securities outside Minnesota as reserves for future expansion, with the investment earnings commingled with operating income and carried as current assets. The Commissioner of Taxation included those earnings in the corporation's total income for apportionment under Minn. St. 290.17(4) and the three-factor formula of § 290.19 when calculating the Minnesota franchise tax for 1955-1958, but the Board of Tax Appeals excluded them. The court reversed the Board, reasoning that the intangibles were employed in the unitary business under the tests from Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation because the funds were not segregated, income was commingled, and the same officers managed both; the taxpayer therefore bore the burden to prove they were not so employed. The matter was remanded to allow the taxpayer an opportunity to present additional evidence distinguishing the facts from the precedent.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a plaintiff who purchased a new 1964 Rambler automobile from the defendant dealer and experienced repeated issues with the horn, accelerator, and steering over the first week of ownership, returning the car for service multiple times. After an accident in which the steering wheel locked during a low-speed turn, causing the vehicle to hit a pole, the plaintiff sued the dealer. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the evidence of a nearly new car with multiple complaints and repairs, combined with the circumstances of the steering failure, was sufficient for the jury to infer that an internal defect caused the accident rather than external factors or misuse, supporting liability on a warranty or negligence theory as in similar precedent.

torts & liability

The case involved a claim for workers' compensation benefits by Margaret Oster, whose husband died from a heart attack while working on a construction job for James Riley. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits after finding that Riley had ordered a workmen's compensation policy from Aetna before the injury occurred, and the policy was issued with an effective date of 12:01 a.m. on the day of the injury. Aetna challenged the award, arguing the policy was not in force because the order was placed after the employer learned of the collapse. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the award, holding that the commission's credibility determination supported the finding that the order was placed beforehand and that the policy's terms controlled its effective date. The court rejected arguments based on the timing of the insurer's selection or any duty to disclose the loss.

labor & employment

The case involved a defendant arrested and convicted by a jury in municipal court for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of a Minneapolis city ordinance. The defendant appealed the denial of his post-trial motion, raising claims that police ignored his request for an examination by his own physician, that the state improperly commented to the jury on his failure to take a drunkometer test, and that the trial court mishandled requests for corrected jury instructions by requiring them only after the jury had retired. The court concluded that the physician-request issue did not require reversal because the defendant had an opportunity to contact his father but did not request a doctor. However, it found reversible error in the state's comments on the test refusal, which the ordinance expressly bars from evidence, and in the timing of jury-instruction requests. The court therefore reversed the order and granted a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1963 car collision at an uncontrolled intersection in Minnesota, where the vehicle owned by plaintiff Raymond Wick and driven by his son David collided with defendant Sigrid Widdell's car, leading to claims for personal injuries, property damage, and a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant with no money awarded to any party. Plaintiff Raymond Wick moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on his bailor claim for $327.10 in stipulated vehicle damage, contending that his son's negligence could not be imputed to him as owner. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion, reasoning that the verdict established concurrent negligence by both drivers but did not bar the bailor's recovery, and directed entry of judgment for the stipulated amount.

torts & liability

The case involved a former wife who obtained an ex parte divorce in Florida and later sued her former husband in Minnesota for property settlement, child support, and attorney's fees. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Minnesota courts had jurisdiction over the former husband, who was personally served and resided in the state. The core reasoning was that the Florida court had jurisdiction only over the marital status itself, so its decree did not bar separate claims for property rights or support; precedents such as Thurston v. Thurston established that such claims could proceed in Minnesota, where the marriage had occurred and the property was acquired.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved a Minnesota corporation suing a New York corporation in Minnesota state court to recover $3,600 allegedly owed under an agreement for the storage and sale of a rejected egg shipment. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which had no office, agents, or other presence in Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant's single telephone call to Minnesota and mailing of a check did not constitute sufficient contacts under the state's single-act long-arm statute to subject it to jurisdiction, particularly where the defendant acted as a buyer rather than a seller. The court reasoned that the quantity of prior transactions between the parties was irrelevant and that the nature of this isolated contact was too minimal to require the defendant to defend in Minnesota.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from an automobile collision on an icy highway in Minnesota, where plaintiffs Fred and Ida Gran sued defendants Dennis and Matthew Dasovic for damages after Dennis's car slid into the Grans' vehicle at an intersection. After a jury verdict finding Dennis not negligent, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the evidence established negligence as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding that the evidence of sudden ice and the driver's efforts to control the car permitted the jury to find no negligence, and that the emergency instruction was proper given evidence of an unforeseen peril. The court emphasized that questions of negligence in skidding cases are typically for the jury when the driver exercises reasonable care under the circumstances.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a property owner who purchased land zoned for multiple-residential use and applied for a special permit to build an apartment building, along with related utility improvements, under the existing village ordinance. The village council denied the permit application without presenting evidence of health, safety, or welfare concerns and despite the plans meeting code requirements, while simultaneously approving the improvements and later adopting a new zoning ordinance restricting the property to single-family homes. The trial court ruled the denial arbitrary and capricious and found the zoning ordinance deprived the owner of property without due process, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that order. The core reasoning was that the special permit ordinance lacked any standards or criteria for decisions, the owner had relied on the existing zoning classification, and purely aesthetic or stopgap regulatory efforts could not justify diminishing the property's value without compensation.

property